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ABSTRACT 
The dssertation examines how concerns about the demands of reahsm should be addressed 
in political theories of justice. It asks whether the demands of realism should affect the 
construction of principles of justice and, if so, how principles should respond to those 
demands. To address the problems posed by the demands of realism, the dssertation 
focuses on two specific realist concerns - namely, a concern about the motivational demands 
of justice and a concern about moral and religous pluralism - and asks what role, if any, 
these concenls should play in the articulation of principles of justice. Through a critical 
interrogation of the theories of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, John Rawls, and Jiirgen Habermas, 
the author argues that a conception of justice should be attentive to citizens' motivational 
capacities an2 reasonable moral and religous worldviews but should not automatically 
accommodate their determinate preferences, opinions, and beliefs whch may be 
objectionable:. Endorsing an ideal of deliberative democracy and a conception of 
deliberative citizenshp, the author argues that institutional arrangements whch encourage 
democratic deliberation can help citizens to be more reflective about their determinate 
motives and beliefs and help them to acquire the desire and reason necessary to support just 
principles and institutions. At the same time, however, the author holds that appropriate 
institutions will be stable only when citizens acquire the necessary motivation and reason 
whlch leads to the defense of a dynamic model of justice, motivation, and reasonable 
pluralism in urhlch just institutions and a just social ethos are regarded as mutually 
reinforcing. The author concludes that theorizing about justice should be h t e d  not by 
what is gven by the social and political status quo, but instead by the h t s  h e d  by political 
hope. 
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Introduction: 
Justice and the Demands of Realism 

Only in public life can we jointly, as a community, 
exercise the human capacity "to dunk what we are 
doing," and take charge of the hstory in which we are 
all constantly engaged by dnft and 
inadvertence. . . . m he distinctive promise of political 
fi-eedom remains the possibihty of genuine collective 
action, an entire community consciously and jointly 
shaping its policy, its way of life. 
Hanna P i h  (1 981 : 344) 
A conception of justice for a democratic society provides an account of the nghts, 
liberties and resources required by citizens to pursue a conception of the good and to be full 
and equal participating members of democratic political life. It guldes us on how institutions 
ought to be designed and arranged and how rights and resources should be dtstributed to 
ensure a fair system of social cooperation. Moreover, as an account of how institutions 
ought to be arranged and how resources ought to be dtstributed, it provides standards with 
whlch existing political arrangements and dtstributions can be assessed. 
Even if we can agree on what a conception of justice is and what it is supposed to do 
in this general sense (and agreement on that is c e r t d y  hard to find), there is sipficant 
dtsagreement about how attentive to the social and political status quo any conception of 
justice should be when it is designed or articulated. In h s  dtscussion of global justice, for 
example, Charles Beitz considers the claim that morality and justice "cannot demand the 
impossible," that the demands of justice should be h t e d  to those whch are motivationally 
possible or realistic (Beitz, 1999: 155). W e  Beitz agrees that justice should not demand the 
impossible in rhe sense of demandmg that justice ignore or seek to overcome "irnpedments 
that are unalterable or unavoidable", he maintains that "irnpedunents to change that are 
themselves capable of modfication over time" should not be included in our notion of the 
impossible (1 999: 156). We should respect the h t s  of the possible when theorizing about 
justice, Beitz holds, but we should not constrain ourselves by a social and political status quo 
whch is "capable of modfication over time." 
W e  Beitz points to an important dstinction between demands of realism whch are 
fixed and demands of realism whlch are capable of modfication, it is not entirely clear how, 
or even if, that dstinction should play a role in theorizing about the content of justice. Why 
might one dunk that the demands of realism - in either fixed or malleable form - should 
play a role in theorizing about justice at all? Perhaps theorists of justice should ignore both 
the fixed and malleable demands of realism. By contrast, if we decide that either the fixed or 
malleable demands of realism matter to theorizing about justice, in what way exactly should 
those demands affect the content of a conception of justice? 
My aim in the dssertation is to examine how concerns about the ideal and the real 
should be addressed in political theories of justice. That is, I ask whether features of the 
social and political status quo - what we can call the demands of realism - should affect the 
construction of principles of justice and, if so, how principles should respond to those 
demands. To address the problems posed by the demands of realism in a manageable and 
rigorous manner, however, the dssertation focuses on two specific features of human beings 
and the world that might affect judgments about the realism of a conception of justice - 
namely, the motives and motivational capacities of human beings, on the one hand, and the 
pluralism of moral and religous doctrines in contemporary liberal democracies, on the other. 
In the first case I ask what role, if any, concerns about motivation should play in the 
articulation of principles of justice and I treat this problem as a piece of the larger puzzle 
about the demands of realism. In particular, I ask whether there are any motives that should 
be accommodated in a conception of justice and I &scuss whether such accommodations are 
to be made for reasons of justice, reasons of practicality, or both. Addtionally, I investigate 
the h t s  that might be imposed on the demands of justice once we consider agents' 
motivational h ta t ions .  In short, I ask whether the content of a conception of justice 
should be adjusted to account for what citizens are already motivated to support or what they 
are motivationally cqable of supporting. 
In the second case, I ask what role the existence of religous and moral pluralism 
should play in the articulation or construction of principles of justice and this too is treated 
as a piece of the larger puzzle about the demands of realism. With respect to pluralism, I ask 
first whether the simple existence of a dversity of moral and religous views - the fact of 
pluralism, as Rawls calls it - requires changes in a conception of justice. But I also ask, 
perhaps more sigruficantly, whether the content of certain ktnds of comprehensive doctrines 
- namely, reasonable comprehensive doctrines - should affect the content of principles of 
justice. That is, I ask not only whether the comprehensive views that currently exist require 
accommodation, but whether there are reasons to adjust a conception of justice in light of 
the range of reasonable comprehensive views that citizens could endorse.' Moreover, I 
inquire into the ways in whch a defensible conception of justice might fit into the dfferent 
worldviews of citizens and thereby increase support for the demands of justice when those 
demands are seen as demands whch citizens have reason to support. Indeed, I ask whether 
the content ofa  conception of justice should be adjusted to account for what citizens believe 
they alreadJ, have reason to support, or what they colrld have reason to support, in light of the 
moral or religous worldviews to wh~ch they are or could be c o d t t e d .  
' I thank Dave Estlund for repeatedly pressing me to r e c o p e  a distinction between the empirical 
fact of pluralism and the range of possibly reasonable comprehensive doctrines and for indcating 
There are other features of the social and political status quo whch we could have 
considered in thmkmg about the demands of realism. So, for example, one might consider 
how to deal with the form of the family in theorizing about justice. Should the famdy be 
taken as a sphere of private action beyond the scope of justice, should the relations between 
members of f a d e s  be regulated by a conception of justice, or should there be some lund of 
middle ground? One might consider the challenges posed by an existing economic system 
or dstribution of property. Should a conception of justice take the market system as a fixed 
constraint on principles or should that system itself be subject to normative evaluation? 
Should a conception of justice work with the existing dstribution of property as a constraint 
or should it gve no weight at all to existing dstributions? Moving away from more formal 
institutions and arrangements, one might consider the complications of theorizing about 
justice in light of resource scarcity or features of one's geographc and demographc 
condtion such as an agmg population or, conversely, an ovenvhehgly  young population. 
Thus, concerns about motives and comprehensive doctrines - the two features of the 
social and political status quo that I wrestle with in the dssertation - constitute just two 
possible demmds of realism among many others. But t h m h g  about these two features and 
whether and how they might be accommodated in a conception of justice d help us to 
reach more general conclusions about how a conception of justice should deal with the 
demands of realism. I have chosen these two concerns in particular because of their 
connection t o '  issues and ideas about citizenshp and about what human beings are like and 
what they are capable of. That is, motives and beliefs are features of the political landscape 
that are tied to human beings and for whch human beings may bear some responsibhty 
because they are thought, at least on some level, to be the products of human decision. 
what dfference the distinction could make for a conception of justice. I will address this more hl ly  
Focusing on these demands of realism, then, requires us to navigate carefdly through both 
the possibihty and desirabhty of deliberative transformation of certain demands of realism in 
the way that more fixed demands of realism - such as natural scarcity or geographc and 
demographc realities - would not. To be sure, because I have chosen to focus on demands 
of realism that are not fixed in the same way that natural scarcity or geographic realities are, I 
have ensured that how we deal with the demands of realism is not solved merely by pointing 
to a distinction between what is fixed and what is malleable. Indeed, the depth of the 
problem is revealed more clearly by a focus on demands of realism whose h t y  is itself in 
question. Thus, it may be the case that certain motives and beliefs should be accommodated 
in a conception of justice, rather than transformed, even though such motives and beliefs are 
not fixed and coztld be transformed. Or it may be that because motives and beliefs are 
amenable to transformation that they should have no bearing on the construction of a 
conception of justice. 
In any case, the focus on motives and beliefs as part of the larger concern about the 
demands of realism ensures that the dissertation addresses a wider range of theoretical issues 
and possibhties. And, moreover, the focus on motives and beliefs allows us to consider the 
relationshp between justice and citizenshp - that is, it allows us to thmk through the ways 
in whlch justice depends upon ideas and assumptions about citizens7 concerns and capacities 
and the ways in whch conceptions of citizenshp are shaped by the requirements of justice. 
Indeed, as I udl argue, a conception of justice should confront the demands of realism with 
an ideal of deliberative citizenshp in the background and a conception of justice should be 
designed in ways whch might help to shape and reinforce the deliberative capacities and 
democratic commitments of citizens. 
in Chapter 5. 
Thus, the dssertation is animated by an attempt to answer a set of questions with 
respect to the relationshp between justice and the h t s  of the possible in general and 
between justice, motivation, and pluralism in particular: WLy should concerns about 
motivation and doctrinal pluralism have a role in theorizing about justice at all? How are we 
to mstinguish between motives or motivational h t a t i o n s  whch should and those whch 
should not be accommodated in a conception of justice? How are we to &stingush between 
comprehensive doctrines, or features of comprehensive doctrines, whch should and those 
whch should not be accommodated? And how should we respond to the problems of 
motivational possibhty and doctrinal compatibhty if we fad to accommodate citizens' 
existing motives and features of citizens' comprehensive doctrines in the conception of 
justice? 
To answer these questions, I examine how concerns about motivation, pluralism, and 
realism more generally, are treated in the theories of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, John Rawls, and 
Jiirgen Habermas. Each of these theorists takes the demands of realism seriously and tries to 
offer a conception of justice and political arrangements whch are, to borrow a term from 
Rawls, "realistically utopian". A "realistically utopian" approach to political phdosophy, 
Rawls writes, "extends what are ordmanly thought to be the l m t s  of practicable political 
possibhty and, in so doing, reconciles us to our political and social conmtion" (1999b: 11). 
Each of these theorists attempts to reconcile utopian ideals with the demands of realism 
without simply r e s i p g  principles of justice to an objectionable status quo. We want 
principles of justice that d play a role in the political and social lives of real human beings, 
they hold, rather than utopian principles that have no connection to the motives, 
motivational capacities, and reasonable moral and religous doctrines of human beings. 
But wlde these theorists dunk that principles of justice should have some practical 
worth, they share a commitment to the idea that principles should be concerned above all 
with how we ought to arrange our political institutions. Nevertheless, whde each theorist 
provides some clues about how the tension between justice and the demands of realism 
should be addressed, I argue that, for chfferent reasons, each view ultimately fads to provide 
an adequate solution to that problem. As we w d  see, Rousseau's monologicalvariant of 
realistic utopianism, whch holds that normative principles should be those we dscover 
through a process of inner reflection, doesn't take seriously the normative implications of 
the range of reasonable pluralism. Rawls's bypotbetical constmctivz>t variant, whlch holds that 
principles should be the outcome of a process of reflection on relevant reasons, fads to offer 
a sufficiently democratic account of legtimacy . And Habermas's realpmceduralist variant of 
realistic utopianism, whch regards justified principles as those whch emerge from an actual 
process of democratic deliberation, fads to offer a compehg  account of how the 
institutional configuration whch reahes the procedure wdl deliver the necessary 
motivational possibhty and doctrinal compatibhty. In the course of critical examination of 
these theories, then, I develop my own approach to navigating the demands of realism that 
attempts to overcome the weaknesses inherent in the monologcal, hypothetical 
constructivist. and real proceduralist variants of realistic utopianism. 
In the remainder of this introductory chapter, I intend to do the following: First, I d 
offer a prehtnary account of what we mean when we speak of motives and I d e x p h  in 
greater detail what I take to be the main problem with respect to justice and motivation 
(section I). In section 11, I w d  introduce and clarify the ideas of pluralism and reasonable 
pluralism and describe the challenge posed to justice by the fact and range of reasonable 
pluralism. Having explained the problems of motivation and pluralism, I d inchcate in 
section I11 what other theorists believe to be at stake and how the concerns about 
motivation, pluralism, and realism more generally should be addressed, if at all. We will 
explore how h k e r s  who lean towards a utopian view believe that facts about human beings 
and the world should have no effect on the content of justice while thmkers who lean 
towards a realist view chtnk that substantial accommodations of those features of the status 
quo must be made if a conception of justice is to be practical. In section IV, I d offer a 
p r e h a r y  sketch of my solution to the justice and realism tension. And finally, in section 
T7, I wdl offer an o u t h e  of the chapters and further describe the ideas of the three theorists 
whose work d be at the centre of critical attention. 
I. Motives and the Problem of Motivation 
In a recent article on issues of motivation in neo-Kantian theories of justice, Vittorio 
Bufacch offers a useful d e h t i o n  of the term 'motive': 
[a] mc)tive is what induces a person to act. The Latin root of the word is 
motives, meaning 'to move', hence the idea of movement, or initiating action. 
A motive gves a person a reason to perform an action. It follows that a 
moral. motivation may be defined as what induces a person to act morally, or 
what reason a person has to act morally (Bufacch, 2005: 26). 
W e  Bufacch's d e h t i o n  captures the core idea of what a motive is, we should be careful 
not to confuse the idea that a motive "gves a person a reason to perform an action" with 
T.M. Scanlon's view that having a motive to act (morally) is a matter of having or 
recogwing a reason to act that could be justified to others (Scanlon, 1998: 147-1 58). If that 
is what Bufacch means by motive - and h s  &scussion of Scanlon's work suggests that 
might be h s  meaning - then we should not endorse the d e h t i o n  as a whole. The 
Scanlonian aspect of the defimtion imports a normative test rather than merely describing or 
d e h g  the term on its own. 
Surely people can have motives whch are not and perhaps could not be framed in 
terms of reasons that are justifiable to others. A person may be motivated by malevolence, 
cruelty, or a desire for relative advantage over others, none of whch would likely be 
acceptable to others. Even less malign motives, such as self-preservation and restricted 
compassion, might not be reasonable in the Scanlonian sense. So whde Bufacch's dehtlltion 
of a motive as "what induces a person to act" is acceptable, we should not confuse the 
definition of motive - i.e., that whlch gves a person "a reason to perform an action" - with a 
normative test for reasonable motives - i.e., that having a motive is a matter of having a reason 
that could be justified to others. If we want to work through the problem of motivation 
understood as a part of the larger problem about justice and the demands of realism, then we 
should adopt a dehtlltion of motive whlch does not narrow the scope of the realism problem 
by importing a normative test for reasonable motives at the outset. For our purposes then, a 
motive wdl be defined as whatever moves an indvidual to act. 
There are various dungs that might move a person to act and therefore, a variety of 
h g s  that might count as motives. Agents may be moved to act by their perceived interests, 
preferences, emotions, or desires. Moreover, these dfferent sources of motivation may be 
united at times and thus together move an agent to perform a particular action whereas at 
other times, perhaps most of the time, motives may confict with each other and compete to 
be the motive whch ultimately determines action. With that in mind, I WIU use the term 
motive in an expansive, rather than restricted, sense. A restricted use of the term motive 
would hold that only those h g s  whch have in fact induced an agent to act are motives, so 
that we would count as motives only those dungs whch induce, or have induced, 
determinate acts. A more expansive use of the term, and the one I w111 use here, holds that 
we include as motives not simply the last motive in deliberation whlch in fact causes a 
person to act - what we might call the operational motive - but rather any motive whlch is, 
or what the agent considers to be, apossible inducement to action. 
The more expansive use of motive has an advantage over the resaicted use insofar as 
it allows us to endorse the possibhty of motivational plurality - the possibihty that agents 
have sets of potential motives, rather than single motives whlch determine all of their 
behaviour, and that the operational motive is simply one among many. Moreover, the 
expansive use of the term helps us to make sense of a state of internal motivational nun@, on 
the one hand, and a state of internal motivational con$?icf on the other - that is, the possibhty 
that an agents' potential motives agree on a determinant action and the possibhty that an 
agent's operational motive may nevertheless be in confhct with the agent's other potential 
motwes. 
The problem, then, is that there may not be a fit between what indviduals are 
motivated to do and what a conception of justice requires them to do. To be sure, what 
motivates agents' behaviour is sometimes regarded as a constraint on what can be realistically 
achleved or demanded by a conception of justice. If human beings are naturally and 
primanlr motivated by narrow self-interest, for instance, a principle of justice whlch calls for 
sipficant redistribution of economic resources d be d~fficult or impossible to implement. 
Absent extem.al incentives for compliance or sanctions for noncompliance, people may 
simply choosr: to ignore the demands of such principles even in cases where they thmk that 
the principles themselves are good. Some theorists b k  that it is rational for them to do so, 
even if they regard such noncompliance as unjust. The prudent thmg to do, one might say, 
is not always the right b g  to do. 
Thus, certain motives appear to be in tension with the requirements of candidate 
principles or conceptions of j~st ice.~ An indvidual wdl often be faced with choices between 
doing what she is already motivated to do and doing what she ought to do accorhg to 
some conception of justice. Just as existing motives appear as constraints on the demands of 
justice, the demands of justice appear to inhviduals as constraints on their choices and 
behaviour. From the perspectives of both justice and o r h a r y  citizens, then, what is 
desirable may not be attainable gven the constraints imposed by motives, in the former case, 
and by the demands of justice in the latter case. 
To illustrate, irnagme that a conception of justice requires an equal distribution of 
resources among all citizens but that, at present, resources are unequally hstributed. The 
required redstribution in that case would confict with some citizens' desires to gve special 
consideration. to their own cMdren and to use their larger present holdmgs to provide them 
with health and educational advantages, for example. The equal &stribution requirement, 
then, confronts those citizens as an external constraint on what they are permitted (and 
motivated) to do for their children. Resources that they would like to use for their children's 
benefit instead are transferred to anonymous others in order to satis$ the equal hstribution 
requirement of the conception of justice. In short, there are cases in whch the demands of 
justice will confict with the preferences and desires whch motivate citizens' behaviour. 
There may be very good reasons for placing constraints on the permissible actions of 
citizens or for rehsing to make concessions in the principles of justice themselves simply to 
accommodate certain existing motives. But even if there are good reasons for those 
I have used the term "canddate" principles or conceptions of justice here to avoid the mistaken 
impression that the dmertation is concerned with how the demands of realism interact with aLrea4 
settled or known principles of justice. The dissertation explores, among other things, whether or not 
motives and beliefs should influence the content of principles of justice prior to the recoption or 
constraints, citizens might nevertheless still regard and feel them as constraints rather than as 
reasonable h t a t i o n s  on their permissible actions (or they might regard them as both). 
Sometimes citizens will acknowledge the demands of justice and change their behaviour 
accordmgly (perhaps because they see the demands as reasonable or perhaps because they 
regard the punishments for flouting the demands as s o m e h g  to avoid). At other times, 
citizens wdl plump for their own concern over the demands of justice. In either case, many 
citizens will regard the demands of justice as demands whch are in competition with their 
existing motives. Meanwlde, from the perspective of justice, citizens' motives d be 
regarded as the constraints. A conception of justice might set out requirements for a fair and 
just society, for example, but find that those requirements can't be met because of the 
practical constraints imposed by citizens' existing motives and capacities. 
Political phdosophers generally agree, then, that motivation affects the possibihty of 
reahzing or maintaining a conception of justice. Whether or not a gven conception of 
justice is realistic depends, among other dungs, on the capacity and motivation of human 
beings to adopt and to live by that conception. T h s  problem of motivation is sometimes 
framed in terms of a "rift" (Cronin & De Greiff, 1998: xii) or a "gap" (YVdhams, 1985: 52) 
between the demands imposed by a conception of justice, on the one hand, and the desires 
and motivational capacities of human beings on the other. As Cronin and De Greiff 
observe, "[tlhe unrestricted universality of moral principles, their hghly abstract, copt ive  
claims to validity, and the unconmtional character of the duties they impose create a rift 
between moral judgment and reasoning, on the one hand, and motivation, on the other" 
(1998: xii). When a conception of justice makes demands on human beings that confict 
adoption such principles and not what we should do when motives and beliefs conflict with already 
settled principles. 
with the determinate content of their existing motives, the conception of justice is for that 
reason less realistic than a conception whch does not make slrnilarly strong demands. 
However, whlle we rmght agree that the concern for motivation presents justice with a 
certain demand of realism, there is substantial dtsagreement about how to deal with such a 
demand, if it should be dealt with at all. Should theorists try to make room for agents' 
motives and hope that doing so wrll ensure greater stabihty for the principles of justice? Or 
should theorists ignore motives in order to insulate principles of justice from objectionable 
features of the social and political status quo? Or, otherwise still, should theorists try to 
dtstinguish between motives whch should and those whch should not be accommodated in 
a conception of justice? Before we attempt to answer those questions, consider another 
example of the way in whlch the demands of realism complicate theorizing about justice. 
11. Pluralism and Justice 
VIMe motives and motivational capacities account for one manifestation of the way in 
whch features of the world confront a conception of justice with certain demands of 
realism, the existence of a dtversity of moral and religous doctrines in liberal democracies 
presents conceptions of justice with another example of a demand of realism. Whereas the 
problem with motives is that agents have desires or preferences whch may confhct with the 
demands of justice, the problem with moral and relqgous pluralism is that people may have 
moral or religous reasons for acting contrary to the demands of a candtdate conception of 
So what exactly is a moral, religous, or comprehensive doctrine, and what do we mean 
by the terms fact of pluralism, fact of reasonable pluralism, and range of reasonable 
pluralism? Before we dtscuss the nature of the pluralism challenge, then, we should clarify 
what we mean by pluralism, reasonable pluralism, and comprehensive doctrines or 
worldviews. 
A comprehensive doctrine, as Rawls defines it, is a moral or religous conception that 
"includes conceptions of what is of value in human life, and ideals of personal character, as 
well as ideals of friendshp and of f a d a l  and associational relationshps, and much else that 
is to inform our conduct, and in the h t  to our life as a whole" (1996: 13). Whereas an 
indvidual may develop or endorse a conception of the good whch inmcates "what is of 
value in human life" and "what is regarded as a fully worthwh.de life", a comprehensive 
doctrine is the "religous, philosophcal, or moral" worldview whch offers an account of 
how "the various ends and aims are [to be] ordered and understood" and accordmg to whch 
such conceptions are interpreted (2001: 19). In contemporary political societies we find a 
variety of such comprehensive doctrines or worldviews whch not only offer dfferent 
accounts of what is a valuable or a worthwh.de life, but often accounts whch confilct with 
those offered by other moral and religous worldviews. That is, contemporary political 
societies are characterized by a fact of pluralism - the fact that there are a variety of 
dfferent, incompatible, and perhaps confilcting moral and religous comprehensive doctrines 
to whch citizens adhere or aspire. 
So, for example, one's moral or religous worldview might regard homosexuality as 
sinfd and thus might require one to support and to advocate policies whch would ensure 
that homosexual behaviour is restricted, perhaps severely punished, and that individuals who 
identi+ as homosexuals should be regarded as morally repugnant. By contrast, a canmdate 
conception of justice might require that all citizens be treated as equals and that behaviour 
whch does not duectly harm others should be tolerated. In thls case, then, what justice 
demands of all citizens conficts with what some citizens believe they have reason to do and 
to h k  and, moreover, what sort of sanctions and punishments it is permissible (indeed 
required) to impose on others. In this case, we might hold that the adherents of the religous 
view in question are unreasonable in the sense that they refuse to acknowledge other citizens 
as free and equal citizens with concerns and commitments of their own. But merely 
regardmg those citizens as unreasonable does not alter the fact that those citizens do not 
regard themselves as having a good reason to adhere to the demands of justice in question. 
The fact and range of rearonabLe pluralism describe more challengng conchtions. The 
fact of reasonable pluralism entds, first, that a subset of those chfferent moral and religous 
views in society are compatible with fair political arrangements. That is, the fact of 
reasonable pluralism entds that the subset of reasonable views are held by people who are 
prepared to a'gree to fair terms of social cooperation, even with others who hold chfferent 
worldviews, and that their being reasonable in that sense is compatible with the moral or 
religous doctrine to whch they subscribe. As Rawls puts it, 
The chversity of reasonable comprehensive religous, phdosophcal, and moral 
doctrines found in modem democratic societies is not a mere hstorical 
condtion that may soon pass away; it is a permanent feature of the public 
culture of democracy. Under the political and social conchtions secured by 
basic rights and liberties of free institutions, a chversity of confhcting and 
irreconcilable - and what's more, reasonable - comprehensive doctrines d 
come about and persist if such chversity does not obtain already (1996: 36). 
Thus, wlvle conceptions of justice may require certain commitments or behaviour from 
citizens, the fact that citizens have moral and religous worldviews whch may not map 
duectlv onto a shared conception of justice means that the demands of justice map confhct 
with the demands of those moral and religous views. Citizens may have reasons - not 
unreasonable moral and religous reasons - to act in ways contrary to canddate conceptions 
of justice. Indeed, their beliefs about the world and what is of value may require them to 
think and behave in one way whereas the demands of justice may require them to behave in 
an entirely dfferent way. Moreover, not only must a conception of justice wrestle with the 
already existing reasonable comprehensive doctrines - thefact of reasonable pluralism - it 
must also wrestle with the range of possibly- reasonable comprehensive doctrines. That is, 
there may be a range of reasonable moral and religous worldviews that a conception of 
justice may be required to accommodate even if those reasonable worldviews are not 
currently embraced by any existing indviduals. The idea of a range of reasonable pluralism, 
then, suggests that a conception of justice may have to be constructed in ways whlch 
anticipate what I refer to as normatively salient or moral facts even if those normatively 
salient or moral facts are not currently instantiated in the world as we now find it. 
The fact of pluralism and the fact and range of reasonable pluralism in democratic 
societies, then, confront a conception of justice with what appears to be a dchotomous 
choice: One can choose to ignore the pluralism of ehcal,  relqgous, and phllosophlcal views 
and insist on independent standards of justice untainted by the demands of pluralism. Or 
one can adjust the conception to accommodate the fact of pluralism or the range of 
reasonable pluralism so that principles of justice can play a role in practical political life and 
thereby avoid the charge of naive utopianism. Theorists who choose the former option can 
be criticized for ignoring a permanent and perhaps attractive feature of democratic societies. 
Indeed, some of the moral and religous worldviews might be endorsed by reasonable 
citizens who are sincerely committed to regardmg other citizens as free and equal citizens 
and to locating fair principles of justice for a plural society. Theorists who choose to adjust 
principles to accommodate pluralism, on the other hand, might succeed in solving the 
problem of doctrinal compliance but risk makmg concessions to unattractive or 
objectionable features of certain worldviews that we find in contemporary plural 
democracies. The challenge is to find some alternative to the dchotomy. How can we 
accommodate pluralism without gving up on the normative and critical value of a shared 
conception of justice? Or should we aim to accommodate pluralism or reasonable pluralism 
at all? What exactly is necessary to reconcile a conception of justice to pluralism and, 
moreover, to what extent (if any) must a conception accommodate the determinate beliefs of 
citizens? 
111. Justice and the Demands of Realism: Utopian and Realist Views 
Recoption of the tension between justice and facts about human beings and the world has 
led some theodsts to attempt to bracket what they regard as concerns about mere practicality 
or realism while articulating or constructing principles of justice to ensure that attention to 
those concerns does not affect the content of justice in objectionable ways. John Stuart Mdl 
puts the point with particular force when, in defendmg las utihtarian conception of justice 
against those who charge that the standard is "too hlgh for humanity" and therefore 
hsconnected from reality, he replies that " h s  is to mistake the very meaning of a standard 
of morals, and confound the rule of action with the motive of it." "The business of ehcs," 
Mdl advises us, is "to tell us what are our duties, or by what test we may know them," not to 
accommodate the standard of justice to meet concerns of practical possibhty (Mill, 1991: 
149). 
Others, hke Hobbes (1991) and Hume (1983,1985), wary of the utopian tendency to 
ignore human beings' desires and capacities and other features of the social and political 
world, respond to the tension between justice and the demands of realism by c a h g  for 
more, rather than less, attention to those demands.' As Hume writes, "custom is the great 
3 In his critique of Rousseau, J.L Talrnon criticizes the utopian tendency to "train men to 'bear with 
dochty the yoke of public happiness', in fact to create a new type of man, a purely political creature, 
without any particular private or social loyalties, any partial interests" (1 952: 42). Sunilarly, Karl 
guide of human life" (1983: 46) and "men must endeavour to palhate what they cannot cure" 
(1985: 38). Recogtllzing that principles of justice d acheve stabihty only when human 
beings have the necessary desire and reason to uphold and to live by the principles of justice, 
realist theorists contend that the best way to ensure a fit between principles, desires, and 
reasons is to design principles in the full light of what human beings are already motivated to 
support and what human beings already regard themselves as having reason to support. To 
be sure, some theorists hold that external moral norms whlch do not already have a place in 
the motivatic)nal sets of moral agents cannot provide the necessary motivation. Instead, 
these theorists look to existing self-interested motives and beliefs as the raw material for 
constructing a stable conception of j~st ice.~ 
David IMiller suggests that in the face of the gap between what some political 
phdosophers thmk justice requires and what ordmary people think justice requires political 
phdosophers should pay more attention than they do now to "what the people thmk" (1999: 
61). T h s  is especially the case, Mdler writes, for "the normative theorist who is guided by 
somedung akin to the Rawlsian ideas of reflective eqdbrium and public justifiabhty" (1999: 
59). As he puts it, "in setting out a theory of justice, [a Rawlsian theorist] needs evidence 
about what people do in fact regard as fair and unfair in hfferent social settings" (1999: 50). 
The idea seems to be that if there is too wide a gap between what normative theorists thmk 
justice requires and what ordmary people believe justice requires, then ordmary people wdl 
lack the reason and motivation necessary to uphold and live accordmg to the more 
demandmg conception of justice. 
Popper calls for "piecemeal" rather than "utopian engineering" because the former is more 
democratic and more attentive to circumstances and interests. With piecemeal enpeering, he writes, 
"[tlhere will be a possibihty of reaching a reasonable compromise and therefore of acheving the 
improvement by democratic methods" (1 966: 158-9). 
But Mdler makes a move that other theorists would regard with skepticism: Mdler 
suggests that the fact that people hold or share certain beliefs about justice gives us reason to 
acknowledge and to perhaps accommodate those beliefs in normative principles. Or, at 
least, that these shared beliefs should be taken as evidence of the h d  of "considered 
judgments" whlch play a role in reachmg reflective eqdbrium about a conception of justice. 
It is not clear at the outset, however, that the fact that certain beliefs about justice are shared 
gves us a strong reason to accommodate those beliefs in a conception of justice. Recall 
Beitz's &stinction between i m p e h e n t s  to change that are themselves capable ofmodtfication 
over time; and i m p e h e n t s  that are unalterable and unavoidable (1999: 155-6). The fact that 
certain beliefs and motives exist and that they might be shared by many people would not 
gve  us, on Beitz's view, reason to adjust principles of justice to accommodate those beliefs 
and motives in part because those beliefs and motives might be capable of mo&fication. 
There are other theorists who would go further than Beitz in h s  regard and argue that 
it is unacceptable to &stort principles of justice to accommodate agents' motives and beliefs, 
whatever those might be. G.A. Cohen (2000,2003) pursues h s  position when he argues 
that to offer an account of justice whlch makes concessions to features of human behaviour 
whlch are the products of unequal relations of power, defective institutions, or unreflective 
conceptions of human nature - rather than assessing and trying to alter behaviour and 
institutions - is to gve  up on the essential normative and critical functions of political 
phdosophy. Indeed, he asks why we should "respond to the hscrepancy between the 
putative and attractive conception of justice and people's moral capacities by a s s i p g  a 
defect to that conception of justice. . .rather than to people's moral capacities?" (2003: 122). 
4 If I understand the project correctly, this is the impetus for Gauthier's (1986) attempt to provide a 
rational basis for morality. 
If the most defensible conception of justice is unrealistic gven agents' motives and beliefs, 
then perhaps all we should do is condemn the human race for its inherent injustice. 
flsmrance, Compliance, and ] d i e  
The positions defended by Mdl (1 991), Beitz (1 999), and Cohen (2000,2003) appear to 
others as too uncompromising - and not simply because they are unrealistic, but because 
they fad to see how some demands of realism in fact operate as considerations of justice. 
Consider the so-called assurance problem whch is often invoked in hscussions about justice 
and legtimate obligations. Some theorists hold that if we are to expect people to adhere to 
the demands of a conception of justice whch requires some amount of self-sacrifice or 
restraint, then. we must be able to assure those people that such restraint "wdl be matched by 
slmdar restraint on the part of others" (Mder, 1999: 19). People have an obligation to be 
just, h s  view holds, only if they can be gven assurance that their sacrifice or restraint d 
not be used by others as an opportunity and occasion for exploitation. If reciprocity is a 
constitutive feature of justice, then there could be no obligation to meet the demands of 
justice if we lack assurance that others wdl meet those obligations as well. 
Thus, in defendmg Rawlsian global justice against critics f i e  Beitz, Joseph Heath 
argues that "[q-iven the central role that cooperation and reciprocity play in Rawls7s system, 
the absence of the rule of law at an international level is not merely a 'practical' hfficulty. It 
plays a central role in determining what indn~iduals can reasonably expect of one another 
under such circumstances" (Heath, 2005: 7-8). Institutions, such as the rule of law, are the 
mechanisms through whch the assurance problem can be solved. If those institutions are 
not in place, then agents have no obligation to meet the requirements of justice because 
those requirements would put them at risk of exploitation by other agents whose self- 
interested mc)tives cannot be checked. In effect, thls means that the requirements of justice 
are shaped or reshaped in light of the existing institutional possibhties for overcoming the 
problem of motivational compliance. If existing institutional arrangements fail to protect 
agents whose motivations are compatible with the rigorous demands of justice from agents 
whose motivations are comparatively less benign, then the well-intentioned agents are 
absolved of some, perhaps all, of the demands of justice. 
Whde we might agree that the h t s  of institutiona1possibilitzi.r could make a dfference 
in the content of principles of justice, Heath seems to perpetuate the realist conflation of the 
h t s  of the probable with the h t s  of the possible. While it is true to say that how far we 
can and how far we should try to realue the demands of justice under gven condtions is 
determined in large measure by the existing institutional and motivational terrain, it seems 
too much to say that absent the appropriate institutional and motivational condtions the 
content of justice itself changes. 
In some ways, Heath's realist argument makes the same assumptions about the nature 
of justice that G.A. Cohen's more utopian argument makes. Both seem to h k  that justice 
is concerned with indvidual behaviour - what agents are obligated, or not obligated, to do in 
their personal behaviour - in contrast to the Rawlsian view that justice is concerned, at least 
in the first instance, with the basic structure of society. Heath seems to hold that I have no 
reason to transfer a certain amount of my current h o l h g s  to another, as a conception of 
justice may require, if institutional arrangements whch would protect me from exploitation 
by the immoral are not in place. In that case, he h k s ,  justice does not demand 
supererogatory acts. But the content of justice would not change under those conhtions if 
we thought that justice was a matter not simply of indvidual decisions and behaviour 
concerning resource dstributions, but that justice required indviduals to work towards 
establishmg and stab~ltzing the institutional condltions necessary for the other demands of 
justice to be r e a l ~ e d . ~  In that sense, we return to Beitz's mstinction between irnpedunents 
that are amenable to moddication and irnpedunents that are unalterable. To solve the 
problems of motivational and doctrinal compliance, then, Beitz holds that we should not just 
take account of the existing institutional, motivational, and doctrinal reality and shape justice 
to fit that reality. Instead, we should consider the institutional, motivational, and doctrinal 
possibhties and take thosepo~sibilitties as providmg the parameters w i h  whlch we theorize 
about justice. 
Yet, whde Beitz's approach might respond adequately to the realist position whlch 
draws the h i t s  of the possible too narrowly, it still faces challenges from the utopians who 
seem to h k  that little or no attention should be paid to practical issues when theorizing 
about the fundamental principles of justice. Thus, even if we h k  that it would be desirable 
for a conception of justice to avoid accommodating motives and beliefs, or to avoid 
accommodating objectionable motives and beliefs, we might ask whether it would also be 
desirable to avoid consideration of practical concerns altogether. G.A. Cohen seems to 
thmk that theorizing about justice should avoid such questions altogether and that, if they do 
enter the picture, they should enter only at the level of application, not at the level of 
justification or articulation of principles of justice. But we should ask whether that 
conclusion is defensible. That is, even if we decide to insulate conceptions of justice from 
the effects of malign or objectionable motives and beliefs, should we also insulate 
conceptions of justice from concerns about motivational possibihty - about whether, even 
under ideal condltions, agents have the motivational capacip to support the demands of a 
This puts me at odds with the Rawlsian idea that we take the institutional condtions - the basic 
structure - as settled in a certain sense. See Heath (2005,2005b) on this. 
conception of justice? And should we insulate conceptions of justice from concerns about 
the h t s  of moral and religous transformation? 
As Bernard Wiulams argues, it is not enough to articulate a conception of justice using 
s o m e h g  hke a Rawlsian veil of ignorance and askmg what rational agents, ignorant of their 
particular preferences, aims, and identities, would choose. "The question 'what do rational 
agents need' is not enough to lead those agents into morality" (1 985: 64). On Wiulams' view 
we need to ensure that citizens are, or could be, motivated to be moral or just and that they 
have, and recogrue that they have, reason to be just. Thus, we also need to consider the 
problem of how we might generate or locate agents' motivation to be just or, as Rawls calls 
it, the "sense of justice" (1999: 41,125; 1996: 19). Even if agents lack at present the 
motivation to be just, must a defensible theory of justice offer an account of how those 
agents coula'be motivated? Must we also consider how citizens who endorse or could 
endorse hfferent, but perhaps reasonable, moral and religous views, might locate reasons to 
be just that are compatible with their moral and religous views? Or, alternately, must we 
demonstrate how it would be possible and legtimate to transform those moral and religous 
views in more justice-supporting ways? 
Theorists hke Cohen and Md, as we have seen, seem less troubled by those questions 
than are theorists f i e  Hobbes, Hurne, W h m s ,  and Elster. For Wdhams and Elster, one 
must show how citizens can come to endorse the principles even when their present motives 
and beliefs confhct with those principles. Framing the problem as one of social order, Elster 
asks '%That is it that glues societies together and prevents them from hsintegrating into 
chaos and war?" (1989: 1). Wfiams, concentrating more than Elster on the normative 
sipficance of the problem, asks how obligations of justice can "stick" to political agents 
and operate as motivating aims of their action (1 981 : 122). So whlle Wdhams and Elster 
might agree with Beitz that we should not regard "impedunents that are.. .capable of 
mo&fication over h e "  as determining the h u t s  of the possible, they nevertheless seem to 
dunk that an account of how those impedunents can be overcome is required. 
Sanctionsfor A~oncom~Iiance 
Before I offer a sketch of the solution that I defend in the hssertadon, I want to consider 
briefly another proposal whlch is often invoked as a way to deal with the problem of how to 
motivate agents to support and abide by the demands of justice. We can call thls the 
sanctions-for--noncompliance approach. Assuming that we have already settled on a 
particular conception of justice, thls approach holds that perhaps the best way to ensure that 
all citizens comply with the demands of that conception - and thus the best way to quell 
fears of exploitation by free-riders - would be to impose penalties or sanctions on those who 
fail to comply with the demands. And, to make the system run smoothly, we should ensure 
that the sancaons for noncompliance outweigh any expected benefits from noncompliance. 
WMe sanctions for noncompliance certamly have an important role to play in assuring 
the stabhty of a conception of justice, they fad to ensure that inhviduals d be motivated to 
uphold the conception of justice when that is necessary. As I d argue throughout the 
dssertation, and at length in Chapters 4 and 6, the sanctions-for-noncompliance approach 
fails to take account of the fact that the laws and sanction mechanisms must themselves be 
created and maintained by citizens in view of what justice demands. If the sanctions-for- 
noncompliance approach is to enforcejustice and not some arbitrary and perhaps indefensible 
set of laws, then those citizens who create and maintain the system of sanctions must 
themselves have a sense of justice and be motivated to design and maintain the system with 
the conception of justice as a guide. Thus, whde the sanctions-for-noncompliance approach 
has an important role, it is insufficient on its own as a solution to the problem of motivation 
because such a system can only enforce justice if it has been designed to do so. 
A conception of justice whch lacks a plausible account of motivational possiblhty, as 
we wdl see, may fad to live up to its own hope for justice. Though external rewards and 
punishments might be necessary in the practical application of principles of justice where the 
motivation isn't already developed, a conception of justice whch relies exclusively on such 
external factors faces great dfficulties in proving that it is not only legtimate and just, but 
that it is stable in the long term as well. Solving the problem of motivation, then, requires an 
account of how the motivation necessary to support a p e n  conception of justice can either 
be located or generated in an internal way rather than simply imposed through external 
sanctions or constraints. 
Moreover, a conception of justice whch fads to locate an overlapping consensus of 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines on a shared conception of justice d fad also to 
acheve stabhty and, for that matter, justice. Indeed, citizens who are committed to moral or 
religous worldviews may be prepared to suffer sipficant sanctions for noncompliance if 
they thmk that adherence to their moral or religous commitments is nonnegotiable. W e  
imposing sanctions raises the costs of violating the demands of justice for those citizens, 
hgh legal or economic costs for violation may not weigh in the deliberations of some 
citizens at all. Avoidmg high legal or economic costs, that is, d not be regarded by them as 
a reason to do or not to do somethmg. When the facts of pluralism and reasonable 
pluralism are considered in theorizing about justice, then, we must wrestle with the reasons 
that citizens have for compliance or noncompliance and attempt to locate some justice- 
supporting reasons that they could endorse. 
A Formal Statement ofthe Realisr- Utopian Disagreement 
Before proceedmg to the sketch of my proposed solution to the justice-realism tension, 
consider the following set-up of the nature of the hsagreement between the realist and 
utopian views. 
It might be said that a conception of justice has or should have two basic features: 
[I] A conception of justice must offer mticalstandards, and 
[2] A conception of justice must bepractical; 
In the first place, a conception of justice provides, or should provide, critical standards [I]. 
That is, it must set out an account of those norms or values with whlch we ought to comply 
if we or our institutions are to be consideredjust. As I noted in the opening paragraph to 
thls chapter, a conception of justice for a democratic society provides an account of the 
rights, liberties and resources required by citizens to pursue a conception of the good and to 
be full and equal participating members of democratic political life and, as a result, provides 
standards with whch existing political arrangements and hstributions can be assessed. 
In the second place, a conception of justice should be practical [2]. That is, a 
conception of justice should be, or must be, action-guidmg in the sense of offering an 
account of justice whch agents are able to follow or reahze. 
But in tllinkmg about the practicality requirement we should r e c o v e  that what 
people do depends on what they desire and on what they regard themselves as having reason to 
do. That is, an agent's compliance with a conception of justice depends on her having the 
desire or motivation to comply and reason to comply. Or, at the very least, that her compliance 
depends on her having non-justice related desires and reasons whlch have the effect of 
producing justice-complaint behaviour whether she aims at justice or not. With the addttion 
of h s  observation, our set-up of the problem looks hke h s :  
[I] .I conception of justice must offer d i a l  standards. 
[2] 4 conception of justice must be practical. 
[3] As a matter of fact, what people do depends on the desires and reasons they have. 
Whlle :m ideal typical realit would accept [I], the realist dunks that [2] must be gven 
greater weight in theorizing about justice once [3] is acknowledged. Indeed, the 
acknowledgment of [3] is what prompts the realist to gve priority to [2] over [I]. That is, the 
realist dunks that a conception of justice should be practical and accepts that what people do 
depends on what they desire and what they have reason to do. In that case, for a conception 
of justice to be practical, the realist dunks that existing desires and reasons d have to be 
accommodated in some way. For the realist, then, the practical aim [2] trumps the m'tical aim 
[I] when the alleged fact that action depends on desires and reasons [3] is acknowledged. 
The ideal typical utopian, by contxast, accepts [I] and [3], but rejects [2] altogether. The 
utopian agrees with the realist that what people do depends on what they have desire and 
reason to do, but holds that a conception of justice must offer critical standards rather than 
mere action-guidmg or practical principles. For the utopian, then, the m'ticalaim [I] trumps 
thepraclica/ aim [2] depite the fact that action depends on desires and reasons [3]. It seems 
that we are compelled to choose between the realists' gring priority to [2] over [I] or the 
utopians' endorsement of [I] and outright rejection of [2]. 
In the dssertation I explore the possibhty that such a &chotomous choice between [I] 
and [2] might not be required in light of [3] and, therefore, that it might be possible to have a 
conception of justice whch is both practical and critical while acknowledgmg that [3], or 
somedung hke it, is true. Thus, whde I accept the basic intuitions behmd [I], [2], and [3], I 
aim to show that they are in fact compatible once we properly understand what each of them 
really e n d s .  To anticipate, my argument holds that when we acquire a better understandmg 
of the ideas expressed in [I], [2], and [3], the apparent need to pursue either the ideal typical 
realist or ideal typical utopian track is not necessary at all. Whereas the common 
understandmg of the practicality condtion [2] assumes that we must rely on what people are 
already able to do, I argue that satisfying the practicahty condtion (in those cases where it 
should be satisfied) requires only that people are capabe of meedng the demands of a 
conception of justice. And whereas condtion [3] holds that what people do depends on 
their existing desires and reasons, I argue that what people are able to do depends not on 
their exziting desires and reasons, but on those desires and reasons that they are capable of 
having. Which means that while condtion [3] may be true, it does not gve us the whole 
story; a further clarification allows us to weaken the apparent force of [3] as stated above. 
Thus we get the following set of compatible condtions: 
[I] .A conception of justice should offer &ca/ standards. 
[2]' A conception of justice should be practical in the sense of offering action- 
guidmg principles with whch agents are capable of complymg. 
[3] \What people do depends on the desires and reasons they have, but 
[4] What people are able to do depends on the desires and reasons that they are 
capable of having. 
In short, once we get a better understandmg of what condttion [2] e n d s  and add 
clarification (41, we see that the condtions are not incompatible as both the realist and 
utopian hold. Thus, we are forced to endorse neither the realist nor the utopian approach to 
justice and the demands of realism. But whether those revisions are c o m p e h g  and what 
they really amount to requires further elaboration. 
IV. Towards a Realistically Utopian Solution 
It seems, then, that there are two levels to the problems of motivation and pluralism - one 
level is concerned with what we should do about existing motives and beliefs wlde the other 
is concerned with how (and for that matter whether) we should demonstrate motivational 
possibhty, on the one hand, and doctrinal compatibhty, on the other. The solution that I 
defend in the dtssertation is duected at both levels. To solve the first-level problem - the 
problem of existing motives and beliefs - we need an argument about whch motives and 
beliefs should or must be accommodated by a conception of justice and those whch should 
not and, addtionally, an argument about why such accommodations are necessary at all. To 
solve the second-level problem we need a plausible account of how the motivation necessary 
to support the conception of justice can be generated and, second, a plausible account of 
how citizens might locate support for a conception of justice from w i t h  their reasonable 
moral and religous worldviews. 
Existing Mot& and Beliefs 
One of the central claims that I defend in the dtssertation is that there are certain motives 
and beliefs that should be regarded not as mere practical constraints on the feasibhty or 
stabhty of justice, but instead as constitutive elements of justice itself. Certain motives and 
beliefs must be accommodated as a matter of justice and not simply as a matter of prudence 
or stabhty. That view seems to put me at odds with the utopian view whch holds that 
concerns about the social and political status quo are entirely practical rather than normative. 
To alter the c:ontent of justice to meet the demands of realism, they hold, is to resign 
ourselves to objectionable features of our social and political status quo. By contrast, I argue 
that some motives and some beliefs are nornative4 salient. Citizens who are motivated by a 
concern for their liberty, for example, are motivated by an attractive idea whch should not 
be lsmissed so hasnly as a mere practical matter. S d a r l y ,  the concerns of citizens who 
endorse reasonable ethlcal or religous worldviews should not be hsmissed by theorists of 
justice. The range of reasonable pluralism, I d argue, must be accommodated not for 
reasons of prudence, but for reasons of justice. In short, I argue that once certain freedoms 
are r e c o p e d  as unobjectionable or even valuable, a conception of justice for a democratic 
society must regard those freedoms and some of their consequences as canldates for 
acc~mmodation.~ 
Defending the idea that certain motives and beliefs must be accommodated as a matter 
of justice rather than mere practicality wdl require a method for h s t i n p s h g  between 
motives and beliefs with normative salience and those without normative salience. I argue 
that such hstinctions should be made from the point of view of a society of free, equal, and 
reasonable citizens capable of critical reflection on their motives, beliefs, and capacities. In 
short, the hstinction should be made from the point of view of an ideal of deliberative 
David E:stlund has suggested to me the idea that if we h k  that there are certain features of human 
beings and the world that need to be accommodated by a conception of justice because they are 
normative4  ahe en^, then in fact we are not "accornmodating" those features or "capitulating" to certain 
demands of realism; rather, we are doing precisely what justice requires. I continue to use the term 
accommodation not because I disagree with Estlund; rather, I use the term because it seems a less 
cumbersome way to refer to the idea that certain motives and beliefs must count as legitimate 
considerations m the construction or articulation of a defensible conception of justice. 
democracy and an associated conception of deliberative citizenshp. Those motives and 
beliefs whch should be accommodated, then, are those whch reasonable citizens would say 
are necessary for the protection of their freedom and their desire to ensure fair conhtions 
for the pursult of their reasonable conceptions of the good. When canhdate principles of 
justice conhct with what is necessary for the protection of citizens' freedom and the fair 
conchtions for the pursuit of reasonable conceptions of the good, then those canhdate 
principles must be adjusted, not for reasons of mere feasibhty or stabihty, but in the 
interests of justice itself. 
But if the motives and beliefs that we accommodate are accommodated because they 
are normatively salient, then it might be said that the utopian position prevails. That is, so 
far we have not made any accommodations for reasons of practicality and thus haven't 
moved away from the utopian position whch holds that practical concerns are irrelevant to 
theorizing about justice. Where we do move away from the utopian position and b e p  to 
flesh out a hstinct real .aIly utopian view is with our consideration of the second-level 
problems of motivational possibhty and doctrinal compatibihty. 
Motivatiunai Po~sibiLig, Docttinal CoqatibiL.0, and DeLiberattive Citixenship 
Even after the normatively salient motives and beliefs have been accommodated, there are 
sall certain features of human beings and the world whch act as constraints on the possible 
demands of justice. That is, there are logcally possible canchdates for demands of justice 
whlch would be practically impossible for citizens to fulfill because they lack not simply the 
motivation at present, but the capacity to do so. A conception of justice, I wdl argue, must 
reconcile itself not only to the normatively salient motives of human beings but to the h t s  
of their capacities as well. Indeed, because the solution to the problem of existing motives 
and beliefs defended here fads to accommodate allantecedent motives and beliefs, an 
adequate approach to concerns about realism d also have to offer a solution to the 
problem of motivational possibiltty. Though I d not try to show how a particular 
conception of justice should locate that motivational possibhty, I will argue that any 
compehg  conception of justice wdl have to show how it can generate or draw on internal 
sources of motivation and/or on the moral and religous doctrines whch citizens endorse. 
To put it another way, a defensible conception of justice must offer a solution to the 
problem of motivational possibiltty whch does not rely on external constraints or coercive 
means to assure its stabiltty. That means that a conception of justice must be able to show 
how citizens living under institutions designed accordtng to that conception could develop 
the sense of justice necessary to support those institutions and that conception. 
To solve the problem of motivational possibhty, then, I shall do three h g s :  First I 
wdl argue that the h d  of reasonable reflection on antecedent motives, whch is demanded 
by the ideal of deliberative democracy, is consistent with a realistic conception of deliberative 
citizenshp. I try to show that human beings are capable not simply of strategc reasoning on 
determinate aims and interests, but that human agents have a capacity for practical, reflective 
reasoning about the necessity and value of those aims and interests whch is fachtated and 
encouraged by deliberative democratic arrangements. 
Second, solving the problem of motivational possibhty requires institutions whlch are 
designed not only in accordance with the demands of the favoured conception of justice but 
whch can also encourage the exercise of deliberative citizenshp and generate both a greater 
sense of legtimacy and motivational support for the conception of justice. Institutional 
arrangements whlch encourage democratic deliberation, I argue, can help citizens to be more 
reflective about their determinate preferences, opinions, and beliefs and help them to acquire 
the "sense of justice" necessary to support a conception of justice. At the same time, 
however, I maintain that appropriate institutions will be adopted and stable only when 
citizens already have the necessary motivation to adopt and support those institutions whch 
leads me to endorse a dynamic model of justice, motivation, and reasonable pluralism in 
whch just institutions and a just social ethos are mutually reinforcing. 
T h d ,  and finally, I argue that a conception of justice can and should draw support 
from citizens' attachment to reasonable ethlcal or religous comprehensive doctrines but in a 
way whlch avoids unreflective and unnecessary accommodations of the determinate content 
of any particular view. When citizens are able to regard a conception of justice as 
compatible, perhaps even required by, their particular moral and religous worldviews, that 
conception of justice, I argue, d be more stable because regarded as legtimate. Thus, I 
articulate and defend a more democratic version of Rawls's idea of an overlapping consensus 
whch seeks to reconcile political agents to the fact of reasonable pluralism and to generate 
legrdmacy for a freestandmg political conception of justice. While the appeal for support 
from reasonable comprehensive doctrines may not improve the motivational realism of a 
conception of justice, it would gve citizens reasons to endorse a conception of justice that 
are themselves more imme&atelp accessible to those citizens. 
justice. R e a h .  and Legitimay 
If those arguments are compehg  then we wdl have made sipficant progress towards 
offering a compehg  approach to the concerns about justice and realism. But an important 
question wdl remain: Why should addressing concerns about realism matter at all when 
theorizing about justice? The solution to the first-level problem - the problem of existing 
motives and beliefs - has a bdt-in response: We accommodate those motives and beliefs 
whlch are normatively salient rather than merely practically salient. But the solutions to the 
problems of motivational possibihty and doctrinal compatibhty lack that h d  of bullt-in 
response. Indeed, from the utopian perspective the problems of possibihty and 
compatibhty appear as problems of mere application or stabihty rather than normatively 
salient problems. Worrylng about these problems seems to confuse fundamental principles 
of justice with the application of those principles. 
Throughout the dssertation I shall try to make the case that solving the problems of 
motivational possibihty and doctrinal compatibihty, whch appear to be mere stabihty 
problems, are in fact requirements of justice. A conception of justice that lacks a plausible, 
even if improbable, account of how it could preserve itself over time would fail to gain the 
endorsement of democratic citizens concerned not with their private preferences, interests, 
and beliefs but with the common good of a democratic society. 
The idea is h s :  A conception of justice, on my view, must be a conception to whch 
citizens agree or could agree. But even if we can locate that agreement, once the conception 
of justice is in place, it is hkely that some citizens d violate or be tempted to violate the 
demands of justice from time to time. In that case, a just society is justified in using or 
threatening to use coercion to ensure compliance with the fair terms of social cooperation 
whch the violators or potential violators themselves have, or could have, endorsed as 
reasonable. But surely no one could rationally or reasonably agree to principles of justice 
whch are either motivationally impossible or with whch reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines are incompatible because doing so would be to agree to be subjected to inevitable 
and hale  coercion. That is, if the demands of justice are beyond the motivational capacities 
of human beings or require commitments and behaviour whch reasonable citizens attached 
to reasonable comprehensive doctrines could not fulfill, then citizens would inevitabb face 
coercive action. And, moreover, because changes in behaviour and attitude are either 
motivationally or doctrinally impossible, the coercion would serve no practical purpose, it 
would be@tzie. My claim, then, is that because no rational or reasonable citizen would agree 
to unavoidable and pointless coercive action, only a conception of justice wluch offered 
solutions to the problems of motivational possibhty and doctrinal compatibhty could 
achleve legtimacy . 
In the end, motivational possibhty and doctrinal compatibihty are not simply concerns 
about the realism or stabhty of a conception of justice, but concerns about the veq j ztstness 
of the conception of justice. 
Jztstice, Realisni, and Reasonable Hope 
I asserted that solutions to the problems of motivational possibdity and doctrinal 
compatibhty must be provided as a matter of justice but I also asserted that the account of 
how citizens could be motivated to uphold a defensible conception of justice simply needs to 
be an account of possibhty rather than one of probabhty. Yet the standard of possibhty, 
rather than probabihty, might stnke realist theorists as inadequate. Against that realist 
concern, I d l  make the case throughout the hssertation that our theorizing about justice 
should not be h t e d  by what it is reasonable to eqect in human behaviour and institutional 
design. Theorizing about justice should not be h t e d  by the parameters of pessimistic or 
optimistic expectation. Rather, theorizing about justice should be guided, and h t e d ,  only 
by what it might be reasonable to hope for in political life.' 
My interest in what I call the politics of hope and despair has a long personal history. It began with 
my first reading of Camus's essay, "The Myth of Sisyphus" (1991) some fifteen years ago. In that 
essay Camus instructs us that we must somehow itnagme the tragic character Sisyphus happy. 
Additionally, the role that might be played by hope in political theory has been a background concern 
while reading Rousseau, Kant, and Rawls, among others. More recently, I was drawn into thinlilng 
Thus, the dstinction that should p d e  political theory is not a dstinction between 
political optimism and pessimism, but instead a dstinction between political hope and 
despair. Political optimism is the view that the societies in whch we live d become more 
just as time passes; it is an expectation that citizens, institutions, and society as a whole will 
become more rather than less just over time. Political pessimism, by contrast, is the view 
that the societies in whch we live d not become more just over time and that they may 
even become less so. But we should h u t  theorizing about justice not in the hght what we 
e.xpect or don't expect to occur. Rather, we should h t  theory only by the parameters of 
political hope:. Political hope e n d s  the conviction that a better world is possible, even if 
unhkely. Though some may come to regard the demanding conception of deliberative 
citizenship defended here as evidence of a naive political optimism, we should instead regard 
it as part of an attempt to construct an attractive conception of justice rooted in the idea that 
justice is within the reach of human beings. It is rooted in the hope that it is possible to 
sever the Thrasymachan h k  between power and the content of justice. As Rawls puts it, 
"political pldosophy is realistically utopian when it extends what are ordmanly thought to be 
the h u t s  of practicable political possibihty and, in so doing, reconciles us to our political and 
social condtion" (199913: 11). In short, a realistically utopian approach to justice limits its 
hopes only by what is practically possible, not by what is politically probable nor by what is 
gven by the political status quo. Indeed, if theorizing about justice takes its cues from an 
more seriously about hope and despair after r e a h g  Jose Saramago's devastating novel Blindness in 
whlch Saramago somehow manages to s h e  a light of hope into an otherwise depressing portrait of 
the human condition at the end of the twentieth century (Saramago, 1997). W e  these and other 
works, along with events in the world both tragic and pathetic, have made thoughts about the 
meaning and worth of hope an ongoing theme in my own internal monologue, my decision to work 
through these tlioughts more systematically and publicly was inspired and encouraged by Joshua 
Cohen. For the example he has provided through his own work and the explicit encouragement he 
has given to me in this regard, I owe hun an enormous debt. 
unjust political status quo, and regards that status quo as unalterable, then it is hard to see 
how theorizing about justice could produce a n y k g  more than a political theory of despair. 
Thus, s realistically utopian approach to principles of justice does not assume that all 
features of the world, includmg existing human desires and beliefs, are fixed. Some of those 
features can be changed even if the outer h u t s  of change are themselves fixed. So what we 
should take as the h u t s  of the possible, then, are not the existing motives and beliefs of 
human beings; rather the h u t s  of motivational possibfity and doctrinal compatibhty should 
be fixed only by what we might reasonably hope for. 
But what would it be reasonable to hope for? Why would it be reasonable to hope for 
certain changes and unreasonable to hope for others? Answering those questions in h s  
introductory chapter would take us too far into the substance of the chssertation at this early 
stage. Nevertheless, askmg the question now inchcates that what we conclude about the role 
that the demands of realism, especially motivational and doctrinal concerns, should have in 
theorizing about justice, d be p d e d  by what could be regarded as reasonable. As the 
appeal to an ideal of deliberative democracy and a conception of deliberative citizenshp will 
make clear, the content of the reasonable is gven by what free and equal citizens could 
justify to each other under ideal deliberative conchtions. And that method of gleaning the 
content of the reasonable should ensure that when we consider the relationshp between 
justice and reality we do not gve in to the realists' pessimism, the utopians' nalve optimism 
nor, especially, to the politics of despair. 
V. Chapter Outline 
The first three chapters following h s  introduction examine how concerns about the 
demands of realism are addressed in the political theories of Rousseau, Rawls, and 
Habermas. In these three chapters the focus is primarily on the first demand of realism - 
the problem of motivation - and while pluralism does receive some attention, it is addressed 
more fully in chapters 5 and 6. As I noted earlier, each theorist takes the practical aim 
seriously and tries to offer a conception of justice or political arrangements whch would 
reconcile utopian ideals and the demands of realism without simply r e s i p g  principles of 
justice to an objectionable status quo. And whlle each theorist provides some clues about 
how the tension between justice and the demands of realism should be addressed, I argue 
that, for different reasons, each view ultimately fads to provide an adequate approach to 
solving that tension. 
In Chapter 2 , I  consider Rousseau's attempt to solve the problem of motivation with a 
combination of transformative and accommodationist strateges. Rousseau defends a 
political theory whch accommodates citizens' fundamental interests in freedom and security 
but also holds that interests and motives whch confict with the fundamental interests are 
legtimate objects of political transformation. In offering h s  solution to the problem of 
motivation Rc~usseau provides us with three critical ideas: the idea of a shared point of view 
whch helps to dstinguish between interests and motives whch should and those whch 
should not be accommodated by a conception of justice; a conception of the person 
understood as free and equal; and a view about the way institutions and the social ethos 
interact to produce the sense of justice necessary to solve the problem of motivational 
possibhty. 
However, whde Rousseau offers these insights about how to resolve the justice and 
motivation tension, there are two weaknesses in h s  theory that prevent us from endorsing 
hls view altogether: First, his move to identify the "fundamental interests" of human beings 
prior to democratic deliberation risks makmg citizens the objects rather than subjects of 
political &sco>urse and, consequently, unable to make contact with the sources of motivation 
on whch hls theory depends. Second, Rousseau draws the h t s  of practical possibihty too 
broadly when he fads to acknowledge the h t s  imposed by the range of reasonable 
pluralism and the need to reconcile a conception of justice to that range. In short, whde 
Rousseau offers some hection, the monologcal variant of realistic utopianism that he 
defends - accordmg to whch we dlscover appropriate principles through inner reflection - 
fails to adequately address concerns about justice and the demands of realism. 
Llke Rousseau, Rawls regards the tension between justice and motivation as sigmficant 
and in need of a solution. Whether a conception of justice can acheve motivational stabhty 
is treated not as a mere practical issue but as a normatively salient concern. But hke 
Rousseau, Rawls does not want to offer a conception of justice whch amounts to a mere 
rational bargain among political actors fully aware of their determinate preferences, interests, 
and motives. Instead, he wants to articulate principles of justice which are insulated from 
agents' objectionable preferences, interests, and motives - that is, principles whch maintain 
a critical &stance from the social and political status quo and its resource and power 
inequalities. 
Thus, in Chapter 3, I take up Rawls's hypothetical constrmctim>t variant of the realistically 
utopian project accordmg to whch principles are presented as the outcome of a hypothetical 
procedure that identifies and relies on relevant reason. In that chapter I ask whether Rawls's 
attention to the "strains of commitment" leads hun to make accommodations to unattclctive 
motives and I argue that, in light of Rawls's later revisions of the role of the primary goods 
and the conception of the person, attention to the strains of commitment does not force 
concessions tc) objectionable motives. In the course of examining Rawls's view, we confront 
more f d y  the idea that motivation matters not simply for reasons of feasibhty and stabhty, 
but for reasons of justice itself. Indeed, Rawls defends a realistically utopian conception of 
justice whch in part ties the justification of principles to their legtimacy and, in so doing, 
inmcates that motivational concerns are relevant to the content of justice. 
However, two concerns about Rawls's hypothetical constmctiuist approach are left 
unaddressed m Chapter 3: In the first place, it is unclear why legtimacy and agreement need 
to play such fundamental roles in the construction of a conception of justice. As G.A. 
Cohen (2003) holds, it is not clear what, if a n y h g ,  legtimacy and agreement add to the 
justness of a conception of justice. Perhaps concerns about motivation can be handled 
without the idea of agreement. The other outstandmg issue has to do with how Rawls's 
approach fares in light of the hversity of moral and religous worldviews whch characterizes 
contemporary democratic societies - the other feature of our social and political condtion 
with which the &ssertation is concerned. In the search for motivational possibhty under 
conhtions of pluralism, Rawls's political theory might require further revision. A final 
assessment of Rawls's approach to justice and the demands of realism, then, is postponed 
u n d  these outstandmg issues are addressed. 
Chapter 4 b e p s  with Habermas's attempt to address the first unaddressed issue from 
the previous chapter and it reconsiders Rawls's political theory in light of the more 
democratic approach to the problem of motivation that Habermas defends. Habermas 
champions a ctiscursive conception of democracy whch tries to embrace Rousseau's 
conviction, on the one hand, that "human beings act as free subjects only insofar as they 
obey just those laws they gve  themselves" (Haberrnas, 1996: 445-6) and Rawls's claim, on 
the other hand, that principles of justice should not be tainted by objectionable interests nor 
influenced by power inequalities. At the same time, however, Habermas rejects Rawls's 
attempt to insulate deliberation about principles of justice from the determinate preferences, 
interests, and beliefs of citizens in an origmal position. Instead, he defends a principle of 
Qscourse ethics whch gves citizens a central role in Qscourses about those norms whch 
wdl apply to institutions and actions while it simultaneously filters out objectionable motives 
and interests via an impartial moral point of view implicit in the pragmatic presuppositions 
of argurnenta tion. Thus, Habermas offers what we might refer to as a realpmceduralist 
approach, as opposed to the Rawlsian hypothetical constn/ctiv.rt approach, to deahg with 
concerns about justice and realism 
R h l e  Habermas's attempt to democratize the procedure for dscovering appropriate 
norms is an important development and one whch a Rawlsian approach should consider, 
Habermas's rea/pmceduralirt variant of the realistically utopian approach ultimately fails to 
provide an attractive approach to the justice and realism tension. In h s  effort to 
"unburden" citizens of the coptive,  motivational, and organizational demands of complex 
societies by shfting from inclusive Qscourses to a more anonymous flow of reasons 
(Habermas, 1!196: 114), Habermas abandons the mechanism by whlch transformations of 
citizens' pre-political preferences and beliefs can be acheved and whch can encourage the 
development of the "postconventional stage of moral consciousness" (Habermas, 1990: 109) 
or sense of justice. I argue that a concern for citizens' capacity to support valid principles of 
justice is unavoidable once we r e c o p e  that the very institutions whch Habermas thmks 
can sidestep the realism problem ultimately depend on citizens7 sense of justice and their 
d e s i p g  and reforming institutions in light of that sense of justice. 
With the critical examinations of Rousseau's monologialism, Rawls's hypothetical 
constmcti~rrim, and Habermas's rea/pmceduraIism essentially complete, the Qssertation moves to 
a more systematic consideration of the pluralism concern in Chapter 5 and towards more 
constructive aims in Chapter 6. In Chapter 5, I consider more hectly the problems raised 
by the pluralism of moral and religious views in democratic societies. I elaborate and defend 
a more democratic version of Rawls's overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines and, in doing so, defend the idea that beliefs and reasons matter not simply for the 
stabhty of a conception of justice, but for the very legtimacy and normative attractiveness 
of a conception of justice. Addtionally, I b e p  to sketch a conception of deliberative 
citizenshp whch indcates how the revised idea of an overlapping consensus is neither 
naively utopian nor objectionably practical. That conception of the deliberative citizen, I d 
argue, helps us to see how we can practically accommodate pluralism in democratic societies 
without losing hope that a just society of free and equal citizens is possible. 
Finally. in Chapter 6, I further elaborate and defend my own view about how the 
demands of realism should be addressed in theorizing about justice. The problems of 
motivation and pluralism should be addressed, first, by accommodating some, but not all, 
antecedent motives and beliefs and that decisions about whch should and whch should not 
be accommodated are to be made from the point of view of an ideal of deliberative 
democracy and a conception of deliberative citizenshp. Thus, the solution to the problem 
requires, second, a richer description and defense of the idea of deliberative citizenshp 
sketched at the end of Chapter 5 and an argument about how that conception helps to solve 
the problems of motivation and pluralism. Addtionally, in Chapter 6, I explain how the 
interaction between institutions and citizens' ethos demonstrates why motivational and 
doctrinal concerns are matters of justice and not merely matters of stabhty and I point to a 
solution to the problem of motivational possibhty whlch draws on the idea of deliberative 
citizenshp. 
Rousseau: Monological Realistic Utopianism 

The h t s  of the possible in moral matters are less 
narrow than we dunk. It is our weaknesses, our vices, 
our prejudces that shnnk them. 
- Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1 978: 3.12.2) 
Let us therefore begm by setting all the facts aside, for 
they do not affect the question. 
- Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1 964: 103)~ 
Rousseau's attempt to resolve the tension between justice and the demands of realism moves 
in a realistically utopian &ection. His theory tries to capture the utopian intuition that a 
conception of justice should avoid accommodations to objectionable motives whde 
simultaneously respondmg to the realist challenge to articulate a conception whlch would be 
motivationally stable. The "fundamental problem" that Rousseau sets for h s  political 
phdosophy, then, emerges from the thought that principles of political right must be 
responsive to some demands of realism and unresponsive to others. In h s  words, the 
problem is to "find a form of association that defends and protects the person and goods of 
each associate with all the common force, and by means of whch each one, uniting with all, 
nevertheless (-)beys only hunself and remains as free as before" (SC: 1.6.4). Rousseau's 
contractual solution to that problem places human beings and their most basic interests, as 
well as an idea of legtimacy, at the centre of political theory. Indeed, not only does 
Rousseau dunk that a conception of justice must ensure respect for citizens' fundamental 
Rousseau's works are cited in this chapter as follows: SC 1.6.4.: On the Soria/ Contract, ed. Roger D. 
Masters, trans. J u l t h  R. Masters (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), Book 1, chapter 6, paragraph 
4; LD: Letter to di4hbert on the Theatre, trans. Allan Bloom (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968); 
Dl: First Discourse, and DZ: Second Dirmurse, ed. R. Masters, trans. R. Masters and J. Masters (New 
York St. Martin's Press, 1964); E: Ernie, trans. Barbara Foxley (London: Everyman, 1993); P: The 
Got)ernment of Pdand, trans. Willmore Kendall (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1985). 
interests, it must also offer an account of motivational possibihty. That is, if agents are not 
already motivated by their objective fundamental interests, as Rousseau dunks they should, 
then the account of motivational possibhty he offers helps us to see how it would be 
possible for citizens to be so motivated. 
But Rousseau is not a brute realist who dunks that existing preferences, interests, and 
motives must be accommodated uncritically by a conception of justice. While he wants 
political theory to have a practical role and dunks that principles must be both constrained 
and legtimized by the h u t s  of motivational possibhty, he does not want to make 
concessions to objectionable or unattractive motives. In the Second DZJL-ourse Rousseau urges 
us to " b e p  by setting all the facts aside, for they do not affect the question" (DZ: 103). The 
Social Contract, moreover, holds that it is both possible and desirable to transform the social 
ethos of citizens to be more supportive of just social arrangements. Yet, the idea that we 
should set facts aside and work to transform the social ethos leads some critics to complain 
that Rousseau7s political theory is objectionably utopian and that it threatens, rather than 
protects, freedom. Indeed, it would appear that Rousseau's transformative ambitions 
confhct with his aim to look for a legtimate and rehble social order "takmg men as they 
are." The tension between the projects of accommodation and transformation presses us to 
ask just what are the motives that, in Rousseau's view, require transformation and what are 
the motives or interests whch a conception of justice must respect? 
Rousseau offers what we can call a monoLogZca/variant of the realistically utopian 
approach to justice and realism. On that kmd of view, principles of justice are to be 
Qscovered through a process of inner reflection. Thus, Rousseau relies on a moral point of 
view, whch he calls the "inner voice" of reasonable human beings, to dlstinguish between 
human beings7 real and artificial interests. The fundamental human interests in freedom and 
security identified by the moral point of view not only require protection in political 
arrangements but gve those political arrangements their central focus. Interests and motives 
whch confict with the fundamental aims of security and freedom are legtimate objects of 
political transformation, on Rousseau's view, and those transformations are acheved 
through sociahzation under just institutions. In effect, Rousseau defends a political theory 
whch reahes and protects citizens' fundamental interests in freedom and security and 
provides an account of how that conception of politics could be motivationally stable. In 
doing so he provides us with three ideas that help to resolve the tension between justice and 
motivation: the idea of a shared point of view whch helps to d ~ s t i n p s h  between motives 
whch should and those whch should not be accommodated by a conception of justice; a 
conception of the person understood as free and equal; and a view about the way institutions 
and the social ethos interact to produce the sense of justice necessary to solve the problem 
of motivational possibhty. 
However, whde Rousseau offers these insights about how to resolve the justice and 
motivation tension, there are two weaknesses of h s  monological approach that prevent us 
from endorsing h s  view altogether: First, Rousseau's move to identi+ the "fundamental 
interests" of human beings through a process of inner reflection and thus prior to 
democratic deliberation risks m a h g  citizens the objects rather than subjects of political 
dscourse and, consequently, unable to make contact with the sources of motivation on 
whch Rousseau's theory depends. Second, Rousseau fails to acknowledge the h t s  of 
practical possibhty imposed by the range of reasonable pluralism and the need to reconcile a 
conception of justice to that range.%e reasonable citizens could come to endorse 
9 The phrase "range of reasonable pluralism" was suggested to me by David Estlund. I use it rather 
than the term "fact of reasonable pluralism" used by Cohen (1993) and Rawls (1996) because the 
former allows us to think about not just the existing moral and religious worldviews and how they 
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Rousseau's political arrangements, the cixd relqgon whlch accompanies those arrangements 
and whlch acts as an addtional source of motivation is incompatible with the pluralism that 
would emerge from the political institutions. Where that pluralism is "reasonable" - an idea 
I wiU explain below - Rousseau faces not only a problem of motivational stabhty, but a 
problem of justice as well. In effect, while Rousseau's monologcal approach to the justice 
and realism tension offers useful insights with respect to motives and motivational 
possibhty, the reliance on inner reflection makes it dfficult for agents to recognize the range 
of reasonable pluralism whlch constitutes another important demand of realism to whch a 
conception of justice must attend. 
I wdl begm with an examination of Rousseau's projects of transformation and 
accommodation (section I). Next, I d consider the moral point of view whlch guides 
those projects (section 11) and the solution Rousseau offers for the problem of motivational 
possibhty (section 111). In section IV, I present the &st of two objections - namely, that in 
the absence of more deliberative and participatory arrangements Rousseau neglects an 
important source of motivational possibhty. In section V, I present what I t h k  is a more 
fundamental objection to Rousseau's attempt to reconcile justice and the demands of realism 
- namely, that adopting a monologia/ approach to resolving the tension, and thus locating the 
moral point of view in the "inner voice" of human beings, fads to take account of the range 
of reasonable pluralism. 
might affect the content of justice, but also the range of possibly reasonable comprehensive doctrines 
that might require accommodation even though they are not instantiated in the world as we find it 
now. 
I. Transformation and Accommodation 
Although Rousseau b k s  that interests and motives are relevant to political theory - that 
political theory should have a practical role and that principles must be both constrained and 
legtimized b \ ~  fundamental human interests - he does not want to make concessions to 
objectionable or unamactive interests and motives. "' R e s i p g  ourselves to accommodating 
all existing interests and motives would be to make justice n o b g  more than a description 
of the social and political status quo with all its inequalities and restrictions on freedom. By 
contrast, Rousseau wants to offer an emancipatory political theory, a political theory that 
would instruct human beings on how to free themselves from enslavement to vanity and 
how to overcome the inequalities in political and economic power whlch contribute to their 
misery. And that emancipation requires a sipficant transformation of the social and 
political ethos. Indeed, in the S o d  Contract, Rousseau holds that it is both possible and 
desirable to transform the social ethos of citizens to be more supportive of just social 
arrangements1' Whereas natural human beings are essentially good but unable to reap the 
benefits of social cooperation and whereas social human beings reap some of the benefits of 
social cooperation but exhbit certain social vices, Rousseau aims to set up institutions whlch 
would transform human beings into virtuous citizens - that is, citizens who could benefit 
from social cc)operation wlde acting in just or moral ways. 
But transformation represents only one element, albeit an important element, of 
Rousseau's political theory. Rousseau is just as concerned that the principles of justice 
accommodate interests in security and freedom that are the most basic and most important 
lo I will discuss the relationslup between interests and motives in Rousseau's theory later in h s  
chapter (Section 111). For the time being, I will consider how Rousseau tries to accommodate and/or 
transform interests and motives understood as s d a r  demands of realism. 
l1 Rousseau argues, for example, that there should be a Legslator who "is capable of changmg 
human nature.. .of transforming each inhvidual.. .of altering men's constitution" (SC 3.7.3). 
interests whch he dunks uldmately motivate behaviour and whose accommodation is 
necessary if we are to have principles ofjustice at all. Nevertheless, just as the transformative 
aim is guided and h t e d  by certain facts about human beings, the task of reconchation is 
guided and limited by a dstinction between h d s  of interests and motives. In the Second 
Discourse Rousseau criticizes Hobbes's understandmg of what constitute fixed, and what 
constitute contingent, features of human beings and maintains that some of those contingent 
features are objectionable. Rousseau's realistically utopian political theory, then, emerges 
from the dalectic between the aims of accommodation and transformation and is guided by 
a moral point of view. Before inquiring into the content of that moral point of view, we 
should consider more fully Rousseau's projects of transformation and accommodation. 
Rousseau's So&/ Contract presents an ambitious plan to transform social human beings into 
virtuous citizens.12 As Habermas puts it, "Rousseau imagines the constitution of popular 
sovereignty through the social contract as a h d  of existential act of sociation through whch 
isolated and success-oriented indviduals tran$om themselves into citizens oriented to the 
common good of an ethcal community" (Habermas, 1998: 102). It is thls plan whch raises 
the suspicions of critics who see Rousseau's political theory as objectionably utopian and 
totalitarian. To be sure, their fears are fanned by Rousseau's statement that "the less the 
indvidual wills relate to the general d, that is to say customary conduct to the laws, the 
more repressi~~e force has to be increased" (SC: 3.1.1 3). 
But Rousseau dunks that a transformation of the social ethos is necessary because 
human beings, in their social condtion, have developed a number of objectionable motives 
or vices whch compete with the common good. He says that "men are wicked; a sad and 
constant experience makes proof unnecessary" (02: 208112). That the status quo social ethos 
is undesirable -- i.e., characterized by a widespread desire for relative social standmg and by a 
concern for private preference rather than general interest - gves Rousseau a reason to 
advocate transformation. That the social ethos is artlfactztai3 - i.e., the product of social 
artifice rather than an essential feature of the deep structure of human nature and therefore 
malleable - gives Rousseau hope that transformation might succeed.14 He aims, then, to 
chscover a leh$imate social order that can produce a "remarkable change in man, by 
substituting justice for instinct in h s  behaviour and gving hls actions the morality they 
previously lacked" (SC: 1.8.1). Rousseau does not dunk that the task is to peel back the 
artificial layers and return human beings to the ideahed state of nature; rather the task is to 
take people as they are - naturally good but socially corrupted - and turn them into virtuous 
citizens. 
But wh.y does Rousseau dunk that a just social ethos, or a virtuous citizenry, is 
necessary? K'hy not dunk instead that political institutions should be adopted whch 
separate powers and establish a system of checks and balances so that the conficting self- 
interests can be duected to produce good out~omes? '~ To see why not, consider the fourth 
l2 Indeed, Rousseau sees as one of his primary aims the examination of "the act by whch a people 
becomes a people. For this act.. .is the true basis of society" (JC: 1.5.2). 
I take this term from Cohen and Rogers (1995). 
14 But not infinitely malleable. The hndamental human interests in self-preservation and freedom 
are not malleable because they are part of the deep structure of human nature. 
'5 Machavelli (1979) holds that human nature is both selfish and immutable and, as such, cannot be 
relied upon for the stabihty of a republic. The best we can do, he argues, is to create a system of 
dvided powers with checks and balances and arrange the system so that people's selfishness, when 
checked and balanced by the selfishness of others, will produce good outcomes. W e  less 
pessimistic about human nature, H a d t o n ,  Madison &Jay (1982) agree that people can not be relied 
upon to always act in virtuous ways and so they also defend a system of checks, balances, and dvided 
powers to stabihze the American republic. 
of Rousseau's types of laws - what he calls "mores, customs, and.. .opinions" (SC: 2.12.5). 
He writes that tius type of law 
is not engraved on marble or bronze, but in the hearts of citizens; whch is the 
true constitution of the State; whch gains fresh force each day; whch, when 
other laws age or Qe out, revives or replaces them, preserves a people in the 
spirit of its institution, and imperceptibly substitutes the force of habit for that 
of authority (SC: 2.12.5). 
The idea seems to be that the social ethos of the citizenry supports the laws and institutions 
and provides a land of standard for j u d p g  when they need revision and what revisions 
should be made. Indeed, Rousseau seems to dunk that a virtuous social ethos is necessary 
for the stabhty of just arrangements and for their effective operation. In h s  respect he 
anticipates the conviction of the late American judge Learned Hand who held that "liberty 
lies in the hearts of men and women; when it Qes there, no constitution, no law, no court 
can save it; no constitution, no law, no court can even do much to help it. While it lies there 
it needs no constitution, no law, no court to save it" (1952: 190). Both men dunk that 
primary support for freedom comes not from institutions, but from citizens themselves. 
When institutions decay, or when structural changes make them ineffective, the only sure 
guide to reforming institutions rests in the social ethos of the citizenry.'" 
Yet Rousseau's reasons for aiming at a transformation of the social ethos are not 
merely those of stabhty and effectiveness. He believes that a society cannot be just unless 
its citizens arc also just because h s  ideal polis embodes an idea of the common good whose 
reahation depends on the democratic wdl of the sovereign citizens. Because it is democratic 
- that is, because it relies on citizens themselves to say what is and what is not in their 
l6 Consider the words of Pitkin (1981): "Only in public life can we jointly, as a community, exercise 
the human capacity 'to dunk what we are doing,' and take charge of the lustory in which we are all 
constantly engaged by dnft and inadvertence. . . . m he chstinctive promise of political freedom 
remains the possibihty of genlune collective action, an entire community consciously and jointly 
shared, general interest - citizens must be made aware of what are, and how they can 
properly pursue, their fundamental interests. Citizens must ask themselves not simply what 
would be best for the satisfaction of their private interest or what they would prefer, but 
instead what the general d requires. If "one always wants what is good for oneself, but 
one does not always see it" then a transformation of the social ethos can help citizens to see 
just what is in the common interest (SC: 2.3.1). In particular, the transformation of the 
social ethos would help citizens to see that "authentic" acts of the general d aim to protect 
their fundamental and shared interests in security and freedom and that they aim to do so 
equally." ,4nd seeing that would help citizens vote as Rousseau h k s  they should. It would 
help citizens to understand that "[wlhen a law is proposed.. .what they are being asked is not 
precisely whether they approve or reject the proposal, but whether it does or does not 
conform with the general will that is theirs" (SC: 4.2.8). Rousseau7s transformation of the 
social ethos would help to ensure that "the characteristics of the general wdl are.. .in the 
majority" (SLI 4.2.9).lX 
To acheve the desired tlansformation of "wickedness" into virtuous citizenshp, then, 
Rousseau suggests that our hopes rest on the possibhty of a Legslator wridng good laws 
whch would effect the virtuous transformation of the social ethos. T h s  mechanism aims to 
change those preferences and beliefs whch motivate behaviour that is objectionable from 
the point of view of human security and freedom, in ways that would help citizens protect 
shaping its policy, its way of life." This idea will receive sigmficant elaboration and defense in 
Chapters 4 and 6. 
17 "[Elvery authentic act of the general will.. .obligates or favors all citizens equally" (SC: 2.4.8). 
lK Rousseau also thinks that justice is not achieved unless it is felt in the human heart. In &us he 
anticipates the ](antian idea that what matters is not the consequence of an action but the purity of 
the motive of the agent who performs the action. In Emiie Rousseau writes "justice and lilndness are 
no mere abstract terms, no mere moral conceptions framed by the understandng, but tme afection~ of 
the head enlightened by reason (E: 235-6). 
their fundamental interests consistent with the protection of the fundamental interests of 
others. Rousseau writes that 
[t]he general ulll is always right, but the judgment that p d e s  it is not always 
enhghtened.. ..Private in&viduals see the good they reject; the public wants the 
good it does not see. All are equally in need of gudes. The former must be 
obliged to make their wills conform to their reason. The latter must be taught to 
know what it wants.. ..From h s  arises the necessity for a legslator (SC 2.6.10). 
The role and powers of the Legslator seem to raise a dark cloud over Rousseau's otherwise 
democratic project. He says that the Legslator should be "capable of changmg human 
nature. . .of transforming each indvidual. . .of altering men's constitution" and, for those 
tasks, he is gven the power to draft the laws (SC 2.7.3). Yet, while the legslator drafis the 
laws, he has no ltyjdaative right - the people retain the power to accept or to reject a law that is 
proposed by him. Even so, the legslator must have recourse to some power in order to get 
the people to agree to those laws whch are in their best interest - that is, laws whch 
transform them in positive ways. The problem here is that the legslator can use neither 
force (because that would conhct with men's freedom to obey only those laws whch they 
gve  themselves) nor reason (because people do not yet have the virtuous "social spirit" 
whch would help them to r e c o p e  and accept good laws). As Rousseau puts it, "the social 
spirit whch should be the result of the institution, would have to preside over the foundmg 
of the institution itself; and men would have to be prior to laws what they ought to become 
by means of laws" (SC: 2.7.9). So the legslator "must necessarily have recourse to another 
order of authority, whch can win over without violence and persuade without convincing" 
(SC: 2.7.9). That other "authority" is religon and I d &scuss that in section nT. 
2. Accommodation 
Rousseau's view of what is required in order for there to be a just political order is insulated 
from citizens' existing interests and the structures of power. It sets out a procedural and 
substantive test for principles and laws if they are to be regarded as legtimate whch requires 
that citizens act from a knowledge of and commitment to a "general d7 whch is 
dstinguished from, and often in tension with, their particular motives and interests. But 
whlle private motives and interests are legtimate targets of transformation, two interests 
whch Rousseau thmks all human beings share gve h s  political theory as a whole its 
character and purpose: the interest in self-preservation and the interest that human beings 
have in their freedom. Accommodating these hndarnental interests, Rousseau thmks, are 
necessary not only from the perspective of stabhty, but from the perspective of justice. The 
interests in self-preservation and freedom, in other words, are not simply interests whch 
affect the plausibhty of political arrangements; rather, the way in whch these considerations 
are addressed by a conception of justice affects the veryj~st-ness of that conception." 
Because Rousseau regards freedom and security as the fundamental interests of human 
beings (about whch more wdl be said in the next section), justice requires that these 
fundamental interests be emboded in and protected by political theory and political 
arrangements. 
Rousseau writes that man's "first law is to attend to h s  own preservation, h s  first 
cares are those he owes h s e l f '  (SC 1.2.2). In h s  regard, Rousseau agrees with Hobbes. 
But u&e Hobbes, Rousseau maintains that freedom is as important to human beings as 
their security. Indeed, he asserts that "[tlo renounce one's freedom is to renounce one's 
l9 Stuart W t e  reminds us that "a conception of justice simply is, at the end of the day, an account of 
the shared basic interests of citizens and of the principles that should govern the protection and 
promotion of those interests" (2003: 25). 
status as a man" (SC: 1.4.6). The concern that Rousseau shows for the interests in freedom 
and self-preservation sits in sharp contrast to the claims of h s  critics that lus theory shows 
little or no concern for human interests and aims at all and that he desires above all to mold 
human beings to fit some pre-conceived utopian ideal. 
Consider the contrast between Hobbes's and Rousseau's political thought. Hobbes 
holds that individuals' concern for self-preservation in the state of nature - where there is no 
"common Power to keep them all in awe" - leads to a "perpetuall and restlesse desire of 
Power after power, that ceaseth onely in Death" (Hobbes, 1968: 161, 185). To emerge from 
thls terrible condrtion, in wluch the life of man is "solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and shoa" 
(1 968: 186), Hobbes maintains that each indvidual would agree to gve up her power of self- 
government - -  her freedom - to an absolute sovereign on the condtion that all others would 
do hkewise. 'The agreement entails that "every man should say to every man, IAuthorire and 
give up my fight 4Goveming my .re@, to  t h i ~  Man, or to t b i ~  Assembb of men, on this condition, that thou 
giw up thy &Right to him, andAuthorLse all his Actions in like manner" (1 968: 227). In an 
environment of social interdependence, freedom is held to be irreconcilable with peace and 
preservation. As such, Hobbes opts for peace at the expense of freedom; for what would 
freedom consist in, Hobbes might ask, if indviduals had time for notlung but the struggle 
for personal security? 
Whde Hobbes holds that the provision of security and peace requires the alienation of 
one's right to self-government, Rousseau maintains that neither security nor freedom can 
legtimately be cast aside. Recall h s  belief that "to renounce one's freedom is to renounce 
one's status as a man, the rights of humanity and even its duties" (JC1.4.6). So Rousseau 
rejects Hobbes' assumption that freedom and security are necessarily at odds and suggests, 
rather, that "the essence of the body politic lies in the harmony of obedence and freedom" 
(SC3.13.5). ?'hefundamentaIpmblem, as we have seen, is framed in a way whlch prevents 
Rousseau from reachmg a Hobbesian solution to the problem of collective security. It says 
that the form of association whlch would provide collective security must use means whlch 
ensure that "each one, uniting with all, nevertheless obeys only hunself and remains as free 
as before" (SC: I .6.4). To remain "as free as before", moreover, each agent need only grant 
"obedence to the law one has prescribed for oneself' (SC1.8.3). 
With those parameters, the fundamental problem is solved by a social contract 
whereby each member of society "puts hls person and all hls power in common under the 
supreme &ec;tion of the general wlll" (SC1.6.9). At first glance, tlus solution seems to 
repeat the Hobbesian trade of freedom for security. Indeed, Rousseau writes that the social 
contract entails "the total alienation of each associate, with all hls rights, to the whole 
community" (SC1.6.6). Moreover, he acknowledges that "what man loses by the social 
contract is hls natural freedom and an u b t e d  right to e v e r y k g  that tempts hun and that 
he can get" (JC1.8.2). But whde the social contract ensures that members receive better 
protection because it rests on the power of the whole community and because it ellmlnates 
the need for power struggles, the very nature of that contract and the security that it provides 
makes freedom possible. Rousseau does not h k  that hls social contract entails an 
alienation of freedom for security; rather, he h k s  that the social compact is a freedom 
enhancing or enabling agreement.2" Wokler writes that "whlle for Hobbes, liberty is 
exchanged for authority in men's transfer of their natural rights to their ruler, for Rousseau, 
provided that citizens rule themselves, liberty is won witbin the state rather than protected 
against it" (1 995: 62. My emphasis). To be sure, whlle Rousseau says that human beings 
21' I take the term "freedom-enabling" from Holrnes (1988: 195). 
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lose their "natural freedom", he maintains that they gain "civil freedom" and 
"proprietorsl~p" in its place (SC: 1.8.2).?' 
In any case, the social compact to whch indviduals freely agree in order to improve 
their security e n d s  that members of society are to be ruled by a general lvil Some critics 
thmk that obedence to Rousseau's general will amounts to an alienation of their private wills 
and, therefore, their freedom." But on Rousseau's view, to be ruled by the general willis to be 
subject to laws whose enacment rests on an understandmg of the common good, whch 
embodes "an equal concern for the good of each citizen" (Cohen, 2001: 6). That "good" is 
citizens' shared fundamental interests in security and freedom. In submitting to the hection 
of the genera/ d, ininviduals submit to a sovereign d whlch acknowledges their equal 
worth and whch enacts only that legslation whlch each indvidual, in a reasonable and 
reflective way, could agree is consistent with the common good - that is, consistent with 
their security and freedom. The general wdl is certady not, as many critics suspect, a 
utopian ideal whch Rousseau seeks to impose on the members of the social compact; rather, 
it is an expression of human beings' own hndamental interests in security and freedom and 
a mutually agreed upon understandmg of how those shared aims can be reahzed for all 
equally. Human beings are not clay to be molded or blank slates to be written on; human 
beings - notably, their capacities and their interests - are the primary inputs for political 
ph~losophy and Rousseau7s social contract and general d are an attempt to accommodate 
those basic features of human life. 
a "One must dstinguish carefully between natural freedom, whch is h t e d  only by the force of the 
inchvidual, and civil freedom, whch is limited by the general will; and between possession, which is 
only the effect of force or the right of fest occupant, and property, which can only be based on a 
positive title" (.YE 1.8.2). 
Cassirer (1 959,  Talmon (1 952). 
11. The Moral Point of View 
Rousseau7s attempt to transform the social ethos, on the one hand, and accommodate 
certain fundamental human interests, on the other, might strike us as incoherent. It might 
seem that he advocates a transformation of the social ethos simply to appease critics in the 
utopian tradtion whde makmg accommodations to certain interests simply to appease realist 
critics. However, whde Rousseau's position is complex, it is not incoherent. The dstinction 
between those interests and motives whlch require transformation and those whch demand 
accommodation is made from a moral point of view whlch Rousseau believes is shared by all 
human beings and whch they would recognize if only they would reflect and listen to their 
"inner voice" or "natural feehgs" (E: 290, 303). Because that point of view is stable, 
accessible to all, and universally shared, it provides the basis for reconchg the aims of 
transformation and acc~mmodation.~~ 
Indeed, Rousseau's project is coherent in the sense that it embodes a aonologia.l 
approach to resolving the tension between justice and the demands of realism. When 
confronted with possible gaps between features of human beings and the social and political 
world, on the one hand, and the demands of a canddate conception of justice, on the other, 
Rousseau advises us to consult the inner voice of conscience to dscover the resolution to 
the apparent gap. Theorizing about and practicing justice, on Rousseau7s view, requires 
agents to engage in a pursuit of truth through isolated, indvidual reflection. As we shall see, 
whde the monologcal approach might lead Rousseauian agents to poor conclusions about 
how to reconcile justice and reality, it nevertheless reveals the possibhty of coptively 
dstinguishmg between at least some of the fixed and malleable features of human beings and 
2' On the "inner voice" of conscience, see sections I11 and nT below. 
the social and political world while it simultaneously encourages agents to regard some of 
their motives and beliefs as possible canhdates for legtimate transformation. 
In hls comments on the Social Contract Roger D. Masters offers an important insight 
into the coherence of Rousseau's project. He writes that 
'men as they are' have concerns of 'interest' and 'uthty' whch 'prescribe' h t s  
- 
to a solution, whereas 'laws as they can be' depend on considerations of 'right' 
and 'justice' whch 'permit' - but only pernit - of legrdmacy. In other words 
Rousseau wdl try to adjust 'right' and 'justice' to the necessary demands of self- 
interest" (SC: 133n5). 
By emphasizing that Rousseau wdl adjust principles to the necessay demands of self-interest, 
rather than to aldemands of self-interest, Masters r e c o p e s  that Rousseau does not aim to 
make accommodations to an objectionable social and political status quo whlch he dunks is 
"wicked" and "~orrupted'~. W e  Rousseau is committed to reconchg right and interest 
and thereby acknowledges that political philosophy must respect "the limits of the possible", 
he reminds us that these h t s  "are less narrow than we dunk. It is our weaknesses, our 
vices, our prejuhces that shrink them" (SC: 3.12.2). So whereas the transition from natural 
to social man makes principles of justice necessary, Rousseau does not simply construct 
principles to meet the existing preferences and motives of social man. Rather, he constructs 
h s  political philosophy around a few fundamental interests - that is, interests in freedom 
and self-preservation that human beings have and that it is reasonable for them to have." 
24 Earlier draft5 of the dissertation gave the impression that the &stinction that matters most to 
Rousseau is thc &stkction between interests that arefired and those that are maileabie. Consequently 
it appeared as though the aim of a realistically utopian conception of justice should be to 
accommodate the fixed interests and transform the malleable interests when necessary. Rousseau's 
view is more nuanced and more appeahg than that and I hope to have captured that in the account 
of Rousseau's view presented here. By fundamental interests, or what I referred to in earlier drafts as 
"necessaq-" interests, Rousseau means those interests that must be protected or reahed if human 
beings are to regard themselves as leadng valuable and uniquely human lives. Conveniently, 
Rousseau seems to believe that these funhmentalinterests are alsojxedinterests in the sense of not 
being capable of elmunation from the deep structure of human nature, whereas the objectionable 
determinate interests about whlch Rousseau complains he regards as not being the deep structure and 
are therefore malleable. So, on Rousseau's view, even if certain human beings appear to have, or 
And, he constructs h s  theory with certain features of human beings in mind - namely, that 
their determinate interests, preferences, and beliefs are malleable; that human beings are 
capable of critical reflection on their determinate interests, preferences, and beliefs; and that 
human beings are capable, through such critical reflection, of rejecting or transforming those 
determinate interests, preferences, and beliefs when necessary. But how do we know whch 
interests arej%ndamental, and therefore require protection in a conception of justice, and 
which are not fundamental, and therefore permit of transformation? Moreover, how does a 
political theory whch attempts to protect certain fundamental human interests amount to a 
realistically utopian theory whch offers a solution to the problem of motivation? 
To answer that first question, consider how, in Emile, Rousseau presents an account of 
how an inhvidual can hscover true knowledge despite the corruption of thought by the 
vices of progress. The account he offers constitutes the core of a monologica/approach to 
reconchg justice and the demands of realism. Speakmg in the voice of a "Savoyard vicar", 
he writes that "I do not derive these [principles of conduct] from the principles of the hgher 
philosophy, I find them in the depths of my heart, traced by nature in characters whch 
n o h g  can efface. I need only consult myself with regard to what I wish to do; what 1 feel 
to be right is right, what I feel to be wrong is wrong.. ..Conscience is the voice of the soul, 
the passions are the voice of the body" (E: 298). Indeed, he continues, "[ilt is enough to 
lead you to dstinguish between our acquired ideas and our natural feehgs; for feehg 
precedes knowledge" (E: 303).'~ 
believe they have, an interest in acting cruelly, that interest is not one of the fixed interests that are 
part of the deep structure. To  the question, "if cruelty is simply a part of human nature, does it have 
to be accommodated?", Rousseau would say that the question does not deserve an answer because 
the predicate of the question is false - that is, he would hold that cruelty is not part of human nature, 
even if it often appears to be part of the interests or motivational sets of determinate human beings. 
25 V(%ile the "Creed of a Savoyard Vicar" perhaps best expresses Rousseau's ideas about the moral 
point of view, the idea of looking to one's inner nature for guidance occurred to hun as early as the 
Notice that the advice gven here about lookmg deeper withm oneself parallels 
Rousseau's "hypothetical hstory" of the Second Discourse. Human beings, as they are, have all 
manner of determinate and contingent interests, aims, prejudces, and motives. But if we 
look at human beings in the state of nature - that is, peel back the layers of artificial 
knowledge and look at the deep structure of human nature - then we begm to see that 
Rousseau asks us to transform only those interests and motives whch are inconsistent with 
or confict with the fundamental human interests in self-preservation and freedom. 
Rousseau's "Creed of a Savoyard Vicar" expresses h s  conviction that human beings are 
capable of more than mere instrumental reasoning about how best to satisfy their 
determinate and contingent interests and aims. He endorses a richer conception of the 
person whch sees human beings as free and equal agents with a capacity for critical 
reflection on their existing interests and motives rather than mere instrumental actors who 
regard their preferences and interests as the antecedent and fixed aims of thought and action. 
One of the dungs that makes Rousseau's project interesting for our purposes is that he 
dunks that critical reflection is best conducted not in conversation or deliberation with other 
political or moral agents but instead by the isolated inmvidual alone. To be sure, because 
Rousseau regards social man as corrupted and committed to myriad prejumces, false 
opinions, and unnecessaq- preferences, he thmks that guidance about what is moral and just 
can onh be found by drawing back from social man and into the inner depths of natural 
man. And for knowledge of man as he naturally is, rather than how he is in society, 
Rousseau holds that inner reflection - monologcal reflection - is our truest guide. Only by 
r i d h g  ourselves of social prejumces and preferences can we dscover true knowledge about 
FirJl Dircomse: "0 virtue! Sublune science of simple souls, are so many difficulties and preparations 
needed to know you? Are not your principles engraved in all hearts, and is it not enough in order to 
what is moral and just. Thus, the tension between justice and the demands of realism must 
be resolved, on Rousseau7s view, through such monologcal reflection rather than, say, public 
political negotiation or deliberation. 
Of course, Rousseau's advocacy of a notion of critical reflection on determinate 
preferences and evaluation of the normative defensibhty of various actions and institutions, 
puts lam at odds with realist thmkers who hold that principles of justice are properly 
understood as solutions to collective action problems where existing preferences and 
interests are to be regarded as fixed and therefore resistant to transformation. But that 
doesn't trouble Rousseau because he h k s  that a conception of justice, if it is to be a 
conception ofjustice and not merely a conception of political order, must offer an 
emancipatoq critique of the status quo when the status quo is unacceptable from a moral 
point of view. Existing preferences and interests, he h k s ,  reflect inequalities and 
dfferences in power. Our task is to base political arrangements not on the contingencies of 
power, but instead on fundamental interests and reason. 
If we were to reflect on our natural feehgs and listen to our "inner voices", then, 
Rousseau thmks that we d be able to r e c o v e  self-preservation as o w  &st law and 
freedom as bt)th a fundamental human interest and a basic human capacity. The very act of 
reflecting on and acting from our natural feehgs rather than our social prejumces and 
artificial interests marks the dfference between being a free human being and being a slave 
to one's passions. With regard to whether Rousseau's projects of transformation and 
accommodation are coherent, then, the idea that human beings have the power to reflect and 
to dscover through that reflection their most fundamental interests indicates one way in 
whch the projects cohere. That is, those fundamental interests whch we find once we listen 
learn your laws to commune with oneself and listen to the voice of one's conscience in the silence of 
to our inner voices are the proper objects of accommodation whereas all those prejudces or 
interests whch are incompatible with the fundamental interests are legtimate objects of 
transformation. 
So the "inner voice of conscience" gves us two dungs: In the first place, if we listen 
closely, the inner voice makes us aware of our fundamental human interests in self- 
presen~ation and freedom. And secondly, it gves us a critical standpoint from whch we can 
judge various political arrangements and principles. But the inner voice also gves us a h d  
dung whch accompanies the capacity for critical reflection and complements a concern for 
others' interest in freedom and self-preservation that we might dscover through reason. 
That h d  thing, then, is human beings' natural compassion or pity. Rousseau holds that 
human beings are inspired by a "natural repugnance to see[ing] any sensitive being perish or 
suffer, principally our fellowmen" (02: 95). He does not see this as a duty or obligation 
imposed from the outside; rather, Rousseau regards natural compassion as part of the basic 
motivational set of human beings. An indwidual's "duties towards others," he writes, "are 
not hctated to hlrn solely by the belated lessons of wisdom; and as long as he does not resist 
the inner impulse of commiseration, he wdl never harm another man or even a sensitive 
being, except in the legitimate case where, h s  preservation being concerned, he is obliged to 
gn7e hunself preference" (02: 96). 
Thus the inner voice of conscience gves us not only an awareness of our own and 
others' fundamental interests and an abhty to critically assess proposals for political 
arrangements or principles of justice in terms of their protection of and contribution to the 
fulfillment of those fundamental interests, it also makes us aware of our natural compassion 
- a motivational dsposition that encourages in us a concern for the well-being of others. In 
the passions" (.Dl: 64). 
that sense, the inner voice of conscience does not set out explicit features of a determinate 
conception of justice nor, for that matter, d it always gve us instructions for moral or just 
behaviour. Rather, the inner voice delivers an awareness of our interests in self-preservation 
and freedom, reminds us of our natural compassion, and thus provides us with a moral point 
of view from whch we can assess various proposals for political arrangements and principles 
of justice. And, in light of natural compassion, it ensures that the moral point of view has a 
"motivational complement" (Cohen, 2001 : 54,57) whch allows us to view that moral point 
of view and the obligations that emerge from it, as an internal feature of our humanity rather 
than an external constraint on b e h a ~ i o u r . ~ ~  
Whether that monologcal variant of the realistically utopian approach to the demands 
of realism - in h s  case, the problem of motives - is successful or not is a question that wdl 
be addressed later in the chapter. For the time being, it is enough to r e c o p e  that 
Rousseau holds that inner reflection is the best strategy for reconcdmg justice and 
motivation. 1.f social corruption is the problem - if social corruption is what causes us to 
regard certain features of an objectionable social and political status quo as either fixed or 
2"arah Song has suggested that my readmg of Rousseau as a defender of the emancipatory potential 
of critical reflection and reason rests uneasily with Rousseau's own skepticism of reflection and 
reason that appears in various passages of hls Second Discotrrse. Rousseau writes, for example, that 
"Reason is what engenders egocentrism, and reflection strengthens it. Reason is what turns man 
upon himself' (1987: 53). While I can't offer a detailed reply to Song's challenge, I dunk a reply to 
that concern would move in the following drrection: I thmk that Song is right that there is an 
important connection, in Rousseau's mind, between reason and feeling but that feeling should not be 
confused with the passions. m e n  critical reflection is pursued what we ask is not what the passions 
demand because the "passions are the voice of the body" (E: 298), rather we ask about what our 
deepest feelings tell us: "what I feel to be right is right, what I feel to be wrong is 
wrong.. ..Conscience is the voice of the soul" and "[iJt is enough to lead you to kstinguish between 
our acquired ideas and our natural feehgs; for f eehg  precedes knowledge" (E: 298,303). When 
critical reflection is understood as a matter of investigating our true feelings, it can provide the sort of 
emancipatory potential that I think Rousseau wants it to have in his work. In short, reason or critical 
reflection may hold the promise of emancipation only if it is oriented to discovering and acting on 
behalf of human beings' true feelings rather than their bodily passions and it is reason or critical 
reflection whlch helps us to kstinguish between b o d y  passions and the true feelings or conscience 
that is the "voic:e of the soul." 
desirable or both - then extracting oneself from the social world through monologcal 
reflection must be the best avadable means to sorting through the dtstinction between 
features of human beings and the world that must be accommodated by a conception of 
justice and those whlch must be ignored or transformed. 
111. Motivational Possibility 
Rousseau's accounts of the moral point of view and the psychologcal capacities of human 
beings allow h m  to offer an account of motivational possibhty whlch, as I noted in the 
introduction, is an important part of a solution to the problem of motivation. But 
demonstrating motivational possibhty requires more than an account of the moral point of 
view and the psychologcal capacities of human beings that Rousseau offers. A convincing 
account of motivational possibhty must inQcate not simply that the moral point of view is 
avadable, but also how that moral point of view motivates or could help motivate citizens to 
be just. S d a r l y ,  an account of the psychologcal capacities of human beings must be 
supplemented with an account of how those capacities can be turned towards, or edsted in 
the support of, a normatively defensible conception of justice. Indeed, whde Rousseau has 
offered an account of what interests a conception of justice must endorse and protect in 
order to be nt)rmativel~- defensible, and whde he has indtcated that human beings have a 
capacity for critical reflection, we nevertheless stdl lack an account of how h s  vision is 
motivational4 possible. For instance, if, as Rousseau dunks, a just and legtimate political 
order depends on our agreeing to a social contract to establish that just order and our 
obedtence to only those laws whlch we gve ourselves, then we must be able to regard 
ourselves as free. That is, if the social contract is an agreement made under duress - 
whether of force or of the tyranny of the passions - and if laws are imposed rather than 
adopted, then the agreement and the laws are not legtimate. But if autonomy is a necessary 
condtion of a just political order, then Rousseau's political theory is realistic only if human 
beings are free in the appropriate sense. 
Again, the moral point of view elaborated in Emde - the point of view of the "inner 
voice" - provides the first step in respondmg to these concerns. The Savoyard Vicar says 
that "I was resolved to adrmt as self-evident all that I could not honestly refuse to believe, 
and to adrmt as true all that seemed to follow &ectly from h s ;  all the rest I determined to 
leave undecided, neither accepting nor rejecting it, nor yet t roubhg myself to clear up 
dfficulties whch d d  not lead to any practical ends" (E: 278). The idea here is that one can 
accept as true forpracticalpurposes anydung whch one believes one must accept - for 
instance, that human beings have freedom of the w d  if justice requires that - so long as it 
does not contradct whatever one knows from theoreti~alreason.~' Indeed, when he listens to 
h s  "inner voice" for guidance, Rousseau's finds, among other dungs, that human beings 
have a moral rzat~re and that they arefre to act on principles of that morality. For Rousseau, 
this mean that the motivational demands of the S o d  Contract are not unrealistic because they 
do not stretch the capacities of human beings beyond the b r e a h g  point. 
So far, however, that account of motivational possibhty is sd l  quite h n .  Rather than 
providmg an account of what actively or dlrectly motivates citizens to uphold the political 
order, here Rousseau has merely provided an account of how the demands of h s  political 
order do not demand the motivationally impossible of citizens. Realist hnkers, as we saw in 
Chapter 1, dunk that principles of justice wdl only acheve stabhty when human beings have 
the necessary motivation, as well as good reasons, to actively uphold and to live by the 
principles of justice. Stabhty of principles of justice is not acheved simply by showing that 
" See Kant (1990b) and &nt (1993). 
the demands of justice are not impossible. That human beings are capable of doing certain 
h g s  does not mean that they will actually do those h g s .  For the realist, then, the best 
way to ensure a fit between principles and motivations is to design principles in the full light 
of what human beings are already motivated to support - that is, principles whch 
accommodate existing human behaviour, beliefs, and interests whatever those may be. As 
we have seen above, Rousseau refuses to make accommodations to all facts about human 
beings because some of those facts are objectionable - indeed, some of them confhct with 
other more fundamental facts about human beings includmg the interests in self- 
preservation and freedom. In the Preface to Emile he writes that "People are always t e h g  
me to makepracticable suggestions. You might as well tell me to suggest what people are 
doing already" (E: 2). Thus, he rejects the status quo as having any normative weight. 
But from Rousseau's perspective, the fundamental human interests in freedom and 
security, along with the capacity to r e c o p e  and to act on those interests, gves further 
motivational strength to h s  political arrangements. Those fundamental interests are not only 
accommodated in the political arrangements, they actually motivate human beha~4our in a 
certain sense. But is that true? Is it correct to hold that interests motivate behaviour or that 
interests are the same kmd of phenonema as motives? At first glance, we might h k  that 
human beings would be or are motivated by their interests. But there is a case to be made 
against the claim that interests can or should be understood as  motive^.'^ It is easy to 
imagme instances in whch a person has an interest in sometlung, objectively speakmg, but 
that she fails to be motivated by that interest or fails to act in ways whch would promote 
that interest. For instance, a person may have an objective interest in reducing or e h a t i n g  
her consumption of foods that contain hgh amounts of trans fatty acids in order to reduce 
her risk of heart dsease. But that same person might not be motivated to pursue that 
interest. Instead, she might be motivated by a strong desire to consume rich foods because 
of the pleasure she receives from the taste of these foods. So r e c o p i n g  that a person has 
certain interests - perhaps even certain fundamental interests - does not dlrectly gve us an 
account of that person's motives. Identification of fundamental interests alone will not 
pro~lde a solution to the problem of motivation. 
Rousseau seems to r e c o p e  the &stinction between interests and motives and thus 
the need to develop an even more realistic account of the relationshp between justice and 
motives in The Government ofPoland. Whereas in the Social Contract Rousseau indcates that he 
wants to reconcile what right demands with what interest prescribes, in Poland he r e c o p e s  
that we need also to bring motives into the picture in a more dlrect way.29 Thus, Rousseau 
acknowledges in Poland, as he does in the S o d  Contract, that "[a] good and sound 
constitution is one under whch the law holds sway over the hearts of citizens" (P: 4). But in 
Poland Rousseau also asks "ply what means, then, are we to move men's hearts and bring 
them to love their fatherland and its laws?" And he answers that it should be "[tlhrough the 
games they play as cMdren, through institutions that, though a superficial man would deem 
pointless, develop habits that abide and attachments that nothmg can &ssolve" (P: 4). 
Elsewhere in that work Rousseau says that we transform human beings into citizens who 
love justice by- tying them "tightly to the fatherland", by makmg them patriotic and, at the 
same time, by tying patriotism to justice and virtue (P: 8). The intuition here is that instead 
of tying the demands of justice to human beings' fundamental tnterests, uahlch they may fad to 
perceive, we attempt to tie justice to the beliefs, sentiments, and attachments that already 
2X I thank David Estlund for drawing my attention to this problem and for discussion about its 
significance. 
29 On the attempt to reconcile right and interest, see SC: 1.0.1. 
motivate citizens' behaviour. In that way we can motivate human beings to pursue their 
fundamental interests and justice without either of those h g s  being felt by them as external 
constraints."' If we can successfully tie just behaviour to internalmotivational possibihties, 
rather than to external constraint, then the tension between motivation and justice will be 
sipficantly, if not entirely, defused." 
So Rousseau's account of motivational possibhty draws on three ideas: In the hrst 
place, he holds that h s  political arrangements are not too burdensome because they demand 
of human beings n o h g  more than what they are capable of doing. That is, the demands 
do not break the h t s  of human capacities. Second, positive motivational support for the 
political arrangements can be found in the fact that they are constructed with a view to 
accommodating the fundamental human interests in freedom and self-preservation and that 
motivational complements can be found in the exisdng beliefs, sentiments, and attachments 
of potential citizens. And, h d ,  motivational support is found in the idea that the source of 
those positive motivations is internal rather than external. That is, one need only listen to 
one's "inner voice", rather than the appeals of others, to gain knowledge of one's most basic 
interests and to locate the motivational complements whch support, but do not alter, the 
conception of justice. Internal sources of motivation, Rousseau appears to hold, are more 
Uely to provide support to political arrangements than are external sources or  sanction^.^' 
By linking justice to nationai beliefs, sentiments, and attachments, Rousseau raises serious questions 
about global justice and motivational compliance. Are there any existing beliefs, sentiments, and 
attachments at an international level whtch might be enlisted to solve the tension between motivation 
and global justice? If not, does h s  suggest that global justice is not possible? Or that it is somedung 
altogether dfferent than justice at the level of the nation-state? I intend to pursue some of these 
questions in future work. 
It is important to note here that in Poland Rousseau does not seek to alter the content of justice or 
virtue while trying to reahe justice and virtue in the Polish constitution and state; rather, he merely 
suggests that justice and virtue can become effective in h s  real political society if we can tie its 
demands to the already existing, and motivationally efficacious, beliefs, sentiments, activities, and 
attachments of' the Poles. 
" Ths idea d l  be hrther developed throughout the dissertation, especially in the chapters in Part 11. 
IV. "Real Interests", Coercion, and Motivation 
W e  Rousseau offers some insmctive ideas about how motivational concerns should be 
dealt with in a theory of justice, the three features of h s  solution to the problem of 
motivational possibhty present some new dtffculties. Two dtfficulties in particular should 
be considered: The first, whch I take up in this section, is that the move to identify the 
"fundamental interests" of human beings prior to democratic deliberation risks makmg 
citizens the objects rather than subjects of political dtscourse and, consequently, unable to 
make contact with the sources of motivation on whch Rousseau's theory depends. The 
second, whch is taken up in section V, is that Rousseau's move to fmd part of the account 
of motivational possibhty in the "inner voice" of human beings, and h s  claim that all 
human beings havefundamental interests in freedom and self-presen~ation, colhde with the 
range of reasonable pluralism whch, as I shall argue, is a condtion whch must be 
accommodated by a conception of justice. Thus, whlle Rousseau makes some progress in 
resolving the tension between justice and motivation, that progress comes at the expense of 
a satisfactory solution to the broader concern of the demands of realism more generally. 
That is, because Rousseau's solution to one demand of realism - i.e., motivation - fails to 
adequately address another demands of realism - i.e., the range of reasonable pluralism - the 
project as a whole offers an incomplete approach to the tension between justice and the 
demands of realism more generally. 
Wdhams notes that Rousseau makes a dtstinction between the "real interests" whch he 
h k s  human beings have and "the interests thv dunk they have." That dtstinction, Wdhams 
continues, "has generated a vast literature, and almost an equal amount of 
suspicion.. . pecause] an appeal to people's real interests is often deployed as a reason for 
coercing them contrary to their 'apparent' (that is to say, perceived) interests" (1985: 40). 
Indeed, some critics of Rousseau's theory hold that the "real interests" approach prohbits 
citizens from having other private interests that chffer from their alleged "real interests" and7 
moreover, th.ey hold that thls approach legdmizes the use of coercion to acheve some 
utopian aim. The critics worry that the transformative aims of Rousseau's political theory 
would treat human beings as mere means to some utopian end. To put it another way, these 
critics hold that Rousseau's political theory does not go far enough in accommodating the 
interests and motives whlch citizens might legdmately develop when freedom is properly 
respected. 
Cassirer pursues thls line of criticism when he argues that the transformative aim of 
Rousseau's political thought prevents inchviduals from having private d s  and interests of 
their own. And that means that inchviduals who are party to Rousseau's social contract will 
find themselves in an oppressively conformist state. He argues that, 
The Contract s o d  proclaims and glorifies a completely unbounded absolutism 
of the state. Every particular and inchvidual d is shattered by the power of 
the volontiginirale. The very act of joining the state s ipfies  the complete 
renunciation of all particular desires. Man does not gve h s e l f  to the state 
and to society without gving hunself completely to both. We may speak of a 
real "unity" of the state only if the indwiduals are merged in thls unity and 
chsappear in it (1 954: 52). 
S d a r l y ,  J.L. Talmon, in The &.re ofTotaIitaman Demomap, claims that Rousseau's "aim is to 
train men to 'bear with dochty the yoke of public happiness', in fact to create a new type of 
man, a purely political creature, without any particular private or social loyalties, any partial 
interests" (1952: 42). Talmon repeats the often heard assertion that "Rousseau7s 'general 
wdl'. . .became the clnving force of totalitarian democracy" (1952: 6). Indeed, in seekmg to 
transform preferences and motives whch would be regarded as objectionable from the point 
of view of an allegedly utopian society, Rousseau seems not to take seriously h s  own 
statement that he will take people "as they are." As a result, h s  political theory appears 
hosale to one of the values that he claims to endorse - namely, freedom. So one problem 
with the notion of "real interests", then, is that it seems to legrtimize coercive measures that 
would bring citizens in h e  with some fundamental interests that they are said to have, even 
if they fad to perceive those interests themselves. And whlle those interests might seem 
worthwhde in their own nght, coercion in service of perfectionist aims is objectionable 
because it fails to treat human beings as free. 
These versions of the "real interests" objection, however, rest on a misreadmg of the 
S o d  Contrac!. Rousseau does not say that indviduals cannot have private d s ;  he says only 
that private wills, when they confhct with the general d ,  must pleld. The social contract 
and the genera/ wid do not seek to e h a t e  private or non-shared interests, but rather to 
coordmate the shared interests in security and freedom. Nevertheless, it is m e  to say that 
even if private d s  are permitted, they are required to yleld to the general d when the two 
come into confhct. And it's that yieldmg requirement whch concerns critics hke Cassirer 
and Talrnon, especially when considered alongside Rousseau's claims that human beings 
must be "forced to be free" and that "the less the indvidual d s  relate to the general wd,  
that is to say customary conduct to the laws, the more repressive force has to be increased" 
(SC: 3.1.13). Even if Rousseau h k s  that necessary coercion simply brings human beings 
closer to satisfjhg their fundamental interests in freedom and security, the very use of 
coercion would molate Rousseau's own desire to offer a politically /egttimte alternative to the 
Hobbesian trade of freedom for security. 
Yet, as the section of the Socia/ Contract on the Legslator shows, Rousseau holds that 
the transformative project cannot be acheved through force because that would confhct 
with men's freedom to obey only those laws whlch they gve themselves. The legslator, 
Rousseau writes, "must have recourse to another order of authority, whch can win over 
without violence" (SC: 2.7.9). So the problem with the idea of "real interests" is not that it 
legtirnizes coercive means to acheve the necessary transformations because coercion is 
ruled out by Rousseau as incompatible with human beings' "real interest" in freedom. 
Cassirer and ?ralrnon r e c o p e  a tension in Rousseau's theory between the interests that 
people percelve themselves to have and the fundamental interests whch Rousseau alleges 
that they all have, but they are wrong that the tension necessarily entds coercive measures, 
on the one hand, and a prohbition on private d s ,  on the other. 
Sull, there is an unresolved problem with the notion of "real interests" and its role in 
Rousseau's transformative project. Even if Rousseau can avoid the charge that he endorses 
coercion, there is sall the question of how h s  legslator can get people to agree to those laws 
whch support their "fundamental interests" in security and freedom. In Rousseau's view, 
the gap between citizens' real interests and their perceived interests or between the general 
w d  and their private wds is prirnanly the consequence of citizens' own rational or 
informational shortcomings. All citizens share the fundamental interests in freedom and 
security even if they fail to r e c o p e  that they have those interests. Men as they are, 
Rousseau seems to dunk, have been corrupted by unjust social and political institutions and 
so cannot always see what laws would serve their fundamental interests. Indeed, although 
Rousseau believes that human beings have a capacity for reflection and can perceive their 
real interests under the right condtions, he is pessimistic about the possiblhty that such 
critical reflection can occur on its own without assistance of some h d .  WMe those socially 
corrupted human beings might be unable to perceive their real interests as indin'divah, perhaps 
through democratic deliberation, the p o o h g  of information, and the collective assessment 
of that information they would be able to perceive those fundamental shared interests as a 
demomatic communig. That is, if Rousseau offered a political theory in whlch citizens could 
deliberate with each other as free and equal citizens then those citizens who failed to 
r e c o p e  their real interests might be brought to r e c o p e  them in a non-coercive way.33 
However, Rousseau seems to e h a t e  the deliberation option: "If there were a people 
of Gods," he writes, "it would govern itself democratically" (SC: 3.4.8). "m f there were no 
chfferent interests, the common interest, whch would never encounter any obstacle, would 
scarcely be felt. E v e r y h g  would run smoothly by itself and politics would cease to be an 
art" (SC: 2.3.note). But, Rousseau continues, "such a perfect government is not suited to 
men" (SC: 3.4.8). So Rousseau7s theory, even as it eschews coercion and therefore escapes 
the criticisms of Cassirer and Talmon, also appears to eschew a deliberative version of 
democracy which leaves the problems of rational and informational deficiencies about "real 
interests" unsolved. And, in many ways, h s  problem points to one of the main chfficulties 
encountered when one adopts a monological approach to resolving the justice and realism 
tension. That is, by relylng on inner reflection and conscience to chscover an alleged moral 
point of view, agents are deprived of the better information and critical encounters that they 
could find in a more deliberative and public attempt to work through the justice and realism 
tension. 
As Williams r e c o p e s ,  however, the most troubhg feature of the real interests 
problem is not that citizens exhbit rational and informational deficits when it comes to their 
alleged "real interests". Rather the problem is that, even if those real interests were known by 
citizens, the gap between those real interests and their perceived interests means that citizens 
33 "A well-constituted deliberative forum," write Gutmann & Thompson (2004), "provides an 
opportunity for advancing both indvidual and collective understanding. Through the gtve and take 
of argument, participants can learn from each other, come to recogrme their in&vidual and collective 
misapprehensions, and develop new views and policies that can more successfully withstand critical 
scrutiny" (2004: 1 2). 
stdl might notjehhose interests as their own. "The most sipficant question about real 
interests arise," Wdhams writes, "when what is wrong with the agent goes beyond lack of 
information or mere rationality.. .and affects the desires and motivations from whch he 
deliberates; or, again, when what's wrong with the agent is that he will not believe s o m e h g  
that he rationally should believe" (1 985: 41). Again, that problem might be overcome 
through democratic deliberation: If knowledge of, and laws that reflect, the real interests 
were worked out in a deliberative fashon and citizens made judgments democratically, then 
they might be motivated by the fact that they gave themselves the laws to whch they are 
subject. But just as the Legslator cannot use coercion to get people to agree to laws whch 
are in their best interests, in Rousseau's theory, neither can the Legslator use reason because 
people do not yet have the virtuous "social spirit" whch would help them to r e c o p e  and 
accept good laws. "The social spirit, whch should be the result of the institution," Rousseau 
writes, "would have to preside over the foundmg of the institution itself; and men would 
have to be prior to laws what they ought to become by means of laws" (SC: 2.7.9). 
By appeahg to a notion of real interests whch a conception of justice must 
accommodate and towards whch citizens must be transformed, and by rejecting coercive 
and democratic means to resolve some of the hfficulties with that approach, Rousseau 
appears to have faded to solve the problem of motivational possibhty. That is, by simply 
pointing out that human beings have certain fundamental interests in freedom and security, 
Rousseau appears to have failed to show how human beings could be motivated to support 
those interests when they confhct with their other private, and more imrnedlately perceived, 
interests. Even when Rousseau tries to h k  the demands of justice and the pursuit of the 
fundamental interests to national beliefs, sentiments, and attachments, as he does in Poland, it 
is not clear why we should expect those motives to outweigh other, perhaps objectionable, 
motives that agents have or, as we d consider presently, the other beliefs to whch agents 
might be committed. Thus, Rousseau7s skepticism of more deliberative, participatory 
versions of democracy is especially troubhg gven the way that those arrangements might 
help to overc:ome the rational, informational, and motivational deficits that vex a 
monologcal variant of realistic utopianism. Moreover, the rejection of deliberative 
democracy which has the potential to resolve the problem of motivational possibhty is 
particularly puzzhg gven Rousseau's own claim that human beings are free and that 
legtimate political arrangements must be those to whch citizens could agree. 
V. Reasonable Pluralism and the "Inner Voice" 
The other main problem with Rousseau7s monologcal approach to resolving the justice and 
realism tension is that he fails to acknowledge the demands imposed by the range of 
reasonable pluralism and the need to reconcile justice to that range." The moral point of 
view which helps to &stinguish between legtimate objects of transformation and the objects 
of accommodation is not shared by all citizens in a &verse society and that creates serious 
dfficulties for Rousseau. One is a practical problem that arises from the tension between 
the moral point of view and the fact of pluralism. The other is a more serious problem - a 
problem of ju-stice - whch arises from a tension between the moral point of view and the 
range of reasonable pluralism. I wdl address each of these problems in turn. 
1. PLitraLim and Stabilig 
In the fist place, Rousseau's turning to the "inner voice" of the subject as the appropriate 
moral point of view suffers from a practical problem. Recall that Rousseau believes that the 
moral point of view is internal rather than external. That is, one need only listen to one's 
"inner voice", rather than the appeals and concerns of others, to gain knowledge of one's 
most fundamental interests and one's sense of natural compassion. That meant that the 
transformations of preferences and interests to whch citizens might be subjected could find 
their justification in interests that citizens already have and would r e c o p e  they have if only 
they peeled away their accumulated prejudces and biases. Moreover, because the moral 
point of view is internal rather than external, Rousseau h k s  that he is offering a more 
c o m p e h g  account of motivational possibhty. That is, the motivation to endorse and abide 
by the demands of justice is s o m e h g  an agent already has rather than somethmg imposed 
externally. In short, Rousseau thmks that justice is best determined, and the problem of 
motivation is best solved, by adopting a monologcal version of the realistically utopian 
project. 
But that moral point of view, whch says that when we listen to our inner voice we 
dscover that we are naturally and fundamentally free beings, that we are interested in our 
self-preservation, and that we are naturally compassionate, is not shared by all citizens or 
potential citizens as a matter of fact. Some citizens might h k  that the source of morality lies 
elsewhere and that the content of that morality excludes the idea of natural freedom. Indeed, 
there are religious views whch hold that human nature and conscience are not the primary 
sources of morality; rather, the moral point of view is the point of view found in sacred texts 
or that of a transcendent and omnipotent deity. Contemporary political societies are 
characterized by a pluralism of moral and religous worldviews whch means that many 
citizens wdl not regard themselves as having reason to endorse Rousseau's moral point of 
view or the conception of political right that rests on that point of view. Moral points of 
- 
- 
'34 Cohen (1993:), Rawls (1996). How we should go about accommodating that range in a conception 
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view and conceptions of political right whch appear to confhct with their beliefs might 
simply be rejected by those citizens in order to preserve and protect the integrity of their 
worldviews. 
When the fact of pluralism obtains, then, it creates great dfficulties for any view whch 
bases principles of justice or political arrangements on the language of legtirnacy and on a 
point of view whch is not shared. Because Rousseau h k s  h s  political order must be 
established bv an act of free wdl for the purposes of protecting indviduals and their 
freedom, it fails to take seriously the objections of those indviduals who do not accept 
freedom as a moral ideal or who dsagree that the moral point of view is located in human 
conscience. That failure to account for the objections of allcitizens creates unfair challenges 
for those citizens who are otherwise motivated to make sacrifices to uphold the political 
arrangements. Even if the political arrangements acheved some measure of stabihty in the 
face of pluralism, motivated citizens would face the possibhty of exploitation by the 
unmoti~ated.~~ That is, whlle those citizens who are motivated by or who regard themselves 
as having reason to endorse Rousseau's moral point of view make the necessary changes to 
their other preferences and beliefs, citizens who regard themselves as not having reason to 
endorse Rousseau's moral point of view might continue to make demands on the basis of 
their pre-political, unevaluated preferences and beliefs. Without a shared point of view to 
resolve these dsputes, confhcts would hare to be resolved through bargaining and the 
of justice wdl be the subject of chapter 5. 
" In written comments on earlier drafts and in private conversations, Joe Heath has referred to h s  
as the "exploitation of the moral by the immoral". Those citizens who are moral - those who 
sacrifice their interests and preferences in the interests of fairness and equality for all - are exploited 
by the immoral - those citizens who neither make such sacrifices and who, moreover, can gain some 
addtional benefit by preying on the moral behaviour of others. I have chosen to refer to this instead 
as the exploitation of the motivated by the unmotivated in part because exactly what is "moral" is 
part of the dspute. 
outcomes of' those bargains would likely reflect dfferences in power rather than fair 
agreements. 
Thus, we begm to see that a monologcal variant of the realistically utopian project has 
chfficulty once we r e c o p e  that a conception of justice is not for indviduals alone, but 
rather constitutes the normative basis for how we are to live and act together. And it has 
mfficulty once we recognize that conceptions of justice must confront a social reality whch 
is characterized by moral and religous dversity rather than homogeneity. In light of the fact 
of our social a,ndplura/ existence, then, a monologcal approach to justice and the demands of 
realism seems less promising insofar as it b h d s  us to sipficant and theoretically relevant 
features of social and political life. 
One might h k  that Rousseau can avoid ths  drfficulty by appeahng to his 
transformative aims. Recall that Rousseau is prepared to set up institutions whch will create 
more virtuous citizens - that is, citizens more &g and able to reflect on and to reject 
when necessaq their non-hndamental interests, aims, and preferences when they confhct 
with fundamental interests. Indeed, Rousseau might simply hold that moral and religous 
views whch do not identify or fit with h s  moral point of view, or agents who fail to locate 
the moral point of view in their own "inner voice" or conscience, are simply wrong and 
therefore sublect to criticism and transformation. Diversity or the fact of pluralism might be 
regarded as the consequence of mistakes in reasoning about moral or religous ends or the 
result of coercion by moral and religous authorities rather than un-coerced reflection and 
conviction. We might even agree with Rousseau that some moral and religous views whch 
do exist are objectionable and therefore should not affect the content of a conception of 
justice and political arrangements. Some religous views, for example, endorse race and 
gender herarches and are clearly incompatible with what reasonable people would regard as 
fair. 
M e  Kousseau might be right not to capitulate to such views, the stabhty of h s  
political arrangements d be in jeopardy if too many of the moral and religous views with 
whch he hsagrees are excluded." Indeed, as numerous views are excluded and marked for 
transformation, it becomes hard to see how agreement and legdmacy continue to play the 
roles in h s  political theory that he wants them to play. At best, Rousseau's normative vision 
would be paternalistic; at worst, it would become the objectionably utopian and totalitarian 
ideal about whlch h s  critics complain. Nevertheless, whde this concern about stabhty in the 
face of pluralism is a hfficult challenge - and one whlch I don't fully address untll later in 
the hssertation - the challenge is, ultimately, a practical challenge. We want agreement, to 
be sure, but not an agreement whch makes concessions to objectionable moral and religous 
w orldviews . 
2. Reasonable Plaraliirm and]u~tke 
Once we move from the fact of mere pluralism to the fact or range of reasonable pluralism, 
any thought that Rousseau can somehow rescue h s  moral point of view should arouse 
skepticism. R'hereas the fact of pluralism simply describes the fact that there are a variety of 
hfferent, incompatible, and perhaps confhcting moral and religous views in a society, the 
range of reasorjable pluralism describes a more challengmg conhtion. The idea of a range of 
reasonable pluralism entds, first, that a subset of the hfferent moral and religous views are 
compatible with fair political arrangements even whde they reject the moral point of view 
'$" am not saying here that Rousseau should accommodate such views, only that the stability of his 
political arrangements will suffer if they don't connect in some way with the motives and sources of 
motivation of diverse moral and religous views. 
whch motivates Rousseau's human beings. Moreover, the range of reasonable pluralism 
entails that there is a set of reasonable views held by people who are prepared to agree to fair 
terms of social cooperation even with others who hold dtfferent worldviews. Finally, the 
Aversity of comprehensive and incompatible, albeit reasonable, religous, moral, and 
phllosophcal doctrines is the "natural outcome of the activities of human reason under 
enduring free institutions" (Rawls, 1996: xxvi.) .37 
As Rawls puts it, 
The dnrersity of reasonable comprehensive religous, philosophcal, and moral 
d0ctrin.e~ found in modern democratic societies is not a mere hrstorical 
condttion that may soon pass away; it is a permanent feature of the public 
culture of democracy. Under the political and social condttions secured by 
basic rights and liberties of free institutions, a dtversity of conacting and 
irreconcilable - and what's more, reasonable - comprehensive doc&es d 
come about and persist if such chversity does not obtain already (1976: 36). 
The doctrines are rea~onable - or, more precisely, the people who hold such doctrines are 
reasonable - when they acknowledge that the very nghts and liberties protected by just 
institutions whlch faclhtated the development of their own doctrine permits the 
development of others and when they regard that as an acceptable consequence of political 
freedom. Resolving conficts and corning to agreements, then, have to be cast not in terms 
of what an independent moral ideal advises us to do; rather, reasonable people seek out 
agreement that rests on reasons and conclusions that other reasonable agents could endorse. 
And that means that reason-gving has to be political - i.e., it has to refer to the terms of 
social cooperation, treating people as n'ti~ens as politically free and equal and reasonable - 
rather than moral - i.e., referring to some comprehensive view about the person or nature, 
treating people as clay to be shaped accordmg to the demands of the moral ideal. 
;' See also Cohen (1993). 
The problem for Rousseau, then, is not simply that h s  political theory will be unstable 
under condtions of reasonable pluralism, but that it will fad to accord all parties to a social 
contract the respect that is owed to politically reasonable citizens as a matter ofjustice. To be 
sure, insofar as reasonable pluralism is the natural outcome of free practical reason under 
just institutions and insofar as the citizens who hold such doctrines are prepared to agree to 
fair terms of social cooperation with others who don't share their moral or religous 
worldview, accommodating that fact is necessary as a matter of justice and not simply as a 
matter of practicality." But Rousseau's political theory requires the transformation of 
persons into citizens who share h s  moral point of view and thus requires otherwise 
reasonable citizens to cast off their moral and religous views to become free and equal 
citizens in Rousseau's political community. 
What is s h g  about Rousseau's view is that wlde on the one hand he acknowledges 
that foundmg a state on a particular religion is "more harmful than useful", he nevertheless 
maintains that h s  own doctrine of natural freedom adrmts of the same dfficulties that he 
seeks to avoid by eschewing particular religons. In the section on Civil Religon in the Social 
Contract, Rousseau writes that "[elverythmg that destroys social unity is worthless. All 
institutions that put man in contra&ction with hunself are useless" (SC: 4.8.17). To be sure, 
whde he endorses a "civil profession of faith" whose dogmas are to act as "sentiments of 
sociabhty without whlch it is impossible to be a good citizen or a faithful subject" (SC: 
4.8.32), Rousseau allows that a variety of existing religous opinions wdl be compatible with 
that civil faith.. It seems as if Rousseau r e c o p e s  that some dsagreement is reasonable and 
that it should be accommodated rather than transformed. But that view appears only to 
apply to a small subset of Chnstian religous doctrines and not to Catholicism, other non- 
" This argument is developed much more fully in chapter 5. 
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Chstian doctrines, or even non-religous comprehensive views. A subset of Chstian 
doctrines, it would seem, is compatible with Rousseau7s vision because, he suggests, those 
doctrines are compatible with h s  idea that human beings are at base free - that God made 
them so. In Emile he responds to those who complain that God does not prevent human 
beings from doing evil by a r p g  that such a view fails to acknowledge that human beings 
are free to do good or evll because God made people free: "Providence has made hlm free 
that he may choose the good and refuse the evil" (E: 292). So when Rousseau says that 
those "institutions that put man in contradction with hlmself are useless" he means those 
institutions whlch confhct with the idea that human beings are essentially free and that God 
made them so. 
But once one r e c o p e s  human beings as free and once one sets up institutions whch 
acknowledge and try to promote that freedom, people d develop other comprehensive 
doctrines whlch confhct with the idea that they are free in the Rousseauian sense while, at 
the same time, those people are able to acknowledge other citizens as political4 free and 
equal. Rousseau hunself acknowledges that human beings are beset by what Rawls calls the 
"burdens of judgment" whch lead them to endorse dfferent comprehensive doctrines under 
institutions which protect freedom and liberty.)' The fact and the idea of a range of 
na~onable pluralism create a ddemrna for Rousseau's political theory. Rousseau is unable to 
gve a persuasive account of how indviduals who would endorse dfferent comprehensive 
doctrines could come to agree to the origmal social contract in the first place. Those people 
who dsagree that human beings are naturally and essentially free and who dsagree that the 
moral point of view is located in human beings' inner conscience would refuse to agree to a 
?9 In Ernile Rousseau writes: "I need not think myself infallible; my opinions, which seem to me true, 
may be so many lies; for what man is there who does not cling to his own beliefs; and how many 
social contract and political arrangements whch accepted those thmgs as true. Moreover, 
they would refuse on reasonable grounds - grounds that Rousseau must acknowledge are 
reasonable gven that they could emerge under the institutions he favours (i.e., institutions 
whch protect freedom); condtions he acknowledges (i.e., the burdens of judgment); and 
gven that the people who endorse those other comprehensive doctrines are capable of 
r e c o w i n g  other citizens as free, equal, and reasonable. So long as thefact of reasonabLe 
pluralism obtains, there is a relevant and unobjectionable demand of realism whch a 
realistically utopian political theory must acknowledge and accommodate - especially one 
that recasts the tasks of political theory in terms of legtimacy rather than perfectionism. 
And so long as we can conceive of a range of reasonable pluralism - even if all possibly 
reasonable views are not instantiated in social and political life at present - then a conception 
of justice wdl have to wrestle with just how to reconcile itself to that condtion. 
VI. Conclusion: The Perspective of a Realistic Utopia 
Even as Rousseau fails to accommodate the range of reasonable pluralism in h s  political 
theory - and thereby fails to accommodate a feature of human beings whch demands 
accommodation as a matter of justice and not mere prudence - he instructs us on the 
questions and concerns that a realistically utopian theory should address. Moreover, he 
offers a few icleas whch might guide the development of a more attractive approach to the 
tension between justice and realism. Indeed, h s  notion of a moral point of view, albeit 
problematic for reasons described above, gves us a way to thmk about whch demands of 
realism should be accommodated and whch should not be accommodated in a conception 
of justice. His conception of human beings as free, equal, and capable of critical reflection 
men are agreed in everythtng? The illusion whtch deceives me may indeed have its source in myself, 
on their determinate preferences, interests, and motives - albeit incompatible with certain 
moral and religous views - points towards an idea whch helps to solve the problem of 
motivational possibhty. And, finally, h s  idea that the political institutions whch help to 
shape citizens' sense of justice, at the same time, depend on citizens' free consent for their 
legrtimacy and motivational stabhty, is another idea that d play a central role in a more 
compehg  reconchation of justice and realism. So just how should these ideas be improved 
upon? To b e p  to answer that question we turn, in the next chapter, to John Rawls's 
attempt to offer another variant of the realistically utopian approach to the justice and 
realism tension. 
l ~ u t  is G o d  alone who can remoFTe it" (E: 308). 
Rawls: Hypothetical Constructivism 

[Plolitical philosophy is realistically utopian when it 
extends what are ordmanly thought to be the h u t s  of 
practicable political possibhty and, in so doing, 
reconciles us to our political and s o c d  con&tion. 
-John Rawls (LP: 1 I)"' 
mhere is a question of how the h t s  of the 
practicable are discerned and what the condtions of 
our social world in fact are; the problem here is that 
the h u t s  of the possible are not gven by the actual, 
for we can to a greater or lesser extent change 
political and social institutions, and much else. 
- John Rawls (JE 5) 
M e  Rousseau, John Rawls regards the tension between justice and realism as 
sigmficant and in need of a solution. Whether a conception of justice can acheve 
motivational stabhty, for example, is treated not as a mere practical issue but as a concern 
whch matters to the very normative attractiveness of the conception of justice itself. But 
again, hke Rousseau, Rawls does not want to offer a conception of justice whch amounts to 
a mere rational bargain among political actors fully aware of their determinate preferences, 
motives, and beliefs. Instead, he wants to articulate principles of justice whch are insulated 
from agents' objectionable preferences, motives, and beliefs - that is, principles whch 
maintain a critical &stance from the social and political status quo and its resource and 
power inequalities. As Rawls says, "[jlustice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is 
4(' Rawls's works are cited in this chapter as follows: CP: Collected Papers, Samuel Freeman ed., 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999); JF: Justice a.r Fairness: L4 Re.rtatement, Erin Kelly, ed. 
(Cambridge: Belknap, 2001); 2 2 :  The Lau, of Pegbles (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999); PL. 
Political Lberali.rm (New Y ork Columbia University Press, 1 996); TJ: A The09 of Justice. Revised ed 
(Cambridge: B e h a p ,  1999); and IPRR. "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited" in Rawls, The L a w  o f  
Peoples. 
of systems of thought.. . .p]aws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged 
must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust" (TJ 3). 
In that sense, Rawls seems to align hunself with the utopian tramtion of political 
phdosophy \r?hlch seeks to construct or articulate principles whde bracketing pluralism and 
various motivational hfficulties that arise when principles are applied to real societies. 
Nevertheless, Rawls also dunks that political phdosophy should have a practical orientation. 
"Conceptions of justice," he writes, "must be justified by the con&tions of our life as we 
know it or not at all" (TJ 398). He wants to find a solution to the problems of motivational 
possibihty and doctrinal pluralism by gaining public agreement on the principles of justice 
among citizens with &verse interests, conceptions of the good, and reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines about human ends and ways of life. With these dual aims of 
critique and practicality at the centre of hls work, Rawls defends a realistically utopian 
conception of justice whlch in part ties the justification of principles to their legtimacy and, 
in so doing, in&cates that concems about motives and pluralism are relevant to the content 
of justice. Ra.wls7s hypothetzcal constmctivirst variant of realistic utopianism holds that principles 
of justice should be the outcome of a process of reflection on relevant reasons. In some 
cases the demands of realism enter into that reflection as relevant reasons - as concems that 
other reasonable indviduals could regard as demands that require some h d  of 
accommodation in principles of justice. At the same time, however, because the approach is 
hypothetical- because it requires that agents bracket their determinate preferences, motives, 
and beliefs - Uawls's version of realistic utopianism faces a democratic challenge to whch, as 
we shall see, he has hfficulq respondmg. 
In h s  chapter, then, I focus in particular on the way in whch motivational concerns 
enter into Rawls's attempt to develop an attractive conception of justice.41 I investigate 
whether Rawls's attention to the so-called "strains of commitment" (TJ 153-4) leads hun to 
make accommodations to objectionable motives or motivational concerns. I argue that, in 
light of Rawls's later revisions of the role of the primary goods and the conception of the 
person, attention to the strains of commitment does not force concessions to objectionable 
motives. However, a defense of Rawls's use of the strains of commitment meets resistance 
from G.A. Cohen (2000,2003) who argues that justice as fairness in fact does makes 
objectionable concessions to existing motives in the content of the dfference principle. 
These concessions, Cohen alleges, are the upshot of Rawls's requiring adherence to justice in 
the basic structure of society rather than in the choices and ethos of citizens themselves. 
While promising replies to Cohen's argument have hghhghted the fact that, contrary to 
Cohen's claims, Rawls does thmk that transformation of an objectionable social ethos is 
necessary, none of these seem to have captured the centrality of an ideal of democratic 
legtimacy to Rawls's conception of justice as a whole. To meet Cohen's criticism, then, I 
will maintain that locating justice in the basic structure is one way in whch a conception of 
justice accommodates citizens' interests in liberty. Thus, whlle adjustments are made to the 
conception of justice to accommodate a particularly important motive - namely, liberty - 
those adjustments should be regarded not as concessions to some objectionable feature of 
the world, but instead as a matter of a conception of justice r e c o p i n g  and endorsing a 
motive - i.e., a concern for liberty - whch any normatively defensible conception of justice 
must do. How far we should go in accommodating specific manifestations of, or claims 
41 We will deal with the other demand of realism - pluralism - in Chapter 5. 
- 103 - 
about, liberty and freedom, however, is a question that should be resolved by citizens 
themselves once the content of principles of justice are settled. 
I b e p  with an examination of Rawls's origmal position and veil of ignorance whch 
capture the core of h s  hypothetical con~tmctivism - i.e., the idea that principles should be 
insulated from objectionable motives and that agreement should be reached from an initial 
situation of equality. Section I1 asks whether Rawls's use of a "strains of commitment" 
requirement allows certain objectionable motives to slip into the design of principles of 
justice and, in section 111, I consider G.A. Cohen's objection to Rawls's theory in Cohen's if 
You 're an Egaliaean, How Come You 'n So ~ 2 c h . ~ ~  To answer Cohen's charge, I argue that once 
we have a proper understanding of the revised role that Rawls gves to primary goods and 
the conception of the person in justice as fairness, we begm to see how the strains of 
commitment approach addresses the problem of motivation in an appropriate way (Section 
IV). The chapter concludes, in section V, with some p r e h a r y  thoughts about how the 
content of a conception of justice for a democratic society can and should accommodate the 
democratically defensible motives of democratic citizens. Those thoughts wdl get us closer 
to the idea, more M y  developed in the final chapter, that a conception of justice must 
address the demands of realism because of the relationshp between realism, legtirnacy, and 
justice. 
4' It's usehl to dtstinguish between two h e s  of criticism that Cohen aims against Rawls's justice as 
fairness. In hit, earlier work on Rawls, Cohen's concern is that the argument for the dtfference 
principle relies on a concession to incentive-seehg behaviour on the part of talented citizens 
(Cohen, 2000). It is that criticism that I take up in h s  section. The other h e  of critique is 
introduced and developed in Cohen (2003) and Cohen (2003b). In those works, Cohen takes issue 
with Rawls's statement that "Conceptions of justice must be justified by the condttions of our life as 
we know it or not at all" (TJ 398). Cohen argues instead that facts cannot "ground" principles and 
that Rawls is misguided about the principles motivating h s  own work when he considers what facts 
I. Agreement, Motivation, and Justice as Fairness 
The main idea behmd justice as fairness, Rawls writes, "is that the principles of justice for 
the basic structure of society are the object of [an] origmal agreement" (TJ 10). Of course 
makmg the content of justice depend on some h d  of agreement raises questions about how 
that agreement is to be reached and what the contractors are allowed to know about 
themselves. Does Rawls7s reliance on the idea of a social contract prompt him to adjust the 
content of principles of justice themselves in order to elicit agreement whch is necessary for 
the legtirnacy and stabhty of the conception of justice? Indeed, does Rawls's commitment 
to a Rousseauian ideal of self-government - of obedence only to those laws one gves 
oneself - allow citizens' existing motives to shape the content of principles in objectionable 
ways? 
Social agreements and the idea of moral arbitrariness 
Rawls says that acceptable principles wdl be those "that free and rational persons concerned 
to further their own interests would accept in an initial position of equality as d e h g  the 
fundamental terms of their association" (TJ: 10). While Rawls wants to follow in the social 
contract tradtion and thereby ensure that h s  conception of justice embraces an ideal of free 
and self-governing citizens, he departs from much of that tradtion in seekmg a fairer and 
more equal initial position for all contracting parties. He holds that certain features of 
human beings are "arbitrary from a moral point of view" (TJ: 14) and therefore should not 
affect the content of principles of justice. Features such as race, class, sex, and the 
dstribution of natural abhties are the outcome of a natural lottery. And because the 
outcomes of that lottery are dctated by chance and luck, rather than choice, we should not 
about human beings and society require accommodation in order for a conception of justice to be 
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be permitted to prosper from, nor doomed to suffer because of, those particular features 
that we end up with. 
The "moral point of view" from whch we determine whether a feature is relevant or 
not, Rawls thinks, is implicit in our everyday common sense moral awareness, but is rarely 
expressed with the sort of phllosophlcal precision whch would be necessary in order to 
identify defensible principles of justice. Thus, Rawlsian political philosophy starts from 
certain "settled convictions" of our shared political morality - such as that slavery is wrong - 
and tries to construct general principles of justice whlch rely on moral principles implicit in 
our common sense morality. Workmg back and forth between settled convictions and 
general principles, justice as fairness aims to achleve reflective equilibrium with our common 
sense morality. With a reconstructed moral point of view as a guide, then, Rawlsian justice 
chstinguishes between those motives, among other dungs, whch are relevant and those 
whch are irrelevant for the content of principles of j~stice.'~ This constructivist approach, 
then, relies on the reflective capacities of the agents to whom the principles will eventually 
apply. That is, the legtimacy of the hypothetical constructivist variant of realistic utopianism 
relies on the abihty of agents to abstract from their own preferences, motil~es, and beliefs 
and to h k  through the requirements of the intuitions and ideals embedded in the public 
political culture of whlch they are members. But, because the procedure is h>othetical, it 
means that those reflecting on principles of justice and the reasons whlch might be relevant 
in their construction, must make a leap of theoretical abstraction - that is, they must i rnape  
just. 
43 But while Rawls says that the moral point of view is located in our implicit common sense 
morality, it seems more accurate to sap that the moral point of view is implicit in our public reasoning 
about political and moral questions. That is, what we regard as relevant and irrelevant is implicit in 
our settled convictions because those settled convictions represent claims in public reasoning to whch 
all have or could agree. This idea points towards the Habermasian foundation of a moral point of 
view whch will be considered in chapter 4. 
themselves as agents who are rational and reasonable, but who have no particular 
preferences, motives, and beliefs. An agreement about principles of justice, if one can be 
reached, is thus not an actual agreement between fully self-aware agents or citizens; rather, 
principles of justice are legtimate, if they are, because reflective agents can i r n a p e  that such 
principles could be the product of rational and reasonable agents situated behmd a veil of 
ignorance. 
From the moral point of view, then, Rawls holds that a host of features of existing 
human beings and the social and political world have no relevance for the initial agreement 
on principles of justice. Consider, for example, the relevance of a pre-contmctual 
dtstribution of property for a conception of justice. In Locke's theory the dtstribution of 
property prior to the social contract is not an appropriate object of criticism if holdmgs were 
acquired legtimately in the state of nature." That is, so long as it was acquired in the right 
way - either by initial acquisition subject to the condttions of non-spoilage and leaving 
enough and as good for others, or by consensual transfer from one party to another - then 
the dtstributic)n of those holdmgs among citizens is legtimate. But legtimate acquisition is 
compatible with unequal holdmgs whch means that some of the parties to Locke's social 
contract d be motivated to argue for and adopt principles and institutions whch would 
protect existing inequality rather than, say, ensuring a more equal dtstribution of resources. 
If an agreement is reached among contractors who have unequal holdtngs and who are 
aware of their unequal holdmgs then Locke might succeed in reconchg what justice 
demands with the motives of some, but not all, citizens. In short, the content of Locke's 
agreement or conception of justice would be shaped to suit the interests of a landed class 
rather than all citizens. But if agreement is what Locke is after, then it is hard to see why the 
For the account of legtimate acquisition see Locke (1980: chapter 5). 
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landless classes would agree to arrangements in whlch &scussions about the legtimacy of the 
existing property dstribution would not be permitted. Indeed, one of the main purposes of 
a social contract on Locke's view is to ensure the protection of property that inchvidual 
contractors had acquired in the pre-contractual state of nature.45 
But taking those features of the pre-contract status quo as fixed features whlch 
contractors must accept is objectionable from Rawls's point of view because that status quo 
was the product not of transactions under just institutions, but instead influenced by the 
contingencies of unequal power, order of &scovery, and order of birth, and maintained by 
unregulated force rather than legtdmate and just law. The moral point of view implicit in our 
common sense morality and settled convictions, Rawls thmks, would regard &stributions 
that reflect power inequahties and order of dscovery or b ~ &  as arbitrary rather than the 
product of a process of reflective, shared public reason, and therefore irrelevant for justice as 
fairness. 
S d a r l y ,  Rawls regards in&viduals7 native endowments as arbitrarily acquired and 
therefore t h k s  that the dstribution of such native endowments should play no role in the 
construction of principles of justice. Because one is not responsible for those features of 
oneself that one acquires at birth - such as race, natural abhties, social class, etc. - one 
should neither benefit from, nor suffer as a result of, those th.mgs. 
Moreover, and consistent with h s  critique of u&arianism, Rawls holds that 
in&viduals7 pre-contractual determinate preferences and desires should not affect the 
content of principles of justice. He follows Rousseau in holdmg that determinate 
preferences and interests are the outcome of inlriduals' sociahzation under political and 
social institutions. Preferences and motives whch were formed under less than just 
45 See Locke (1 980). 
institutions, therefore, should be subject to critical evaluation rather than automatically 
accorded normative weight in determining what the content of principles of justice should 
be.4"or that matter, even those preferences and motives whch were formed under just 
institutions should have to face critical scrutiny to ensure that they are acceptable from a 
moral point of view. If unexamined preferences and motives were gven normative welght, 
then principles of justice would simply reflect and reinforce those existing preferences and 
motives, as well as existing inequalities in property and power. Justice, in that case, would be 
"nothmg other than the advantage of the stronger7' and would confict with our common 
sense moral c:ornmitrnent to fairne~s.~' 
To insulate the construction of principles of justice from objectionable motives and 
inequalities of property and power, then, Rawls offers a formal argument whch relies on the 
idea that principles of justice are to be determined by "the choice whch rational men would 
make in [a] &otbetical situation of equal LibeKtJ" (T' 1 1, my emphasis). In an o r i p a l  position 
we construct a "situation of equal liberty" by requiring that the parties who are asked to 
come to an apeement on principles of justice do so from behmd a veil of ignorance. The 
veil of ignorance prohibits knowledge of "morally irrelevant" features of human beings so 
that the parties in the o r i p a l  position are unable to tailor principles to their own advantage. 
Rawls stipulates that 
No one knows h s  place in society, h s  class position or social status, nor does 
any one: know h s  fortune in the &stribution of natural assets and abhties, h s  
intehgence, strength, and the hke. I shall even assume that the parties do not 
46 The interesting £hp-side of h s  idea, as we'll see when we examine Rawls's approach to the fact of 
reasonable pluralism in chapter 5, is that comprehensive doctrines that would emerge underjiisf 
institutions do require our attention as a matter of justice. 
47 See Thrasymachus7s definition of justice in Plato (1974: 338c). W e  Plato's reply to 
Thrasj~machus throughout the Republic relies on an argument about the Form of justice as an 
objective, metaphysical standard, Rawls's own "political, not metaphysical" reply would rely on a 
Hegelian appeal to the, albeit inarticulate, principles implicit in the political culture of a constitutional 
democracy. More on th~s below. 
know their conceptions of the good or their special psychologcal propensities 
(TJ: 1 1:). 
So constructed, the o r i p a l  position is "the appmpriate initial status quo, and thus the 
fundamental agreements reached in it are fair. T h ~ s  explains the propriety of the name 
'justice as fairness': it conveys the idea that the principles of justice are agreed to in an initial 
situation that is fait" (TJ 1 1). 
Thus, whde Rawls says that "conceptions of justice must be justified by the conhtions 
of our life as we know it or not at all" (TJ 398), he does not hold that existing interests, 
motives, or the gven hstribution of resources and power should have normative 
sipficance. A conception of justice should acknowledge and wrestle with the problems of 
motivation and compliance, but in doing so we need not resign ourselves to an unattractive 
social and political status quo. Our common sense morality, if only we would reflect on it, 
would not allow us to resign ourselves to anythmg unfair. "The k t s  of the possible are not 
gven by the actual, for we can to a greater or lesser extent change political and social 
institutions, and much else" UE 5). To be sure, "[i]f one starts duectly with the particular 
case as known, and if one accepts as gven and d e h t i v e  the preferences and relative 
positions of the parties, whatever they are, it is impossible to gve  an analysis of the moral 
concept of fairness" (CP: 207n.13). Justice as fairness, then, uses a veil of ignorance in the 
o r i p a l  position to model a fair, albeit hypothetical, situation of initial equality as the 
appropriate st:atus quo from whlch rational actors can choose defensible and legtimate 
principles of justice. 
The veil. of ignorance and the "hypothetical situation of equal liberty" that it offers, 
then, is a central feature of Rawls's bypotbetical constmctivisf approach to justice and the 
demands of realism and provides the centerpiece of a general strategy that could be used to 
deal with demands of realism. Using that general strategy, we ask agents to set aside their 
determinate preferences, motives, and beliefs, and consider what principles they could agree 
to knowing only that they are rational and reasonable agents who will want to ensure fair 
condtions and sufficient resources to pursue a conception of the good, to participate in 
public politic:al life, and to contribute to the development of their two moral powers (JE. 18- 
19). Because the agents who would reach an agreement in such a situation are not fully self- 
aware, the agreement must be regarded as hypotheticaL But the condtions whlch permit us to 
speak merely of a hypotheticalagreement are those same condtions whlch ensure that the 
content of that agreement - the conception of justice - is the outcome of reflection on 
relevant reasons, rather than a reconstruction of an unequal and unattractive social and 
political status quo. If features of the status quo or other demands of realism are to have an 
impact on the design of principles of justice, then it must be the case that the agents behmd 
the veil of ignorance r e c o p e  good reasons for accornrnodadng those demands. So are 
there any demands of realism that could pass the hypothetical constmctivist test established by 
Rawls's theory? 
11. Strains af Commitment and Unattractive Concessions? 
Rawls's approach to the justice and motivation tension, and the tension between justice and 
the demands of realism more generally, depends crucially on a lsdnction between two 
stages of theory. At the first stage, principles of justice are selected by parties in an initial 
situation of equality and behmd a veil of ignorance. That ensures, in Rawls's view, that 
principles are articulated and justified with attention concentrated on the attractiveness and 
fairness of those principles. At the second stage, the conception articulated at the &st stage 
is tested against knowledge about citizens' interests, motives, and capacities to see if it would 
be stable or motivationally possible. A defensible conception of justice, Rawls h k s ,  is one 
that could pass the tests of both stages. 
But whde Rawls states h s  as the official approach of justice as fairness, the dstinction 
between the two stages seems blurred when concerns about the "strains of commitment" are 
raised in the &st stage of principle construction. He writes that the parties in the origmal 
position "cannot enter into agreements that may have consequences they cannot accept" (TJ 
153). Thus, the parties in the origmal position "must ask themselves whether those they 
represent can reasonably be expected to honor the principles agreed to in the manner 
required by the idea of an agreement" UF: 1 0 3 ) ~ ~  Knowing that "the origmal agreement is 
fmal and made in perpetuity" contractors are to ask themselves whether they would be able 
to abide by and support the principles that are selected once they find themselves in a society 
guided by those principles. Indeed, "there is no second chance," Rawls writes; "[a] person is 
choosing onc:e and for all the standards whlch are to govern h s  life prospects" (TJ 153). If 
the agreement that parties in the origmal position make has h s  conchtion of finality, then 
the parties must ask whether they could continue to accept its consequences once the veil is 
lifted and they learn what position they d hold in the society guided by justice as fairness. 
' 'When we enter an agreement," Rawls writes, "we must be able to honor it even should 
the worst possibhties prove to be the case. Otherwise we have not acted in good faith" (TJ 
153). 
On a weak readmg of the strains of commitment, parties in the origmal position must 
ask themselves whether they could abide by the principles of justice regardless of the 
position in whlch they find themselves once the veil is lifted. That readmg regards the 
strains of commitment test as a question of the rational grounds for compliance. Parties 
would ask themselves whether they h k  that they could comply with principles of justice 
even in cases where those principles appear to constrain the pursuit of their self-interest. 
But Rawls wants more than that weak readmg of the strains of commitment. He maintains 
that the parties in the origmal position are to agree to a conception only if they dunk that 
"when the conception is reahzed in basic institutions, those who grow up and live under 
them acquire a sufficiently strong sense of justice" (JF: 103n.26). On &us strong 
interpretation of the strains of commitment, the parties must ask whether they could be 
motivated to support, and not simply grudgmgly accept, the conception of justice. In that 
way, the stability of a well-ordered society could be ensured and that would gve political 
agents another reason for agreeing to those principles to regulate the basic institutions of 
society. 
However, it is possible that those principles that could pass the strains of commitment 
test might not be attractive principles from the point of view of justice. But Rawls hunself 
says that "[jlustice is the first virtue of social institutions.. ..Flaws and institutions no matter 
how efficient and well-arranged must be reforrned or abolished if they are unjust" (TJ 3). 
Askmg the paaies to consider whether they find the strains of commitment excessive 
certady invites indviduals to withhold their consent untd concessions are made to their 
particular, and perhaps unattractive, motivational concerns. By gving a central role to 
requirements of democratic legtimacy and agreement in justice as fairness Rawls seems, on 
h s  objection, to open the door to unattractive concessions to citizens' motivational 
weaknesses and perhaps also to the unequal dstribution of resources and power in existing 
political societies. 
See also TJ sec. 29;JF: 103-4, 128-30; CP: 250-2; and DL: 17ff., as well as Rawls's thoughts about 
stabdity and the sense of justice generally. 
The strains of commitment certady tug hard on potential contractors when they are 
permitted information about their particular situations. Agreement in the o r i p a l  position 
on Rawls's dfference principle, for example, would be hard to reach when both the strains 
of commitment and particular information are part of the initial situation. Wealthy 
indviduals who would face hlgh rates of taxation of their current holdmgs if the dfference 
principle were selected would have an incentive to withhold agreement und  the principle of 
dstribution conceded ground to their interests. Indeed, it is hard to see why any wealthy 
indnidual would agree to the dfference principle when the origmal position is regarded as a 
place where rational indviduals should aim to advance their self-interests. In the case of 
societies with many indviduals who have developed a preference for positional goods or 
relative standing, for example, an agreement whch satisfies the strains of commitment, if 
one could be reached, would look very dfferent than Rawls's justice as fairness and I expect 
would be less egalitarian.49 ~ y ,  then, does Rawls h k  that not only is it acceptable to 
49It is useful to note how Rawls dunks that a competing conception of justice - namely, 
utihtarianism -- would fare when faced with the strains of commitment. Parties in the o r i p a l  
position, Rawls thinks, would regard the strains of commitment of utihtarianism as excessive and 
would therefore reject it. A uthtarian conception, in effect, asks that, 
even when we are less fortunate, we are to accept the greater advantages of others as a 
sufficient reason for lower expectations over the whole course of our life. T h s  is 
surely an extreme demand. In fact, when societ). is conceived as a system of 
cooperation designed to advance the good of its members, it seems incredible that 
some citizens should be expected, on the basis of political principles, to accept lower 
s d  prospects of life for the sake of others" (TJ 155). 
Uulitarians, Rawls says, have to rely on the development of external moral virtues h e  benevolence 
and sympathy to ensure the stabihty of utilitarian justice rather than locating stability w i h n  the 
attractiveness of the conception of justice itself. Justice as fairness, by contrast, tries to locate 
motives and reasons for endorsing the conception that are internal to the conception itself. Justice as 
fairness, with its two principles of justice, aims to satisfy the strains of commitment by ensuring that 
"the least advantaged feel that they are a part of political society, and view the public culture with its 
ideals and principles as of slgtllficance to themselves" (JF 129). Indeed, Rawls dunks that an 
attractive and stable conception of justice must satisfy the requirements of a strong interpretation of 
the strains of cr~mmitment which asks that the least advantaged under a gven conception of justice 
actively endorse the conception rather than a weak interpretation which asks only that the least 
advantaged are satisfied enough that they don't "reject s o c i e ~ ~ s  conception of justice and are ready to 
resort to violen ce to improve their condtion" VF: 129). 
consider the strains of commitment, but that hls conception of justice - justice as fairness - 
would survive that test? 
In the first place, the veil of ignorance restricts the information that parties in the 
origmal have about themselves and therefore elurunates attempts to secure positional goods 
in the principles of justice selected. Rawls's contract is not the product of bargaining among 
inchiduals fully aware of their determinate preferences and motives. Samuel Freeman 
explains that the combination of the veil of ignorance with the strains of commitment entails 
that the parties in the origmal position will "strongly favor piawls's] principles of justice over 
the principles of uthty and other consequentialist views. For it is much more difficult for 
those who end up worse off in a uthtarian society to wdhgly accept their situation. Given 
what we know about human nature, the person is rare who can freely and without 
resentment sacrifice h s  or her life prospects so that those who are better off can have even 
greater comforts, honors, and enjoyments" (2003: 20). Because Rawls prohibits knowledge 
of particular information about the contracting parties in the origmal position attendmg to 
the strains of commitment does not gve  rise to certain indtviduals makmg unreasonable 
demands in return for commitment to the conception of justice. Behmd the veil of 
ignorance, parties simply don't know what determinate preferences and motives they have, 
so when they are asked if the strains of commitment are excessive, they have no reason to 
withhold their agreement in an effort to elicit concessions to determinate preference and 
motives. The parties in the origmal position, Rawls says, "have no basis for bargaining in the 
usual sense" (TJ l20) .~~ '  
5" Rawls acknowledges that problems of envy and preferences for positional goods do exist and that 
they "must be reckoned with" (TJ: 465). To reckon with them he says that "[alt fust we reason as if 
there is no problem of envy and the special psychologes; and then having ascertained which 
principles would be settled upon, we check to see whether just institutions so defmed are likely to 
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Yet, while prohbition on particular knowledge in the origmal position prevents 
strategc bargaining, perhaps allowing knowledge of even the "general facts of moral 
psychology" could lead the parties in the o r i p a l  position to consider the problems of 
motivation in the wrong way. Parties in the o r ipa l  position might reason, for example, that 
it is "desirable to mod$ normative principles in response to anticipated non-compliance 
among  other^."^' If we dunk that others might violate our initial, more demandmg, 
principles then we might think it reasonable to make those principles less demandmg in 
order to ensure compliance. That is, we are tempted to adjust the conception of justice not 
because we thmk citizens cannot comply with the more demandmg principles but simply 
because we expect that some citizens will not comply. But if we are t a h g  about modfjkg 
principles to account for anticipated motivational deficits then the principles we end up with 
would seem to be the mostfeaible principles of justice all dungs considered rather than ideal 
principles of justice. To put it another way, if the thought is that we should mod+ 
principles for practical reasons then we must already have an antecedent idea of what the 
most desirable principles are. And if we mom@ those antecedent pdnciples to account for 
motivational concerns, or other demands of realism such as anticipated non-compliance, 
then we seem to have moved away from questions of normative justification and towards 
questions of practical application. Important questions, to be sure, but questions of 
application presuppose the existence of principles that can be applied. 
There is the risk, then, that the content of the principles of justice chosen in the 
o r i p a l  position wdl accommodate unattractive motivational or compliance concerns, even 
arouse and encourage these propensities to such an extent that the social system becomes 
unworkable" ('TJ 465). 
5' Joe Heath stated the concern this way to me in an email. My understandmg of the compliance and 
assurance problems has benefited from readmg Elster (1989), Farrelly (2004), and Heath (2001, 
2002). 
whlle they avoid concessions to particular preferences or interests. So considering the strains 
of commitment at the first stage of theory construction, then, seems to put Rawls's justice of 
fairness at risk of makmg concessions for reasons of mere practicality that otherwise would 
have been avoided had the two stages of theory been clearly hstinguished. 
111. G.A. Cohen on Incentives 
The work of G.L4. Cohen on justice and incentives provides a concrete way to work through 
and to sharpen the problem of motivation and the strains of ~ommitrnent.~' Cohen argues 
that because Rawls restricts the application of the dtfference principle to the basic structure 
of society rather than applylng it also to the social ethos of citizens in the society, he permits 
indtviduals to make choices that violate the spirit of the dtfference principle itself. Indeed, 
Cohen maintains that not only does Rawlspennit incentive-seekmg behaviour, but that Rawls 
must regard that behaviour as not unjust. If correct, Cohen's claim means that justice as 
fairness entails an unattractive concession to self-interested motives. The talented agents 
who demand incentives, Cohen alleges, do so not because they are necessary, but simply 
because they want them and have the power to demand them successfully. 
The difference principle holds that "social and economic inequalities are to be 
arranged so that they are. . .reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage" (TJ 53). But 
Cohen thmks that Rawls's defense of permissible inequality is not a normative defense, but 
instead "a merely factual defense of it" (2000: 120). "Despite what Rawls hunself says," 
Cohen charges, "he does not show that incentive-based inequality is just, on hls own 
conception of justice, but, at most, that it is regrettably unavoidable" (2000: 120-1). On 
52 While in hls work on incentives and h s  critique of Rawls, Cohen does not discuss the "strains of 
cornrnitment" in particular, the concern that he articulates arises because of Rawls7s consideration of 
the strains. See Cohen (2000). 
Cohen's view, the incentive rewards that are "necessary" for the talented to be more 
productive (and thereby benefit the worse off) are necessary, if they are, because of choices 
made by the talented themselves. In Cohen's words: 
Talented people who affirm the dfference principle would find those 
questions [about the necessity of incentives] hard to handle. For they could 
not claim, in se~j~stIfication, at the bar of the dfference principle, that their hlgh 
rewards are necessary to enhance the position of the worst off, since, in the 
standard case, it is they themselves who make those rewards necessary, through 
their own u n e g n e s s  to work for ordmary rewards as productively as they 
do for exceptionally lugh ones, an unwdhrtgness whch ensures that the 
untalented get less than they otherwise would. =gh rewards are, therefore, 
necessary only because the choices of talented people are not appropriately 
informed by the dfference principle (2000: 127). 
Incentives and the dstributional inequalities they introduce are not logcally or physically 
necessary, but instead are the product of choice and power. In that case, Cohen h k s  there 
is a dscrepancy between Rawls's egahtarian intuitions and h s  (less than) egalitarian 
principles. Where incentives are necessary - that is, in the case where it appears that the 
dfference principle has not become a part of the social ethos of the talented - Cohen dunks 
that the social. ethos should be transformed to fit with the requirements of the dfference 
prmciple. 
From Ciohen's perspective it seems that Rawls has made a bad deal with the talented in 
order to elicit their agreement. That is, Cohen accuses Rawls of watering down the 
requirements of justice, of moving away from a more attractive egalitarian view, in order to 
gain the adherence of those who would prefer to retain some of the benefits they might 
receive from the use of their talents in a system that appears to reward talents - talents 
whlch, Rawls hunself adrmts, are arbitrary from a moral point of view and should be viewed 
as a "common asset". The dfference principle - or, more precisely, the scope of inequality 
whlch Rawls thmks is permitted by the dfference principle - is the product not of reflection 
on the requirements of justice, but instead on the requirements of stabhty under non-ideal 
condttions. On h s  view, Rawls seems to hold that the motivational weakness of the 
talented is reason enough to adjust the principles of justice and that the parties in the origmal 
position would agree when they are asked to consider the strains of commitment. 
Rawls thmks that he has "reconcile[d] us to our political and social condttion" ( I 2  
11). But, hke Rawls, Cohen dunks that a conception of justice must not simply 
accommodate the existing status quo, otherwise it loses its critical and emancipatory appeal. 
Recall agam that Rawls holds that "[j]ustice is the first virtue of social institutions" and that 
"laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or 
abolished if they are unjust" (TJ 3). If Cohen is right that in the very content of the 
principles of justice Rawls makes concessions to motivational deficits whch are both 
unattractive and unnecessary, then Rawls has failed on h s  own terms. To rescue Rawls7s 
position from Cohen's objection, then, we need to show either that Rawls does not permit 
the sort of inequalities that Cohen accuses hum of permitting or, if he does permit such 
inequalities, that permitting them isn't, as Cohen dunks, a matter of accommodating 
unattractive and unnecessary motivational deficits but instead a matter of accommodating 
attractive morivational concerns or the h t s  of human motivational capacity. 
The question that parties in the origmal position face might be stated h s  way: Would 
the strains of commitment be excessive if, rather than requiring the hfference principle to 
apply to the basic structure of society, justice demanded that it apply also to the choices 
political agent-s make? To Cohen the question is unimportant because justice should not 
depend on agents' agreement. That can only open the door to concessions to unattractive 
preferences and interests. But for Rawls, because justice is a matter not simply of equal 
dstributions, but of what best serves the hndamental interests of human beings concerned 
with the development of their two moral powers, some motivational concerns make that 
question, ancl consideration of the strains of commitment, necessary. 
Basic Stmcture, S o d  Ethos, and Justice 
Before proceedmg to a h e c t  evaluation of Cohen's critique of Rawls in the next section, I 
want to offer a few words to clan$ Rawls's view about the relationship between the basic 
structure, the social ethos, and justice. Cohen seems to h k  that Rawls's claim that justice 
is a subject for the basic structure of society entds that endorsement of justice as fairness is 
not required at the level of the social ethos. Whlle Cohen is right to maintain that justice as 
fairness does not require indviduals to make dstributional calculations and decisions at the 
level of their mdvidual, dadp behaviour - and thus that they are not prohibited from makmg 
incentive demands - it is not true to say that justice as fairness does not have a place in the 
social ethos at all. In Rawls's view, justice requires that the dfference principle apply to 
social and political institutions. And that means that, at certain points in time, we should 
assess whether or not the social and political institutional configuration is producing 
dstribudonal results consistent with the dfference principle and that we should alter the 
institutions if ne~essary.~' 
But contrary to Cohen's assumption, the fact that the dfference principle applies to the 
basic structure does not mean that citizens themselves are released of any obhgation to 
endorse the dfference principle and to assess, reform, and support an institutional 
configuration whch satisfies the dfference principle. The dfference principle and the 
demands of justice as fairness more generally should be endorsed at the level of the social 
ethos on Rawls's view. But that means only that citizens have an obligation to support and 
to assist in the construction of social and political institutions whlch would satisfy the 
chfference principle. Citizens do not have, on Rawls's view, a duty to comply with the 
chsuibutional demands of the dfference principle at the level of indvidual chstributional 
 decision^.'^ liindoment of the dfference principle at the level of the social ethos - whlch 
justice requires - does not entad a change in the content of the chfference principle. 
Endorsement of the chfference principle by citizens, then, requires only that they really believe 
and ensure that the institutional configuration produces inequality only if it is to the 
advantage of the least advantaged. 
Of course, this does not mean that there is not s d  an important challenge in Cohen's 
critique. Indeed, Cohen can concede the point that Rawls's view requires endorsement of the 
dfference principle at the level of the social ethos while s d  holdmg that the content of the 
chfference principle should be revised to apply to the behaviour and decision-makmg of 
indtviduals. So can a convincing reply be offered to Cohen's concern? 
IV. Replies to G.A. Cohen 
In thls and the following sections I will reply to Cohen's concern by emphasizing the roles 
that democratic legtirnacy, primary goods and the conception of the person play in Rawls's 
Si For Rawls's account of the social and political institutions associated with dstributive justice, see 
TI: $43  '73ackground Institutions for Distributive Justice". 
54 Josh Cohen, who has helped me to see thls dstinction, has provided an insightful example: 
Supporting the First Amendment's prohibition on laws regulating free speech - i.e., that C0ngre.u shall 
pass no law which abridges the freedom of speech - is something that citizens can support at the 
level of the soc~al ethos. But supporting the First Amendment which requires that Congress pass no 
law abridging freedom of speech does not require indvidual citizens to consider whether their own 
actions constitute restrictions on free speech. In other words, if people endorse and really believe in 
the First .4mendment that means only that they really believe that it should apply to C0ngre.r~ and its 
law-making behaviour. Similarly, then, if people really believe in and support the dfference principle, 
that means only that they really believe that it should apply to the basic structure. Justice is a matter 
of the basic structure which must be endorsed at the level of the social ethos, but endorsement at the 
level of the social ethos does not alter the content of the demands of justice in the way that Cohen 
seems to think ~t does. 
justice as fairness. Unhke other replies to Cohen's critique, my reply maintains that Rawls's 
restriction of the principles of justice to the basic structure is a feature of justice as fairness 
that reasonable political agents would have chosen, not to accommodate some unattractive 
and unnecessary motivational deficit, but rather to ensure that the conception of justice is 
one that inch~iduals could regard as promoting their fundamental interests as free and equal 
citizens.55 
Other replies to Cohen rely on a number of strateges. Joshua Cohen's reply, for 
instance, is instructive in the way he shows how, contrary to G.A. Cohen's claims, justice as 
fairness is concerned with the social ethos of a well-ordered society.56 In the &st place, 
J.Cohen (2002) notes how justice as fairness does not simply take the existing, perhaps 
inegalitarian and egoistic, ethos as fixed in the way that G.A. Cohen suggests. The chfference 
principle permits inequalities, if it does at all, not on the basis of determinate or particular 
preferences or motives that some inchviduals might have. Rather, inequalities are permitted 
only on the basis of the general facts of human psychology. 
,4s I have noted, however, Rawls fails to clearly specify the content of the so-called 
general facts c.)f human psychology. It might be the case that egoistic motives are a feature 
of that general psychology. Thus, G.A. Cohen can respond that the veil of ignorance on 
particular infccmation is insufficient to exclude h s  objectionable feature of human 
55 Notable papers which wrestle with Cohen's incentives, structure, and ethos critique of Rawls's 
theory (as we might call it) include Williams (1998), Estlund (1998), Murphy (1999), Pogge (2000), 
Cohen (2002). Wolff (1998) also takes up the issue of ethos versus institutions but is less a direct 
reply to Cohen's critique of Rawls than the other works cited here. m i l e  the essays by Wilhams 
(1998) and Pogge (2000) give some mention of autonomy and democratic legtimacy, neither of them 
match the degree to which Murphy (1999) and J. Cohen (2002) consider these concerns. ,4nd even 
these latter two don't capture the force of the autonomy and democratic legitimacy concerns that I 
emphasize here. 
50 In this paragraph I refer to G.A. Cohen and J.Cohen using the initials of their given names along 
with their shared surname in order to avoid confusion. Elsewhere in the chapter, where I simply 
write "Cohen", one should assume that I mean G.A. Cohen. 
psychology from the origmal position. Even so, the force of J. Cohen's reply rests on the 
claim that Rawls's focus on the basic structure is not as objectionable as G.A. Cohen might 
h k  because "at least in some circumstances a Rawlsian conception of justice d 
require. . .changes in the social ethos because that is how institutional changes lead to a more 
just dstribution" (2002: 364). J. Cohen emphasizes that Rawls's understandmg of the effects 
that institutions have on a social ethos is inspired by Rousseau's statement "that a man is 
naturally good, and that it is solely by [our] institutions that men become wicked." If bad 
institutions make people wicked, then perhaps just institutions make them more just. 
Moreover, J. Cohen's reply captures the idea, dscussed above, that at the level of the social 
ethos citizens might have an obligation to support and to work towards the construction of 
social and political institutions that satisfy the requirements of the dfference principle even 
if they are not required to apply s o m e h g  hke the dfference principle to their individual 
decision-malung and daily behaviour. Contrary to G.A. Cohen's clam that Rawls ignores the 
social ethos, then, J. Cohen shows how Rawls's concern for the social ethos is demonstrated 
by h s  view about how the social ethos can be transformed and what citizens are obligated to 
do to support justice. 
Two other replies to Cohen are of particular interest in that they show how 
accommodations of human motives can be made for unobjectionable reasons. David 
Estlund (1998), for example, makes the case that motives of affection "might compete with 
the demands of social justice" but not for egoistic reasons. Behaviour motivated by 
affection for one's spouse or children, for example, may contribute to inequalities in the 
wider society, but the motive itself can be regarded as "untainted" (1 998: 102, 108). 
Moreover, attempts to replace the motives of f a d a l  affection with a society-wide 
"pseudoaffect~on" may have worse consequences for an egalitarian ethos than would 
maintaining the status quo motives of affection. Thomas Pogge (2000) also acknowledges 
certain motives that might result in greater inequalities but are unobjectionable from a moral 
point of view. He notes, for example, the "fact that people have &verse preferences over 
jobs" whch can motivate in&viduals to demand hgher wages, not as incentives to greater 
productivity, but to compensate them, in some way, for agreeing to perform more 
productive work that they would sincerely prefer not to do.57 
VIMe both Estlund and Pogge demonstrate that attention to motives, and therefore 
not all inequalities, are objectionable, that doesn't suffice to show why incentives and 
therefore the inequalities that result, are necessary for ensuring the greatest benefit to the 
least advantaged. The dfference principle holds that "social and economic inequalities are to 
be arranged so that they are.. .to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged" (TJ 266) whch 
suggests that inequalities are permissible when are necessaty to improve the advantage of the 
least advantaged, not simply that inequalities whch arise from unobjectionable motives are 
permissible. It may be permissible to accommodate certain untainted motives, but mere 
permissibhty does not demonstrate necessity. And it is a demonstration of necesszg that the 
dfference principles demands. Thus, if Rawls's conception of justice is the product of a 
hypothetical agreement, then we need not only reasons why the parties in the origmal 
position rnigh t regard accommodations of untainted motives as unobjectionable, we need to 
show also that there are reasons why the parties would dunk agreeing to these concessions 
would be good - that is, required by justice and not merely a practical concession. The 
parties in the ~:xigmal position should, and Rawls dunks that they wdl, aLqee only to 
accommodate those motives and only those features of human psychology that promote 
some interest that they themselves have. But what interest or interests do parties have when 
57 As Joshua Cohen has pointed out to me, Pogge's shift from the idea of "incentives" to the idea of 
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they are in the o r i p a l  position whch could guide their judgments between merely 
permissible and necessary concessions to certain general facts of human psychology? 
V. From Facts to Conceptions 
Note that in restricting the dfference principle to the basic structure, Rawls is not 
respondmg to the demands of citizens' determinate preferences and motives. With the veil 
of ignorance .in place, no one would be in a position to know whether concessions to 
incentive-seehg or egoistic behaviour would benefit or harm them once the veil is lifted. 
So Rawls's conception does not accommodate the demands of any particular class or 
indidual when it restricts application of the dfference principle to the basic structure. But 
our question was whether Rawls's conception of justice makes an objectionable concession 
insofar as it relies on the general facts of human psychology. Indeed, Rawls hunself writes 
that "the theory of justice assumes a d e h t e  h t  on the strength of social and altruistic 
motivation. It supposes that indviduals and groups put forward competing clams, and 
whlle they are w&ng to act justly, they are not prepared to abandon their interests" (TJ 248). 
So we might wonder whether that might lead to concessions to objectionable motives. 
Even there, however, Rawls does not make concessions to the empirical facts of 
human psvchology, but instead tries to accommodate a conception of the person. That 
conception "is meant as both normative and political, not metaphysical or psychologcal" 
(JF. 19).~"t holds that citizens are to be regarded as free and equal, and that citizens have 
two moral powers - a capacity for a sense of justice and a capacity for a conception of the 
"compensation" actually changes the issue rather than addressing it hectly. 
SVn Jurfice as F~rimess Rawls writes that "[tlhis conception of the person is not to be mistaken for the 
conception of a human being (a member of the species homo sapiens) as the latter q h t  be specified 
in biology or psychology without the use of normative concepts of various h d s ,  includmg, for 
example, the concepts of the moral powers and of the moral and political virtues" 24). 
good UF: 18-24). Notice how that conception expresses the Rousseauian theme of Rawls7s 
political theory: Citizens are regarded as having a fundamental interest in having the 
freedom to pursue a conception of the good and the aim of a conception of justice is not 
only to acknowledge that interest, but to secure condttions necessary for the protection and 
encouragement of that freedom. What the representatives in the origmal position are to ask, 
then, is what they would need in order to ensure that all are regarded as free and equal and to 
ensure that they have the resources necessary to exercise the two moral powers. 
Framing the question of justice in terns of the requirements of a normative 
conception of the person leads Rawls to re-characterize hls idea of primary goods. In the 
Preface to the French Edttion of Theory, Rawls says that "a serious weakness of the o r i p a l  
English edttion was its account of primary goods" (CP: 417). In the earlier account, primary 
goods were held to be those h g s  that rational persons would want whatever else they 
might want because they were characterized as those material and social resources that 
indtviduals would need in order to pursue their aims and ends (whatever those might be). 
But in the years after the publication of Theory, Rawls began to see how principles of justice 
could not be articulated by a s h g  simply what rational actors would choose under 
condttions of h t e d  in f~ rmat ion .~~  ~nstead, he says that "persons are to be viewed as 
having two moral powers. . .and as having hgher-order interests in developing and exercising 
those powers. Primary goods are now characterized as what persons need in their status as 
free and equal citizens, and as normal and fully cooperating members of society over a 
complete life" (CP: 417). Primary goods in the later characterization are to be seen as 
"answering to their needs as citizens as opposed to their preferences and desires" (CP: 417). 
59 See JF: 82n2, and CP: 365115. 
What G.A. Cohen regards as Rawls's accommodation of egoism should be regarded 
instead, in light of the conception of the person, as an attempt to accommodate certain 
fundamental interests of citizens. Whereas G.A. Cohen thmks that distributive equality is 
the primary subject of justice, Rawls's maintains that a concern for equality must be 
accompanied by a concern for citizens' interest in freedom, their autonomy as citizens. The 
conception of the person holds that indtviduals have a capacity to have and to revise a 
conception of the good and justice as fairness maintains that citizens' having and pursuing 
those conceptions should gulde our construction of principles of justice. If freedom entails 
that people "regard themselves as being entitled to make claims on their institutions so as to 
advance their conceptions of the good" UF: 23), then principles of justice whch are not 
responsive to citizens' understandmgs of their reasonable conceptions fad to r e c o p e  a 
fundamental human interest in freedom. Of course Rawls r e c o p e s  that a conception of 
justice cannot deliver a "society in whch all can acheve their complete good, or in whch 
there are no confhcting demands and the wants of all fit together without coercion into a 
harmonious plan of acti~7it-y'' (T' 249). That would be a society, as Rawls says, "in a certain 
sense beyond justice" - a society whch "has elmmated the occasions when the appeal to the 
principles of tight and justice is necessary" (TJ: 249). But if such a utopia is unattainable, 
then justice requires at least an effort to attend to and to accommodate in some way citizens' 
interest in having the freedom necessary to pursue a reasonable conception of the good even 
if cannot guarantee universal success is all those pursuits. 
By accommodating the normative conception of the person, rather than mere 
empirical facts about human beings, Rawls's concep tion not only avoids Cohen's critique, 
but indicates one way in whch a conception of justice should be responsive to citizens' 
motives and the demands of realism more generally. Indeed, a conception of justice whch 
failed to acknowledge and in some way accommodate citizens' interest in freedom would not 
only be unstable - would not only create excessive strains of commitment - it would be an 
unattractive conception. Meeting the requirements of the strains of commitment, Rawls 
dunks, solves part of the problem of motivational possibhty. That is, a conception of justice 
is endorsed hy the parties to the o r i p a l  agreement only if they thmk that under that 
conception all citizens could, over time, develop an appropriate sense of justice and wdhngly, 
rather than grudpgly, support the conception. But, because the strains of commitment 
question is framed in a subjective rather than an objective way - that is, because it asks the 
parties in the o r i p a l  position to ask themselves whether they thmk the strains of 
commitment are acceptable or excessive - that requirement attends not only to the problem 
of stabhty, but in some ways also to that of legtimacy. Justice as fairness demands that a 
sense of justice whch supports the two principles of justice develops in virtzle ofthe 
concep tion of justice it defends. Justice as fairness aims for stabhty thmztgh legtimacy. 
However, as far as the difference principle itself is concerned, G..4. Cohen's objection 
seems to hold. The replies whch point to "untainted" motives or, in my case, to the needs 
of democratic legtimacy, do not demonstrate why inequalities would be necessay to improve the 
condition ofthe least advantaged. Makmg justice a matter of the basic structure rather than the 
social ethos and thereby creating some space for the exercise of liberty and some associated 
&saibutional inequality might be necessary from the point of view of justice as fairness as a 
whole - that is, a point of view whch is concerned to reconcile liberty and equality - even if 
it is not ideal from the point of view of the least advantaged once the veil of ignorance is 
lifted. From the perspective of justice as fairness as a whole, such inequalities may be 
permissible insofar as they are the outcome of how the conception of justice responds to 
freedom-based motives to whlch it must respond if the conception is to be justifiable and 
legtimate. A4oreover, gven that the parties in the origmal position are assumed to be 
concerned with material resources not as mere rational economic agents but instead as 
democratic citizens, it might be reasonable for them to agree to principles whch permit 
some material inequality whch isn't strictly necessary to improve the advantage of the least 
advantaged. And insofar as the parties in the origmal position must take up all of these 
different points of view when deliberating about justice and the strains of commitment, it is 
reasonable to hold that justice as a whole does not require satisfjing what would be 
considered ideal from ody one of the many points of view that the parties must take on.60 
VI. Conclusion 
G.A. Cohen's criticism of Rawls's justice as fairness, it seems, derives at least in part from 
the assumption that justice is primanly a matter of hstributive justice. But as I have tried to 
show, Rawls is concerned not simply with rllstributive jus tice, but with justice in a larger 
sense - with justice understood as fair terms of social cooperation. Citizens have interests 
not simply in material resources, Rawls holds, but in how a package of rights, liberties, and 
resources together wdl affect their abhty to participate in the political life of their societies as 
equal democratic citizens and their liberty to pursue a conception of the good. A defensible 
theory of justice, in other words, tries to articulate fair terms of social cooperation in a way 
whch recognizes that citizens have an interest in arrangements whch permit the pursuit of 
both public and private aims. Once that idea enters the picture, a conception of justice must 
accommodate itself to at least some of the motivational concerns of citizens - that is, to one 
of the demands of realism. 
"' I am indebted to Sarah Song for help in clarifjmg the argument of t h s  paragraph. 
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Of course, G.A. Cohen and others in the utopian camp might say that justice is notfor 
human beings but instead an independent idea that does not or should not depend on 
human motives or other demands of realism in any sense. But then it would be hard to see 
why we should deliberate and care about justice at all. It might be an object that we study 
out of curiosity, but its connection to the political and social lives of real people would be 
lost. And yet, even if we regard justice as s o m e h g  whlch isfor human beings rather than 
an independent object of curiosity, Cohen's worries about the way concerns about realism, 
legtimacy, and stabihty might affect the content of a conception of justice are instructive. 
They show us that a &stincrion between relevant and irrelevant demands of realism must be 
made and, moreover, that concessions to objectionable features of the social and political 
status quo should be avoided. The Rawlsian reply to Cohen's worries here have shown, I 
dunk, how we can at least begm to make that &stinction and how we can avoid concessions 
to objectionable demands of realism in the selection of principles of justice. 
However, there are 1 x 7 0  outstandmg issues that we wrll have to resolve over the course 
of the next two chapters: In the first place, it is stdl not clear why legtimacy and agreement 
need to play such a fundamental role in the construction of a conception of justice. Perhaps 
the concerns about realism can be handled without the idea of agreement. The next chapter 
considers the way in whlch Habermas's political theory offers an answer to that concern and, 
moreover, reconsiders Rawls's political theory in light of the more democratic approach to 
the problem of motivation that Habermas appears to defend. The other outstanding issue 
has to do with the way the Rawlsian approach to the demands of realism fares in light of the 
dversiq- of moral and religous worldviews whch characterizes contemporary democratic 
societies. A hypothetical constructivist approach to the demands of realism might falter 
under condtions of pluralism and thus Rawls's political theory might require further 
revision. I take up h s  issue in chapter 5. Our final assessment of Rawls's approach to the 




Habermas: Real Proceduralism 

Tossed to and fro between facticity and validty, 
political theory and legal theory today are 
&sintegrating into camps that hardly have anydung to 
say to one another. The tension between normative 
approaches, whch are constantly in danger of losing 
contact with social reality, and objectivist approaches, 
whch screen out all normative aspects, can be taken 
as a caveat agamst fixating on one &sciphnary point 
of view. 
- Jiirgen Habermas (BFnT: 6)61 
Interests can be satisfied through generaked 
behavioral expectations in the long run only if 
interests are connected with ideas that justify 
normative valimty c h n s ;  ideas can in turn gain broad 
empirical acceptance only if they are connected with 
interests that lend them motivational force. 
- Jiirgen Habermas (BFRT: 69) 
Jiirgen Habermas's political theory is guided by the idea of a "self-organizing community of 
free and equal citizens" (BFN: 445,7). He defends a mscursive conception of democracy 
whch tries to embrace Rousseau's conviction, on the one hand, that "human beings act as 
free subjects only insofar as they obey just those laws they gve  themselves" (BFhl: 445-6) 
and Rawls's claim, on the other hand, that principles of justice should not be tainted by 
objectionable interests nor influenced by power inequalities. At the same time, however, 
Habermas departs from Rousseau's monologia/ approach - the idea that the moral point of 
a Habermas7s works are cited in the essay as follows: B F N  Between Facts and h T o m ,  trans. Wrilliam 
Rehg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996); LIE: "Discourse Ethlcs: Notes on a Program of Philosophical 
Justification" and MCC4: "Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action" both in Moral 
Consciousness and Communicative Action (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990); RDE: "Remarks on Discourse 
Ethics" in Jztst~f;cation and.4ppkcation: Remark on Diiconrse E th i~s  (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1 993); STPS: 
The Jtmctura/ Tranrfimation of the Pnblic Sphere, trans. Thomas Burger (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1 989); 
and R P L R  "Reconchation Through the Public Use of Reason" in The IncLnsion ofthe Other 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998). 
view is located in the "inner voice" of a reflective in&vidual. And he rejects Rawls's 
hypothetical constmctivism - i.e., the attempt to insulate deliberation about principles of justice 
from the determinate preferences, motives, and beliefs of citizens in an origmal position. 
Instead, Habermas defends a reaIpmceduralist variant of realistic utopianism whch relies on 
principle of c~scourse thlcs whch holds that "only those norms can claim to be valid that 
meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity asparticipants in a 
practical dircoursr" (MCCA: 66). He aims for a more democratic realistic utopia whlch gves 
citizens a central role in &scourses about those norms whch wdl apply to institutions and 
actions whlle it simultaneously hlters out objectionable motives via an impartial point of 
view implicit in the pragmatic presuppositions of argumentation. 
In this chapter, I investigate Habermas's &scourse ethlcs whch ties the justification of 
principles of justice to actual &scourses among citizens who are fully aware of their own 
preferences, motives, and beliefs. I ask whether the actual deliberation Habermas advocates 
can deliver on the promise that indviduals can and wdl look beyond their own interests, 
preferences, and needs and consider the interests, preferences, and needs of others in testing 
appropriate moral norms. W e  Habermas dunks that impartiality is acheved not by 
abswacting from features of human beings and the social world, but instead by permitting a 
free exchange of information, opinions, and arguments among fully aware citizens, we might 
wonder whether those &scourses have undesirable consequences for the moral norms that 
are endorsed by deliberating citizens. Indeed, gven that political &scourse in existing 
capitalist societies is permeated by inequalities of power and a variety of unattractive private 
preferences and expectations, it is hard to see at the outset how principles of justice that are 
the outcome of a realproceduralism embedded in an objectionable status quo could avoid the 
dangers of strategc bargaining and concessions to unfair advantages. They q h t  offer a 
more immediate solution to the problem of motivational possibhty and capture some of the 
force of the democratic ideal of self-legslating citizens, but those gains might be acheved at 
the cost of principles whch make concessions to objectionable motives as well as 
unattractive features of existing capitalist societies. 
I argue that whde Habermas's attempt to democratize the procedure for dscovering 
appropriate norms is an important development for realistically utopian theory, h s  theory 
ultimately fails to provide an attractive approach to the justice and motivation tension. First, 
h s  failure to acknowledge the substantive requirements of ideal dscourse exposes canddate 
principles to threats from objectionable motives and unattractive features of the social status 
quo. That fallure, moreover, makes it hard to see how Habermas can defend a solution to 
the problem of motivational possibhty whch relies on citizens being able to develop a 
"postconventional stage of moral consciousness" (DE: 109) - that is, a psychologcal 
dsposition to be motivated to act on principles because they are vahd and not because they 
fit with any pre-political motives, preferences, or beliefs that the agent may have. Secondly, 
Habermas7s move from a defense of actual dscourses of justification to a defense of a 
"subjectless" flow of reasons in the formal and informal public spheres threatens the 
normative and motivational advances made by a dscourse-theoretic conception of 
democracy (HFN: 299). In h s  attempt to "unburden" citizens of the coptive, motivational, 
and organizational demands of complex societies by shfthg from inclusive dscourses to a 
more anonymous flow of reasons and the use of a legal system to sanction noncompliance, 
Habermas abandons the mechanism by whch transformations of citizens' pre-political 
motives and preferences can be acheved and whch can encourage the development of the 
"postcon~~entional stage of moral consciousness". 
In short, I argue that a concern for citizens' capacity to suppoa valid principles of 
justice is unavoidable once we r e c o p e  that the legal and political institutions whch 
Habermas thinks can sidestep the motivational problem ultimately depend on citizens' sense 
of justice and their d e s i p g  and reforming institutions in light of that sense of justice. A 
theory that fails to demonstrate how that sense of justice can develop fails to offer an 
account of motivational possibibty and, thus, fads to solve the problem of justice and 
motivation. In that sense, Habermas's realpmcedztraiirt approach - whch regards justified 
principles as those whch emerge from an actual process of democratic deliberation - fads to 
offer a compehg  solution to the more general problem of how to reconcile justice to the 
demands of realism. Because the institutional configuration Habermas envisions fads to 
produce in citizens the capacities and commitments necessary to support defensible principle 
of justice, the realpmceduralirt theory that he defends fails to show how chscourse participants 
wdl be able to hstingmsh between demands of realism whch should, and those whch 
should not, be accommodated by a conception of justice. 
As in the previous chapter on Rawls's hlrpothetical constmctivism h s  chapter on 
Habermas's n?a/proceduro(m will focus on concerns about motives and motivational 
possibhq. The other demand of realism with whch we are concerned - pluralism - d be 
addressed from time to time in h s  chapter, but a more comprehensive treatment of that 
concern wdl be postponed unnl Chapter 5. In h s  chapter, then, after pro~idmg a sketch of 
the main features of &scourse e h c s  (Section I), I mscuss the two ways in whch Habermas's 
political theory fads to address the tension between motivation and principles of justice in a 
suitable manner. Section I1 focuses on the role of substantive justice in reahzing the ideal 
speech situation whch is central to Habermas's theory. Section I11 interrogates Habermas's 
move from direct to more impersonal &scourses in Between Facts and N o m s  and hls move to 
rely on a legal system with sanctions for noncompliance as a strategy to unburden citizens of 
the problem of motivation altogether. I argue that these moves prevent discourse ethlcs 
from facihtating the transformation of citizens' preferences and motivations as necessary. 
Finally, in section IV, I offer some concludmg reflections and point towards the outstandmg 
problem of pluralism whch I confront bectly in the next chapter. 
I. Radical Democracy and Discourse Ethics 
Habemas's realistically utopian approach to the problem of motivation, and the demands of 
realism more generally, like those examined in earlier chapters, attempts to &stinguishes 
between objectionable and unobjectionable motives from a moral point of view and offers a 
solution to the problem of motivational possibhty that is consistent with that point of view. 
like Rawls, Mabermas is guided by an ideal of a democratic society implicit in the public 
culture whch includes a conception of the citizen as free and equal. But u&e Rawls, 
Habermas is not prepared to develop and defend substantive principles of justice in h s  
theory because he dunks that workmg out the implications of the implicit democratic ideal 
for principles of justice is not a matter for philosophers alone but a matter for all citizens. 
Thus, he defends a procedural conception of democracy whch o u h e s  con&tions under 
u-hch principles could be accepted, and therefore justified, by actual citizens deliberating 
among themselves. As Thomas McCarthy describes the project, "rather than contractual 
arrangements among 'unencumbered' indmiduals with arbitrarily chosen ends, [Habermas's 
&scourse ethlcs] involves processes of reflective argument among previously socialued 
subjects whose needs and interests are themselves open to discussion and transformation" 
(1990: A). On thls model the &stkction between motives whch should be accommodated 
in principles of justice and those whch should be transformed or ignored is made by citizens 
themselves albeit through the guidance provided by presupposed rules of argumentation 
whch exclude certain claims and arguments. 
While our focus in thls chapter will be on Habermas's approach to the narrower 
concern about motives, it can be said that the way in whch Habermas deals with that 
concem is dlustrative of h s  approach to the demands of realism more generally. His real 
pmceduralst variant of realistic utopianism holds that decisions about the demands of realism 
and whether they should affect the content of valid principles must be made by citizens 
themselves in deliberation with others. Whlle Habermas is concerned, especially in h s  later 
work Bctzveen Facts and Noms, to "unburden" citizens of not only the motivational demands 
of right and justice, but also the copt ive  and organizational complexities of contemporary 
societies (BFjIVT: 114), and thus shlfts to what we might call a more institutional or structural 
proceduralism, he nevertheless retains the idea that decisions about the demands of realism 
must be made in a deliberative fashon where participants have access to all information. To 
be sure, &stkcdons between information whlch is relevant or irrelevant are to be made by 
the deliberators themselves rather than by political phdosophers in advance of actual 
deliberation. W e  the shft to an institutional or structural proceduralism is problematic, as 
I wdl argue later in the chapter, a real procedurahst approach to the tension between justice 
and the demands of realism is in many ways compehg  because of the strong commitment it 
shows to the idea of legtimacp. Whereas monologia/realistic utopianism and b&otbetica/ 
con.rtmCtim.rm demonstrate a concem for agreement, a realpmcedztralist variant of realistic 
utopianism captures the idea that hypothetical agreements or agreements made in isolation 
from other citizens do not produce the same kmd of legtirnacy as agreements made by 
actually deliberating citizens. 
Discourse Ethics and the Moral Point cf 17iew 
In contrast to democratic theories whch hold that democracy is a matter of uncritically 
aggregating gven interests or selecting elites to rule untd voters replace them with a less 
objectionable group, Habermas defends a much more rigorous conception whch invites 
wide-spread participation and deliberation among all citizens about the fundamental 
principles which should p d e  their collective political life. Citizens are not simply left to 
dtscuss particular policies or regulations with an already established set of liberal rights 
h t i n g  the agenda of that discussion. Accordmg to dtscourse ethlcs, "only those norms can 
claim to be v:hd that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity 
a~participants in apractical discourd'' (DE: 66). And it is in such practical &scourses that 
Habermas locates the point of ~ l e w  from whch &stkcdons between permissible and 
impermissible motives should be made. In thls sense, the moral point of view that Habermas 
offers draws on the ideal of a democratic society but might be referred to more accurately as 
apolitical point of view because of the way in whch Habermas locates normative vali&ty in 
the outcome of the practical political &scourses of citizens. 
At the same time, Habermas has argued elsewhere that political dtscussion in existing 
capitalist societies is permeated by power inequalities and strategc maneuvering. Indeed, he 
rejects Hobbt:sian conceptions of justice because they appear to concede ground to 
objectionable motives as well as uncritically accept potentially unjust featured of the social 
and political status quo. Contracting parties on Hobbes7s account, accordmg to Habermas, 
"are equipped only with freedom of choice" and therefore "can justie their contractual 
agreements exclusive1~- on purposive grounds, with the result that their reasons remain tied 
to the contingent interests and preferences of participants" (DE: 27). That tie to contingent 
interests and preferences is unacceptable because the interests and preferences of citizens in 
modern capitalist societies are often dlegtimately manipulated by private advertisers, 
corporate me&a, and state propaganda.62 I A e  Rousseau and Rawls, Habermas wants a 
conception uf justice that does not amount to a mere bargain among indviduals whose 
determinate motives are taken at face value. But why, then, does Habermas endorse a 
dscursive approach to justifying moral norms whch threatens to expose principles to 
objectionable motives and other unattractive preferences, strategc compromises, and power 
inequalities? 
To answer these questions, it helps to examine what Habermas finds unacceptable in 
the Rawlsian (and Kantian) conception of justice. On Habermas's readmg, Rawls "wants to 
ensure the impartial consideration of all affected interests by putting the moral judge into a 
fictitious 'original position"' where he, as much as any other indvidual so situated, "can 
undertake to justify basic norms on h s  own" (DE: 66). Because "the same holds true for 
the moral phlosopher hunself," Habermas claims that Rawls must view h s  principles of 
justice "not as the contribution of a participant in argumentation to a process of chscursive 
wdl formation regardmg the basic institutions of late capitalist society, but as the outcome of 
a 'theory of justice,' whch he as an expert is qualified to construct" (Dl:: 66).63 Habermas 
seems to agree with those critics of Rawls's veil of ignorance device who, on the one hand, 
hold that indviduals are simply incapable of adequately abstracting from their own particular 
preferences or conception of the good, and those who, on the other hand, hold that 
62 For Habermas's diagnosis of the ills of modem capitalist societies and analysis of the 
manipulations of social consciousness see the latter half of his Stmctural Tran~fomation oftbe Public 
Sphere, the whole of Legdimation Ccisis and, on the medla, Between Facts and Norms (especially pp. 376- 
379). 
63 Rawls (1996) disagrees with this characterization of hls view. See especially (1996: 382-5). More 
on this below in Section 11. 
indtviduals are incapable of adequately adopting the perspectives of others when considering 
the consequences of principles or actions on their interests and conceptions of the 
The Benefits of Real Pmceduralism 
So how can arrangements whch are more dtscursive or democratic rather than monologicalor 
h@othetzcal improve our abihty to articulate principles of justice? In the &st place, dtscursive 
approaches potentially lead to "a better-informed perspective" on the normative and 
practical concerns of principles of justice and public policies (Mendelberg, 2001: 3).65 
Whereas an indtvidual deliberating alone knows her own interests and capacities and has 
limited access to information about the world and potential consequences of various 
principles and policies, a more dtscursive approach can produce information about interests, 
motives, and consequences that the solitary inchvidual dtd or could not have.66 Second, 
dtscursive democratic arrangements can help us to better develop and defend reasons whch 
could justify principles of justice because of the opportunities they create for assessment of 
those justifications from multiple perspectives. Thud, dtscursive approaches offer 
opportunities for indtviduals to become more aware of the interests and perspectives of 
others and perhaps improve the concern that indtviduals have for the consequences of 
decisions on others' interests and well-being rather than simply their own.67 Fourth, and 
related?, democratic approaches are potentially superior to monologcal and hypothetical 
approaches in that they reduce the possibhq- that deliberators wdl either misrepresent or 
" See Deveaux (2000), Sandel (1982), and the contributions to Benhabib & Cornell (1987), especially 
those by Benhabib and Young. 
65 See also Gutmann & Thompson (2004: 1 1 - 12). 
Of course, discursive approaches might also increase the quantity of in-ejevant information and so a 
mechanism for sorting through the increased information would be necessary for the d~scursive 
approach to be informationally superior to monological deliberation. 
" Gutmann & 'Thompson (2004: 10-1 1); Mendelberg (2001: 3,4); DE: 65; and RDE: 48-9. 
dlscount the interests and perspectives of others.6R Finally, democratic or real proceduralist 
approaches have the potential to increase the legitimacy of, and therefore the motivation to 
support, principles whlch emerge from deliberation because participants can regard 
themselves as having contributed to their development rather than simply passively accepted 
them from some other source.b9 
On Habermas's view, "nodung better prevents others from perspectivally distorting 
one's own interests than actual participation" (DE: 67). Indeed, actual deliberation among 
citizens aware of their own interests ensures that the practice of takmg the perspective of 
others is supervised and, if necessary, corrected by those very others whose perspectives are 
being taken. So "moral justifications are dependent on argumentation actually being carried 
out, notforpnlgmatic reasons of an equahation of power, but for internal reasons, namely that 
real argztment makes moral insight possible" (DE: 57). That is not to say, however, that 
determinate motives are beyond criticism and possible tlansformation or rejection in moral 
discourse. Rather, determinate motives, as well as preferences, interests, and interpretations, 
are subject to critical examination and assessment by other participants when they "adopt the 
perspecti~~e of all others" (DE: 65). 
More generally, an actual process of deliberation allows citizens to dlscuss the 
relevance of specific demands of realism as well as the reasons that permit or prohlbit 
accommodations to any particular demand. A real proceduralist approach to the demands of 
realism has an advantage over monological or hypothetical approaches, then, insofar as it 
permits a fully informed dscussion about potential demands of realism and allows each 
DE: 65, 67; JDE: 48-9, 58. 
fl 1 think that there are other benefits to deliberative democratic approaches, includmg and especially 
their encouragement of the development and use of citizens' capacity for critical reflection on their 
own interests, which I wdl &scuss in chapter 6. My concern here, however, is not with the 
citizen an opportunity to make a case for or against accommodation. Because monologcal 
and hypothetical approaches restrict the scope of participation by makmg decisions about 
practical and normative relevance in advance of actual deliberation, those approaches are at 
risk of overlookmg important information or arguments that would be more hkely to emerge 
where all citizens are allowed to offer their views at all stages of principle construction. 
Moreover, "impartiality of judgment," Habermas writes "is essentially dependent on 
whether the conacting needs and interests of alparticipants are gven their due and can be 
taken into consideration from the viewpoint of the participants themselves" (RDE: 48-9). 
"The descriptive terms in whch each inchvidual perceives h s  interests," he maintains, "must 
be open to criticism by others" (DE: 67). Distinctions between l e e a t e  and dlegtimate 
motives and other demands of realism are not made prior to public chscussion but through 
public chscussion. Participants engage in a practice of ideal role-takmg in whlch they 
consider the appropriateness of their own claims from the perspective of other participants. 
"The moral point of view," Habermas argues, "calls for the extension and reversibhty of 
interpretive perspectives so that alternative viewpoints and interest structures and chfferences 
in inchvidual self-understandmgs and worldviews are not effaced but are gven full play in 
chscourse" (RDE: 58). In short, we cannot know in advance of deliberation whch features 
of human mouvation, identity, and psychology should be known by moral deliberators and 
whch should be hdden by a veil of ignorance. 
But so far Haberrnas has only shown us why a monologcal point of view is unsuitable 
for moral deliberation. He has not shown us how actual chscourses can be insulated from 
the very strate'gc motives and power inequahties that he has criticized in contemporary 
political life. What makes an actual chscourse an idea/ chscourse? To put the problem another 
attractiveness of democratic deliberation as a whole, but rather with how it might correct some of the 
way, how are participants in actual dscourses to know when they can legtirnately criticize or 
reject the determinate motives, preferences, or beliefs of others and when they must accept 
others' motives, preferences, and beliefs? Here Habermas notes that the moral point of view 
of actual dscourses rests not in the dscourses themselves, but in the presuppositions of 
argumentation or "ideab@ng assumptions that everyone who seriously engages in 
argumentation must make ax a matter offact' (WE: 50). The idea here is that any citizen who 
engages in an. argument to convince another of the truth or validty of some claim, or who 
wishes to come to an agreement about some matter, must make certain assumptions about 
what she is doing and what standmg the other person has in the dscourse. If the speaker is 
sincerely trying to convince the other person of the validty of some claim, rather than simply 
trying to coerce or to deceive that person into acting in a certain way or believing a certain 
claim, then the speaker must regard that other person as, among other thmgs, capable of 
takmg part in a dscourse, as worthy of equal recoption, as free to contest and reject certain 
claims, and as free to express opinions and beliefs of her own.'" As Habermas puts it, "in 
the symmetry condtions and reciprocity expectations of everyday speech oriented to 
reachmg understandmg, there already exist in nuce the basic notions of equal treatment and 
general welfare on whch all morality turns" (WE: 50). 
The moral point of view from whch we make dstinctions between interests and 
motives whch should be accommodated and those whlch should not, then, rests in the logc 
of argumentation itself whch all participants in practical hscourses oriented to 
understandmg always already assume. "It follows from the aforementioned rules of 
dscourse," Habermas reasons, "that a contested norm cannot meet with the consent of the 
alleged deficiencies of monologcal approaches. 
participants in a practical dscourse unless (U) holds, that is, Unless all affected canfree4 
accept the consequences and the side effects that the general observance of a controversial 
norm can be expected to have for the satisfaction of the interests of each indiv'duat' (RDE: 
9 3). Distinctions between objectionable and unobjectionable interests and motives and 
decisions about their role in the design and justification of principles of justice thus become 
a matter of public reasoning subject to the critical point of view of the "ideal(izing) 
presuppositions of dscourse"" In the end, then, it is the presupposed universahzation 
principle in practical dscourses whch "works like a rule that e h a t e s  as nongenerahable 
content all those concrete value orientations with whch particular biographes or forms of 
life are permeated" (MCCA: 120). How that universahzadon principle is to be understood in 
particular cases is up to the participants, but the general principle whch guides those actual 
&stinctions does not depend for its validty on the always less-than-ideal deliberative 
situation in existing societies. The moral point of view "implicit in the.. .public practice of 
argumentation" ensures that participants abstract from their particular preferences and 
interests so that "the core of generahzable interests can then emerge step by step" (RPUR: 
58, 68). "Discourse ehcs," Habermas writes, "views the moral point of view as emboded 
in an intersubjective praxis of argumentation whch enjoins those involved to an ideahzing 
enlazement of their interpretive perspectives" ( U L R  57). 
For a more formal and comprehensive set of "rules of discourse" that Habermas regards as the 
"inescapable presuppositions" any speaker who is oriented to reachmg agreement will make see 
W E ,  pp. 86-9'1. 
71 In an earlier version of this chapter I referred to the critical point of view as the "ideal speech 
situation", a term whlch, as Thomas McCarthy has reminded me, Habermas has moved away from in 
his more recent- work. McCarthy suggests that the term "ideal speech situation" now makes 
Habermas "nervous", presumably because of its n2ve sociologcal implications. But whereas the 
move to focus on the presuppositions of mscourse might make Habennas less sociologcally nervous 
in one sense, in another sense I thmk that move damages rather than improves h s  theory when we 
consider the preconditions necessary for the development of citizens7 "postconventional moral 
consciousness7' (see section I11 below). Nevertheless, I am grateful to Thomas McCarthy for 
&scussion on tllls point. 
So Habermas can respond to concerns about the sorry state of actual dscourse in 
existing societies and its threat to discourses of justification by pointing to the critical role of 
the ideahzing presuppositions of dscourse whlch must be approximated if actual discourses 
are to be taken seriously as dscourses of political justification. Moreover, over time and 
under the rigllt institutions Habermas believes that citizens will develop a "postconventional 
stage of moral consciousness" whereby "judgment becomes dssociated from the local 
conventions and hstorical coloration of a particular form of life" (DE: 109). In that case, 
citizens would be motivated to act in accordance with principles of justice, not because they 
fit with any of their private motives, preferences, or interests, but instead because they 
r e c o v e  them as valid. In short, over time the ideahzing presuppositions of dscourse and 
the associated principles of universahzation (U) and dscourse (D) become internahzed by 
deliberating citizens. 
Motiuational PossiI3iIi~ 
Habermas recogmzes that while the moral point of view must be assumed by participants in 
practical dscourse, the moral norms that acquire validty through practical dscourses may, 
nevertheless, lack a duect motivating force. That is a consequence, he dunks, of moral 
&scourses having to operate from a more abstract standpoint than the ehca l  and evaluative 
dscourses which provide indviduals and groups with answers to questions about the good 
life. Ethlcal and evaluative dscourses are concerned with questions whose answers can 
more irnmedately motivate citizens' action because answers to those questions "refer to 
what, from the first person perspective, is in the long run good for me or for us - even if 
thls is not equally good for all" (RPUR: 66). Moral dscourses, by contrast, are focused on 
questions of justice - on what is "in the equal interest of all" in societies where answers to 
the ehca l  and evaluative questions dtffer - and therefore are a step removed from the 
wealth of motivational potential vested in ethtcal life (RPUR: 66). Habermas recogrmes, 
then, that "moral judgments, whch provide demotivated answers to decontextuahed 
questions, require an offsetting compensation" (DE: 106, my emphasis)." 
The problem here, as with earlier theories, is to show how principles of justice can 
"stick" (Wilhams, 1981: 122). That is, to ensure that the citizens who must live accordmg to 
the endorsed principles are capable of adhering to those principles without over-taxing their 
capacities or over-burdening them with too rigorous demands. At the same time, however, a 
solution to the problem of motivational possibhty should not demand that principles 
accommodate objectionable motives. For Habermas in particular, the problem is not to 
show how a certain substantive conception of justice is w i k  the realm of practical 
possibhty because dtscourse ethtcs gves us onlj7 a procedure to test principles and not a 
substantive set of valid principles. Instead, Habermas has to show more generally how an), 
principle whlch might be accepted as valid via the &scourse ethlcs procedure is 
motivationally possible gven that justification of principles can rely only on motives and 
other motivational complements whlch survive the critical assessment of the practical 
discourse. 
Habermas considers four possible sources of motivational potential: 
7 2  Here Habermas seems to regard moral and religious worldviews - comprehensive doctrines, to use 
Rawls's term - as imbued with motivational potential. While I agree with Haberrnas that there is 
connection between motives and moral and religous doctrines, we should be careful not to equate 
the two ideas in the cliscussion about the demands of realism more generally. Like the dtstinction we 
noted in the previous chapter between motives and interests, motives and comprehensive doctrines 
are hfferent in the sense that motives induce an agent to act while comprehensive doctrines, like 
interests, give an agent a reason to act, but not necessady the motivation to act. 
1. Motlvatitzg Force 0fRea.ron.r 
In the first place, Habermas identifies motivational potential in the reasons and arguments 
circulating in practical &scourses. I&e Scanlon (1 998)' Habermas h k s  that there is a 
"weak motivating force" in the very reasons whch justify valid moral norms. A person can 
or should be motivated to act accordmg to the demands of valid moral principles because 
those principles are supported by good reasons - reasons whch, Habermas might remind us, 
are those whch are (or could be) accepted by all participants in a practical d~scourse.~~ A 
certain "socially integrating force" is derived from the fact that "the addressees of the legal 
norms may understand themselves.. .as the rational a~tbors of those norms7' (BFN 33). 
What could be more motivating than the idea that the principles whlch one is asked to 
endorse and to support are simply those principles whlch one has gven to oneself in the 
strong sense of having authored those principles oneself? 
But as Habermas a h t s ,  the motivating force of reasons alone is "weak." That 
weakness, it seems, derives in part from the fact that although citizens gve themselves the 
principles to uh.~ch they are subject in actual &scourses, there remains a gap between the 
generalizable interests whch are served by those principles and their own nongenerahable 
interests whlch concern them and perhaps motivate their own behaviour more immediately. 
There may be good reasons to endorse a particular norm whch reflective, deliberating 
citizens come ro r e c o p e ,  but those good reasons sdl  have to find a way back to the 
motivations of often unreflective and non-deliberating political actors going about their 
'"ecall the principle of discourse ethics (D) whch holds that "only those norms can claim to be 
valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity aspafiiczpaantr in a 
practical di.rcourse" (MCC4: 66). 
ordmary, daily business. So we need to identify other sources of motivation if the moral 
norms justified by dscourse are to be anydung more than utopian hopes.74 
2. Strategic and Communication Action 
Another candidate for motivation, then, is the potential fit between strategc and 
comrnunicati.ve action. Because agents in political dscourse are asked whether the 
consequences of norms are acceptable from their own perspectives, there is an opportunity 
for agents to consider whether those canhdate principles are compatible with their 
antecedent motives as well as their antecedent interests, preferences, and beliefs. As Wdham 
Rehg notes, "public dscourse is not merely a cop t ive  exercise but mobdues reasons and 
arguments that draw on citizens' interests, values, and identities. Political mscourse thus 
brings in the citizens' actual sources of motivation and volition" (1996: xxvii). On &us 
readmg, dsccmrse ethlcs appears to re-introduce elements of Hobbes' and Gauthler7s 
approaches insofar as it does not demand that deliberation about canddate principles be 
insulated from the participants' antecedent preferences, interests, and  belief^.'^ 
Again, however, thls source of motivational potential is less promising than it appears 
when we recall that Habermas requires that determinate interests and preferences be open to 
critical assessment in practical dscourses. Political actors might find a fit between their 
generaIi~abLe interests and valid principles, but gaps between non-generalixabIe interests or 
'4 In this Habermas differs from Scanlon (1998), for example, who thinks that the motivational force 
of reasons is a 1  that a conception of justice need demonstrate. That is, Habermas thinks that the 
threshold of motivational possibility for a realistic political theory is higher or, to put it another way, 
that the h u t s  of the practically possible are narrower than Scanlon takes them to be. Scanlon thinks 
that reasons - or, more precisely, the right reasons - are sufficient, that no addtional motivational 
force, such as a desire to be just or moral, is required. By contrast, Wilhams (1981, 1985) thinks that 
we're already lost if we're not dealing with people who don't have a desire to be moral or just at some 
level. That same intuition seems to motivate Hume (1978, 1983). 
'5 On the relationship between lscourse ethics and rational choice see Heath (2001). 
preferences and those same principles will hkely remain. "However gentle it may be," 
Habermas writes, "the force of normative claims uTlll be experienced by actors as externally 
imposed coercion, unless they make it their own as moral force, that is, unless they convert 
thls force into their own motivations" (BFN: 67). The question remains then: How can the 
motivational hfficulty raised by the apparent gap between justified principles and citizens' 
motivations be repaired without violating the integrity of the principles whch are deemed 
valid in dscourses of justification?. 
3. The Motivating Potential ofthe Lifworld 
W e  some motivational capital is available in the fit between generahable interests and 
principles, on the one hand, and in the "weak motivating force" of reasons on the other 
hand, Haberrnas knows that a richer and more immedate source of motivation is necessary 
for principles validated by dscourse ethlcs to be more than principles of a nake utopianism. 
The h d  potential source of motivational possibihty, then, is in the reladonshp between the 
lifeworld and the mscursive moral point of view. If a fit can be found between the values 
and practices of citizens7 ethlcal conceptions of the good and the moral point of view, then a 
more reliable source of motivation might be f o u n d . ' ~ u t  even here Habermas recognizes 
problems that have to be overcome. "Wiithtn the horizon of the lifeworld," he writes, 
"practical judgments derive both their concreteness and their power to motivate action from 
their inner cclnnection to unquestioningly accepted ideas of the good life, in short from their 
connection to the ethlcal life and its institutions" (DE: 108-9). However, he continues, "the 
abstractive achevements required by the moral point of view" pose a "risk [to] all the assets 
of the existing ethlcal substance" (DE: 109). So if motivational capital is to be found in the 
relationshp between the lifeworld and the moral point of view it c e d y  cannot be a h e c t  
relationshp lp~ven the chfferentiation between moral and ehca l  questions that the moral 
point of view brings with it. 
4. Moral Con.s~ousness 
Habermas's answer to the sd l  hgering gap is to introduce a theory of moral psychology 
whch shows how in&viduals can reach a "postconventional stage of moral consciousness" 
whereby they are motivated to act on the basis of rational principles rather than by self- 
interest or a substantive ethlcs. "[A] principled morality," Habermas explains, "depends on 
sociahation processes that meet it halfway by engendering the correspondmg agencies of 
conscience, namely, the correlative superego formulations.. ..Aside from the weak 
motivating farce of good reasons, such a morality becomes effective for action only through 
the intemali~ation ojmoralpm'nnPles in the personalip gstem" (BFN 1 1 3-4). This seems to take us 
back to the first source of motivational potential - the motivating force of reasons - but 
u&e the initial description of the motivating potential of reasons, Habermas tries here to 
show just how the "weak motivating force" of reasons can be embedded in a moral 
psychology. 
Relying on the theory of moral development defended by Lawrence Kohlberg, 
Haberrnas maintains that hscourse e h c s  is not beyond the h u t s  of the practically possible 
because the stage of psychologcal development it requires is w i h  the range of human 
capacities. And that stage of psychologcal development, Habermas dunks, can emerge 
where all citizens are engaged in practical hscourses and placed in situations whch 
encourage them to recogmze the contingency of their own preferences and interests, and 
'"1s assumes that citizens are motivated by the ethlcal conceptions of the good. I will address this 
especially their own ehcal  beliefs. As Heath describes it, "[w]hereas sociologsts have 
traditionally sought to introduce some shared motivational structure - a norm, value, role, 
etc. - into the analysis of interaction that would hectly influence what agents decide to do, 
Habermas b e p s  by abstracting from imrnedtate problems of decision, in order to determine 
what interactive structures must be in place for agents to develop the cogmtive and hguistic 
resources needed to deliberate rationally about action" (2001: 26). By engagmg in &scourses 
and recognlzmg the role of the moral point of view in those &scourses, citizens makes those 
crucial &st steps towards having the content of their ehca l  beliefs and culture meet 
discourse ethics "halfway." 
Yet, in the end, h s  strategy also fads for Habermas, although the reasons are more 
complicated and, for that reason, take up the remainder of the chapter. I argue that 
Habermas's attempt to locate motivational potential in a theory of psychologcal 
development is undermined by h s  inattention to the substantive preconmtions of ideal 
deliberation, on the one hand, and by the shft from rea/proceduralism to institutional or 
stmcturaalpmadurah made in Between Facts and Noms, on the other. In the next section, then, 
I argue that the development of the postconventional stage of moral consciousness whch 
Habermas regards as necessary to demonstrate the motivational possibhty of mscourse 
e h c s  wdl remain a naive utopian wish unless h s  procedural conception of democracy is 
supplemented by a more substantive account of justice. That is, unless Habermas is 
prepared to acknowledge that h s  conception of democracy must r e c o p e  and develop its 
substantive assumptions, the moral consciousness whch is supposed to emerge from and 
support that conception wdl fad to do so. In section 111, I argue that Habermas's move in 
h s  later work towards more impersonal and macro-level models of discourse, along with an 
assumption in Chapter 5, "Reasonable Pluralism." 
attempt to "unburden" citizens of the motivational problem by relylng on a legal system with 
sanctions for non-compliance, threatens the mechanism by whch transformations of 
citizens' pre-political preferences and interests can be acheved. Moreover, that move 
threatens to undermine the mechanism whch helps citizens to develop and act from the 
"postconventional stage of moral consciousness" - that is, the psychologcal &sposition to 
be motivated to act on principles because they are valid and not because they fit with some 
pre-political preference or interest that the agent map have. 
11. Procedure and Substance 
Although there are some substantive norms of justice implicit in Habermas's theory, 
Habermas seems not to regard those substantive norms as clear principles of justice hke 
those offered by Rawls in h s  justice as fairness. But without clearly articulated substantive 
principles of justice gven prior to democratic deliberation, it is hard to see how Habermas 
can insulate deliberation from objectionable preferences and inequalities and how the 
necessary postconventional stage of moral consciousness can develop. The &scursive point 
of view from whlch we mstinguish between generabable and nongenerahable interests, on 
Habermas's account, is rooted in an ideabed speech situation in whch citizens regard each 
other as equal participants in dscourses about principles where the interests of all should 
count equally. But that formal description of the ideahed speech situation must be 
supplemented with substantive con&tions and resources to ensure that participants actually 
do stand in relations of equality with each other and that objectionable interests and power 
inequalities are excluded. 
Habermas's critique of the Rawlsian origmal position relies on the idea that individuals 
are unable to create the necessary &stance between their reasoning about just principles and 
their own private preferences. Individual reflection, he argues, is no substitute for collective 
dtscourse on permissible motives, preferences, interests and acceptable principles of justice 
because only in communicative relations with others can we ensure that all relevant 
information rs presented and that private preferences are subjected to collective assessment. 
In light of that argument, it is dtfficult to see how deliberators in Habermas's procedural 
conception of democracy can successfully adopt the attitude of mutual recoption and 
equality implicit in the discursive point of view and how all indviduals can effectively and 
equally voice their interests and arguments without explicit grudehes on just how that can 
and should be acheved. Participants in such dtscourses must have a set of guaranteed rights 
and freedoms on whlch they can rely and adequate material resources to ensure that those 
rights and freedoms can be effectively and equally exercised. Moreover, in the absence of 
these substantive guidelmes and material resources, the postconventional stage of moral 
consciousness whch Habermas holds is necessary to demonstrate the motivational 
possibhty of discourse etlucs is not hkely to emerge. 
To see the problem more clearly, consider again the dtspute between Haberrnas's 
dtscourse ethics and Rawls's justice as fairness on the issue of procedure and substance as 
they relate to the motivational possibhty of a conception of justice. Rawls holds that justice 
as fairness is w i t h  the h t s  of practical possibhty because it makes not unrealistic 
demands of the cogrutive capacities of citizens. The sense of justice necessary to motivate 
citizens to support the conception would develop over time, Rawls holds, once just 
institutions were in place.77 But that means that we must be able to identi5 substantive 
principles of justice a c c o r h g  to whlch a well-ordered society would be organized. With h s  
two principles, Rawls not only identifies the set of rights and freedoms necessary for a well- 
ordered society, he also identifies the requirements of a fair dstribution of resources whch 
would ensure that citizens can make effective use of those rights and freedoms. Thus, if we 
can imagne the well-ordered society in place, we can imagme how it is practically possible 
for the sense of justice to emerge in that society gven knowledge of the well-ordered society 
and some not unreasonable assumptions about the capacities of citizens. 
At the outset, Habermas seems to follow a slmilar h e  of thought. With the right 
institutional set-up - gven by a dscursive conception of democracy - we can see how 
acquiring the postcont-entional stage of moral consciousness is practically possible for 
deliberating citizens. That is, in situations where deliberators regard each other as equals and 
in whch only the force of the better argument prevails, citizens can develop that attitude 
whch holds that it is good to follow principles simply in virtue of the fact that they are valid 
and arise from legtimate procedures. But unlike Rawls who r e c o v e s  that the shape and 
proper functioning of just institutions and procedures must be guded by substantive 
principles, inc lubg  a principle whch ensures adequate resources for participants to have 
equal standmg in deliberation, Habermas appears to balk at the idea that substantive 
principles and resources must be identified in advance of &scourse, even as h s  conception 
implicitly endorses some less precise substantive norms. 
Seyla Benhabib notes that Habermas does not regard such b a h g  as objectionable 
because the ideal speech situation, in h s  view, is guaranteed in the pragmatic presuppositions 
of argumentation. That is, even in cases where speakers have unequal resources or where 
they are motivated by strategc aims, the ideahed speech situation is unavoidable if they are 
to regard the outcome of their deliberations as valid (Benhabib, 1986). The problem here is 
that if others lack adequate deliberative resources, they might agree to norms to whlch they 
-- 
/ I  O n  the re la t ionsb  between institutions and the sense of justice in Rawls's justice as fairness see 
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otherwise would not have agreed if they had, for example, a decent education whlch would 
improve their communicative competency. It is simply not enough to say that dscourses 
can approximate an idealzed speech situation when that ideal presupposes an equality 
among speakers that does not develop on its own. 
Yet, Habermas defends hls rejection of more explicit substantive principles of justice 
f i e  those offered by Rawls by a r p g  that to do otherwise would be to violate the 
democratic ideal itself. Indeed, Habermas regards Rawls's defense of substantive principles 
as violating the "dogmatic core" of a democratic conception of justice whereby "human 
beings act as free subjects only insofar as they obey just those laws they gve themselves" 
(BFN 445). Habermas seems to thmk that Rawls7s substantive principles are worked out in 
theory by the phdosopher alone and that citizens themselves cannot thereby regard them as 
principles that they have gven to themselves. As he puts it, 
From the perspective of the theory of justice.. . [the citizens] cannot reigmte the 
radcal democratic embers of the origmal position in the civic life of their 
society, for from their perspective all of the essentia/dscourses of legtimation 
have already taken place w i h n  the theory; and they find the results of the 
theory already sedunented in the constitution. Because the citizens cannot 
conceive of the constitution as apmjet, the public use of reason does not 
actually have the sipficance of a present exercise of political autonomy but 
merely promotes the nonviolent presemation ofpolitical stabilify (WCJR 69-70) 
In an effort to avoid that same fate, Habermas opts for a more procedural than substantive 
conception of justice. If a truly impartial perspective must be located in actual dscourses, 
then substantive principles that are presented prior to such dscourses can only be regarded 
as "contribution[s] of a participant in argumentation" (DE: 66).78 
Cohen (2002). 
'Were, as elsewhere, my claim is not that Habermas's theory in fact eschews substantive principles 
altogether, only that Habermas says that we should eschew such principles in theorizing. As 1 hope to 
make clear in the following discussion, Habermas's theory does in fact e n t d  some substantive 
commitments along the h e s  of principles of justice, but that Haberrnas h s e l f  is hesitant to 
But H:rbermas7s attempt to avoid substantive justice falters in two ways. In the first 
place, he is wrong to h k  that Rawls's defense of substantive principles is entirely 
undemocratic or that, more generally, any conception which defends substantive principles 
must necessanly be undemocratic. In Rawls's political liberalism, citizens are gven an 
opportunity to consider whether the principles of justice as formulated are principles whch 
they could eridorse. After the first stage of justification where principles are selected in an 
o r ipa l  position, a second stage of justification proceeds whereby citizens are asked whether 
they could endorse those principles from the point of view of their respective 
comprehensive doctrines. For those principles to be the outcome of an exercise of political 
autonomy it need not be the case that citizens gve themselves the principles in Habermas's 
strong sense of citizens being the "authors" of those principles. It is consistent with political 
autonomy that citizens can identi5 good reasons for endorsing principles of whch they are 
not the literal and dnect authors. What would it take away from the justification of a law 
whch condemns murder, for example, to say that each citizen is not the "author" of that law 
in the strong Habermasian sense? Substantive principles presented to citizens need not be 
seen as violating the democratic ideal, then, so long as citizens are gven the opportunity, and 
are able, to identie good reasons for regardmg those substantive principles as principles 
whch they cc~uld endorse." 
In the second place, it is not at all clear that Habermas has avoided h s  own 
prohibition against offering substantive principles. He defends h s  theory as a procedural 
conception of democracy whch leaves the articulation and justification of substantive 
principles to deliberating citizens. But the condrtions he sets out for ideal drscourse rely on 
endorse the principle that such substantive commitments should be made or at least that they should 
not be made as he thinks Rawls makes them. 
substantive norms of freedom and equality. In order for Qscourses to approximate the ideal 
conQtions necessary for their outcomes to be regarded as just, those discourses must meet 
certain substantive demands such as equality between speakers and the freedom of speakers 
to object and to consent accordmg to the moral point of view. As Cohen (1996) argues, 
procedural c(.)nceptions of democracy unavoidably rest on certain principles of substantive 
justice because the procedures are designed in ways whch would ensure fair outcomes. If 
there are criteria for fair outcomes prior to procedural design and prior to the operation of 
those procedures, however, then substantive principles of justice must be implicit in the 
procedures themselves (Cohen, 1996).~(' Although in some places Habermas denies that 
substantive principles are implicit k dscourse e h c s ,  in other places he seems to 
acknowledge the substance: "in the symmetry con&tions and reciprocity expectations of 
everyday speech oriented to reachmg understandmg, there already exist in nuce the basic 
notions of equal treatment and general welfare on whch all morality turns" (WE: 50). And 
again, it shows up in the ''dogmatic core" of h s  project as a whole whch he describes as a 
"self-organizmng community of free and equal citizens" (BFN 445,7). 
So whlle Habermas claims that substantive principles cannot precede actual Qscourses 
if the democratic ideal of citizens giving themselves the principles to whch they are subject 
is to be respected, I have argued that not only is Habermas wrong to tlunk that the 
democratic ideal is violated by a priori substantive principles but that h s  own theory relies 
on certain implicit substantive commitments. Substantive principles of justice - such as 
guaranteed rights and freedoms and an egalitarian principle of Qstribution - are necessary 
for actual Qscourses to approximate the conQtions of ideal Qscourse whch itself is necessary 
' T o r  more on this line of h l i m g  see "Reply to Habermas" in Rawls (1996) as well as Cohen (1999, 
2003). 
8u See also Vernon (2001). 
for Habermas's pos tconventional stage of moral consciousness to develop. A rea/pmcedt/ralist 
theory, in other words, cannot be merelyprocedurali~f all the way down. An advocate of 
proceduralism must at some level endorse - even if only provisionally - some substantive 
principles of ideals if we are to regard the procedures as normatively compehg  or 
defensible. 
In the absence of substantively equal condtions in political deliberation, moreover, 
strategc motives and objectionable preferences d threaten the integrity of principles. And 
if the postconventional stage of moral consciousness is defined as the psychologcal 
dsposition to act on the basis of principles, then that moral consciousness, when it develops 
under principles infected by objectionable condtions, will be a warped moral consciousness. 
If, for example, a certain principle whch preserves some inequality is deemed valid in an 
artztal chscourse only because some participant has the power to withhold necessary or 
desired goods from some other participant and thus elicit h s  agreement through 
manipulation rather than persuasion, then the development of the moral consciousness to 
act on such a principle wdl itself be infected by inequality. That is, participants motivated to 
act accordmg to principles d in effect be motivated to uphold inequality as a matter of 
principle. To establish the condtions necessary for the development of a healthy moral 
consciousness then, Habermas must r e c o p e  the substantive principles implicit in hls own 
theory and work up substantive principles of justice whch could ensure that actual 
chscourses at least approximate ideal dscourses. 
Without access to resources for education and participation, and without a fair 
dsuibution of such resources, the formal condtions of an ideal dscourse wdl fail to gain 
substantive efficacy. It is not enough to say that the condtions necessary for an ideal 
dscourse are "always already" implicit in the presuppositions of argumentation because, as 
Habermas is well aware, not all participants in a gven drscourse aim at communicative 
understandtng. Inevitably some w d  view such dscourses strategcally and aim to shape 
outcomes to suit their nongenerahable interests. We need more than implicit condrtions for 
ideal drscourse in the presuppositions of argumentation, we need some assurance that the 
implicit conditions become explicit - that citizens know what the condrtions for ideal 
dscourse are - and that they are motivated to support and act accordtng to those condrtions. 
The question, then, is whether the implicit substantive commitments that Habermas 
makes include commitments to a fair drstribution of resources. Citizens d be better able to 
participate as equals in deliberation if they have received an education (whch should include 
some kmd instruction on how to participate and deliberate fairly and effectively) and only if 
they have material resources and time enough to take the opportunity to participate (rather 
than, say, having time only to work to meet their basic needs). Addtionally, if citizens have 
such varying levels of resources that some of them view participation as a means to 
protecting their resources whde others view it merely as a means to get more, then there can 
be only faint hope for deliberation oriented around the common good or what justice 
requires. In short, if actual deliberations are to approximate the requirements of an idealued 
speech situation and if they are to be oriented to deliberation about the common good rather 
than the satisfaction of private, unshared preferences, then Habermas must deliver a better 
account of how educational and material resources can and should be drstributed. What we 
need to know, then, is whether Habermas's implicit substantive commitments are 
substantive enough to overcome concerns about the drstortion of drscourse. 
In some ways, Habermas r e c o p e s  the concern. Thus, we hnd h m  arguing that, 
the requirement of equal legal treatment is contradrcted by those inequalities 
that drscrirninate against specific persons or groups by actually reducing their 
opportunities to utilze equally drstributed indrvidual liberties. Insofar as welfare 
compensations establish equal opportunities to make equal use of legal powers, 
compensation for material inequalities in life circumstances and power 
positions helps reahe legal equality (BFN 41 5-6, my emphasis). 
So Haberrnas r e c o p e s  that the opportunity for citizens to participate equally in h s  
procedural c(:)nception of democracy - and thus to deliberate about appropriate principles of 
justice - depends on some material precondttions. At the same time, however, he argues 
that such material precondttions cannot be guaranteed or delivered in advance of the 
democratic procedure because that would entad "paternalism" or, worse, an unacceptable 
reduction of justice to concerns of mere dtstributive j~stice.~' Habermas recogtllzes that 
some material resources are necessary but holds that exactly whch resources are necessary 
must itself be the outcome of a airscourse. But absent a pre-airscourse airstribution of 
whatever those resources might be, and assuming that actual discourses occur amongst 
unequal participants, it is hard to see how the actual airscourses d result in fair principles of 
dstribution. Thus, while Habermas r e c o p e s  that more substantive principles of justice 
are necessary. the priority that he gves to democratic airscourse raises serious concerns about 
whether the necessary resources d actually be delivered." 
By contrast, a realistically utopian conception whch endorses substantive principles - 
u ~ h c h  recognizes the need for a fair airstribution of resources so that airscourses can proceed 
in an appropriatel~~ free, equal, and reasonable manner - helps to ensure that citizens can 
equally and effectively participate in deliberation and it helps ensure that the outcomes of 
"The welfare paradigm of law is oriented exclusively toward the problem of the just distribution of 
socially produced life opportunities. By reducing justice to distributive justice, it misses the freedom- 
guaranteeing meaning of legitimate rights" (BEW 41 8). 
On the feminist movement's demands for a better dstribution of both resources and rights, 
Haberrnas writ-es that 'Yubiic discusions mustjrst clan$! the aspects under whlch differences between 
the experiences and living situations of (specific groups of) women and men become relevant for an 
equal opportunit). to take advantage of individual liberties" (BFhT: 425). He r e c o p e s  that 
"institutionally defined gender stereotypes" are "social constructions" and that they should be 
subjected to discursive evaluation, but he does not seem troubled by the fact that given a social and 
political status quo in whlch women cannot participate as equals with men (because they- are still 
such deliberation are more likely to be fair. And while those substantive principles might 
lack democratic procedural legtimacy at the outset, they may be able to gam democratic 
procedural legtimacy once better-situated deliberators reflect on the defensibhty of those 
principles and resource mstributions. If deliberators are more equally situated then they 
might have greater confidence that the outcomes of deliberation are fair and just rather than 
outcomes which protect the interests of strategcally motivated and better situated 
indviduals and groups. And if the participants have reason to be more confident in the 
fairness of deliberative outcomes, then they have more reason to be motivated to support 
and to uphold those outcomes for their own sake. Insofar as a better &sttibution of rights 
and resources ensures a better approximation of an ideabed speech situation, a defensible 
approach to justice and motivation should try to elaborate an account of fair mstribution 
prior to actual deliberation. That Habermas fads to do so, even as he r e c o p e s  the 
importance of doing so, makes h s  approach to justice and motivation less attractive. 
Thus, a rea/pmcedural.ist approach to justice and the demands of realism falters insofar 
as it fails to recogrue the substantive precon&tions of legtimate or normatively defensible 
procedures, on the one hand, and the need to insulate the deliberations in some way from 
objectionable features of the social and political status quo, on the other. Rawls's bsothetical 
constmctivism suggests one way to escape the real proceduralist's ddemrna: By imagmmg 
ourselves in an initial situation of equality, it is possible to construct the very substantive 
principles of justice whch provide the precondldons for real &scourses to approximate ideal 
mscourses. Adtmttedlj-, the democratic deficits of b>otbetica/ constmctivism are a problem and 
the realprocedmralisl view offers not only a compehg  account of those deficits, but also some 
possibfities for remeches. Thus, we begm to see that whlle neither the realpmceduralirt nor 
subject to the, ;it this stage, un-evaluated stereotypes and barriers) the outcomes of those actual 
the bypotbeticrrl constmctiuist variants of realistic utopianism are capable of addressing the 
demands of realism alone, when we begm to combine certain features of each view, a more 
attractive realistically utopian approach comes into view. But before we flesh out that more 
attractive realistically utopian view, we should consider another weakness of Habermas's 
attempt to resolve the problem of motivation, as well as the tension between justice and the 
demands of realism more generally. 
111. Impersonal Discourse and Citizen Motivation 
In another move whch threatens the plausibhty of h s  solution to the problem of 
motivational possibfity, as well casting doubt on h s  solution to the tension between justice 
and the dem~nds of realism more generally, Habermas undermines the conhtions necessary 
for the healthy development of the postconventional stage of moral consciousness by 
turning away from actual &scourses to arrangements whch could ensure an anonymous "flow 
of communication" and reasons in Between Facts and Norms. In that work Habermas claims 
that a theory of democracy, if it is to be realistic, must confront and overcome the problem 
of social complexity. The problem, as Rehg notes, is that "the functional complexity of 
contemporary societies no longer permits du-ect democratic control but rather requires 
indu-ect adrmnistrative measures guided by expert knowledge" (1996: xxx). The ideal of a 
macro-subject or democratic community consciously and reflectively organizing its 
institutions, economic and social processes, and citizens7 behaviour accordrng to the 
principles of a shared conception of justice is, on Habermas's view, naively utopian. There is 
simplj- too much information to take in and to process for any i n h ~ d u a l  citizen, or any 
group of citizens, to successfully construct and apply a normative model to the institutions 
dscourses may not deliver a sufficient critique and evaluation of those stereotypes. 
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and processes of contemporary societies in the h e c t  way dreamt of by "philosophers of 
justice" such as Kant and Rawls. 
Habermas's solution to social complexity and the "overburdening" of the democratic 
subject is to move away from the idea of normative steering through more personal 
democratic discourse to a macro-level, more anonymous, public sphere and to replace the 
idea of the morally judgmg citizen with the notion of the legal subject "unburdened" by the 
cogrutive, motivational, and organizational demands of contemporary complex societies 
(BFN 114). "Various symptoms of.. .a cognitive overburdening of deliberative politics," he 
writes, "lend support to the assumption, by now widely accepted, that dscursive opinion- 
and wd-formation governed by democratic procedures lacks the complexity to take in and 
dlgest the  operative!^ necessaty knowledge" (BFN 320)." So the dscursive-democratic point of 
view that Habermas reconstructs in h s  earlier work is transformed in BFN into a 
"structuralist point of view" incluhg a legal system of sanctions for noncompliance, in 
order to inject what Habermas dunks is a necessary dose of realism into the empirically naive 
philosophy of justice. "It is precisely the dscourse-theoretic approach," he writes, "that 
introduces a realistic element insofar as it shfts the condtions for a rational political 
opinion- and wd-formation from the level of individua/ or group motivations and decisions 
to the socia/ level of institutionahzed processes of deliberation and decision makmg" (BFN: 
46 1 -2). 
Drawing on insights gained from what he calls the "sociology of law", then, Habermas 
shfts the normative core of h s  political theory from actual hscourses of all citizens to a 
8' Just to be clear on the difference between the issue in this section and that considered in the last 
section: In the last section the problem was that Habermas failed to show- how actua/discourses could 
approximate iu'ea/ &scourses without relying on the h d s  of substantive principles for whch he 
criticizes Rawli. In this section, the problem moves from a concern for the fdure to approximate 
model of "subjectless communications" in whch the institutions of a "procedurahzed 
popular sovereignty" and the anonymous circulation of reasons in the public sphere take 
priority over inclusive deliberations and reflections of citizens themselves. No longer does 
the justification of moral norms depend of the dlrect participation of alcitizens; rather the 
justification vf moral norms and legtimate law now depends simply on the circulation and 
filtering of reasons in informal and formal public spheres. Indeed, in this updated dscourse 
theory, "the success of deliberative politics depends not on a collectively acting citizenry but 
on the institl~tionahzation of the correspondmg procedures and condtions of 
cornmunicadon, as well as on the interplay of institutionahzed deliberative processes with 
informally developed public opinions" (BFN: 298). What matters now for the dscourse 
conception of democracy is not that all citizens engage in actual deliberation about canddate 
norms or laws, because that would be naive in the face of social complexity; what matters 
now is that the informal and formal public spheres encourage a "flow of communication" 
whch could ensure that legtimating reasons - "communicative power" - are "transformed 
through legslation into adrmtllstrative power" (BFN: 299). 
Recall that in examining the possible sources of motivational potential, Habermas held 
that the reasons whch validate norms in dscourses of justification offer a h d  of "weak 
motivating force". The fact that the reasons are those whlch participants in dscourses have 
themselves accepted allows them to dunk that acting on those principles is consistent with 
their regardmg themselves as autonomous. "[Wlithout religous or metaphysical support," 
Habermas writes, "the coercive law tadored for the self-interested use of indvidual rights 
can presenTe its socially integrating force only insofar as the addressees of legal norms may at 
the same tirne understand themselves, taken as a whole, as the rational authors of those 
ideal discourse to a concern for the disappearance of inclusive, ideal discourses as the central feature of 
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norms" (BFPbJ: 33). But even that source of motivation is not enough. Habermas r e c o p e s  
that being able to regard oneself as the "rational author" of a particular norm carries only a 
weak motivating force because the abstractness of the norm opens up a gap between one's 
private interests and preferences and the generahable interests whlch the norm endorses or 
protects. And Habermas dunks that citizens' attempts to bridge that gap between the 
abstract principles and their own understandmgs and actions wdl "overtax" their rational 
capacities ( B f N  34). So, Habermas opts to sidestep the motivational and complexity 
problems by removing much of the responsibihty that citizens might have had for 
developing a sense of justice - that is, a responsibihty to be motivated to obey and to 
suppoa principles of justice as principles - and a responsibhty to offer, assess, and accept or 
reject claims made in dscourses of justification. Under the new model citizens have an 
oppo17tunip to contribute ideas and make claims, say as members of social movements or 
intermedate associations, but there is no correspondmg responsibihty to make an effort to 
understand the claims of others. That task falls to institutional processes of "filtering" 
contributions. 
Adhtionally, Habermas attempts to sidestep or avoid much of the force of the 
motivational concerns by developing and endorsing a legal system whose task it is to ensure 
compliance with legitimate law. On Habermas's view, as we have seen, the phdosophy of 
justice approach of theorists Lke Rawls lacks an appropriate degree of sociologcal realism. 
The construction or articulation of a conception of justice under ideal assumptions, rather 
than the non-ideal world, fads to account for the fact that some citizens w d  simply lack the 
motivation necessary to fulfd the obligations of justice. And insofar as a remedy to that 
problem is absent, the phdosophy of justice approach fads to solve the problem of 
Habermas's cotlception of democracy. 
motivational possibhty. Indeed, as some theorists hold, to fail to protect the motivated 
from the non-motivated is to fail to deliver a defensible conception of justice.84 To remedy 
this deficiency or at least to account for it, Habermas argues that obedence to l e g h a t e  law 
can be ensured through a legal mechanism whlch imposes sanctions on those who fad to 
comply with legtimate law. As he writes, "whereas archaic institutions supported by 
worldviews fix value orientations through rigd communication patterns, modem law allows 
convictions to be replaced by sanctions in that it leaves the motives for rule compliance open 
whlle enforcing observance" (BFN: 39). Thls move to incorporate a legal system with 
sanctions for noncompliance allows Habermas to "unburden" citizens of some of the 
motivational responsibhty they might have under Rawlsian justice and fairness and its 
associated need for a sense of justice. 
Thls is not to say that Haberrnas h k s  that a legal system alone can completely 
e k a t e  the motivational issue. Indeed, he r e c o p e s  that even if a system of sanctions for 
noncompliance is to function effectively, citizens must regard the legal system itself as 
legtimate even if they dunk that particular laws are not legtimate. In that sense, he 
recogrues that motivational stabihty cannot be delivered by the system of sanctions for 
noncompliance alone. Nevertheless, the production of that legtimacy and thus motivational 
stabhty in Habermas's later work as we have seen, is now the work of an institutional and 
impersonal circulation of reasons rather than the work of indvidual citizens themselves. 
And that, I shall argue, undermines the motivational compliance that is required of actual 
citizens. 
Now whether the institutional and more impersonal model of communication is itself 
naive is a problem I wdl leave to the side. What matters for us is whether the shlft from 
84 See Chapter 1. 
agent-level discourses to a more anonymous institutional-level flow of communication 
strengthens or undermines the account of motivational possibhty of Habermas's political 
theory and, more generally, whether it undermines the theory's abihtp to dstinguish between 
demands of realism whch should and those whch should not be accommodated. The 
solution to the problem of motivational possibhtp whch Habermas defends, remember, 
relies on the idea that principles whch are deemed valid through ideal &scourses can gain 
the support of citizens once those citizens advance to a postconventional stage of moral 
consciousness. "At that stage," as Habermas notes, "moral judgment becomes dssociated 
from the local conventions and hstorical coloration of a particular form of life" (DE: 109). 
Instead, the indvidual who advances to thls stage of moral development "takes the 
perspective of a moral point of view" as the perspective which should guide action and 
judgment (MCCA: 129). That is, the indvidual learns to be motivated by the insights of 
moralitv rather than by the private preferences, non-generaluable interests, or personal 
beliefs that she has. In the recent characterization of h s  theory, Habermas claims that "the 
socially integrating force of solidarity, whch can no longer be drawn solely from sources of 
communicative action, must develop through widely &versified and more or less 
autonomous public spheres, as well as through procedures of democratic opinion- and d- 
formation institutionahzed w i h  a constitutional framework" (BFIV: 299). But can that 
solidarity actually develop under these new con&tions? 
The problem with Habermas's move away from actual &scourse and to "autonomous 
public spheres" and "subjectless communication" is that no longer do a l  citizens have 
meaningful opportunities, or a responsibhty, to learn how to act in that postconventional 
and principled manner. ICohlberg's theory of moral development, on whch Habermas 
relies, is a theory of moral leanting. Agents advance to the postconventional stage of moral 
consciousness, if they do, by engagmg in practices and activities whch encourage that 
development. In Habermas's more institutional and anonymous conception of democracy, 
agents are unburdened of the responsibihty to take on the perspectives of others, to reflect 
on the generahzabhty of their own interests, and to have those reflections and 
interpretations of their own interests challenged by others in a duect way. Citizens no longer 
have to experience assessment of their claims in a duect manner and are deprived of 
opportunities to respond to the assessments in the new framework because in the flow of 
communication clauns are no longer tied to the particular agents who make them. 
W e  some opportunities to contribute to dscussion in the informal public sphere are 
s d  avadable to citizens, the decisions made by officials in the formal public sphere now lack 
the duect h k  with contributions that they once had (or ideally could have) in the more 
agent-level dscourses defended in Habermas's earlier work. It might be the case that the 
new instituticlnal arrangements wdl filter claims appropriately, but that might come at the 
cost of a widespread apathy among citizens who, we might say, are no longer invited to 
attend hearings concerning their own interests. An autonomous flow of reasons fads to 
respect citizens as valuable participants in deliberation about their shared political fate. And 
when a political system fails to ensure respect for its citizens and their deliberative 
contributions, it is hard to see how those citizens can regard the principles and laws whlch 
the system produces as worthy of their support. Obehence, in that case, rmght simply be a 
matter of respondmg to the sanctions for noncompliance as a matter of self-interested threat 
aversion rather than obedence to principles and laws that one can regard as those whlch one 
has gven to oneself in Rousseau's sense. 
Habermas might object to thls challenge by arguing that not only is the institutional 
model of hscourse more realistic from the perspective of sociology, but that the demands of 
motivational possibihty are sipficantly eased under the new model. To be sure, Habermas's 
more impersonal and institutional characterization of the bscourse-theoretic conception of 
democracy might be attractive precisely because it shows us how we can sidestep 
motivational and other practical bfficulties wlde retaining the animating ideal of a "self- 
organizing community of free and equal citizens" (BFiV: 7). Habermas holds that "to the 
degree that practical reason is implanted in the very forms of communication and 
institutionaluedpmcedures, it need not be emboded exclusively or even predominantly in the 
heads ofcollective or individual actor3' (BFIV: 341, my emphasis). 
If we allow Habermas the assumption that the institutionaltzed, procedural flow of 
communication wdl identify good reasons for principles and laws - reasons that, at the very 
least, "could meet with the approval of all affected" (MCCA: 66, my emphasis) even if they 
can't claim the actualapproval of all citizens - then he might be able to defend the 
characterization of h s  theory along the h e s  we used earlier to defend Rawls against 
Habermas's charge that justice as fairness is undemocratic. That response, remember, held 
that so long 21s the reasons whch support principles are reasons whch citizens could regard as 
good reasons, then a conception of justice need not ensure that citizens are the atlthors of 
those principles in the strong sense. In that case, however, Habermas would have to gve up 
hls criticism of Rawls7s justice as fairness, and other s d a r  conceptions of justice, whch 
work up and defend substantive principles of justice in advance of democratic deliberation. 
But even so, Rawls's approach retains an advantage over Habermas7s theoq because Rawls 
calls for a second stage of justification or legtimation in whch citizens are asked whether 
they could endorse the political conception of justice from the perspective of their 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Because Habermas collapses the stages of justification 
and legtimation into a single model of autonomous communication, citizens are never gven 
that opportunity to consider whether the reasons offered for principles are in fact acceptable 
to them. 
Moreover, to the extent that the autonomous model of communication no longer 
requires the inclusion of all citizens in actual &scourses, Habermas loses an account of how 
objectionable interests, motives, and beliefs can be transformed when the moral point of 
view deems such transformations necessary. The new model may ensure that objectionable 
preferences, claims, and beliefs are filtered out and therefore have no impact on the 
principles which are deemed valid, but it fails to show how the citizens who make those 
claims or who have those interests can be brought to see why those interests are 
objectionable and why changes in their attitudes might be desirable. Indeed, Habermas no 
longer has a compehg account of how the "interpretation of needs and wants and the 
change of prcrpolitical attitudes and preferences" that he praises in Joshua Cohen's model of 
deliberative democracy, can actually occur when the deliberations of actual political agents 
are replaced by an anonymous circulation of reasons (BFN 306). 
But perhaps Habermas might hold that such transformations are unnecessary, even 
dangerous, and that the development of the postconventional stage of moral consciousness 
is no longer necessary to solve the problem of motivational possibhty. If the institutions 
whch ensure the appropriate filtering of facts and reasons are stable and tend to produce 
principles and laws whch citizens could, on reflection, regard as acceptable, then what more 
does a political theory have to do? 1 would answer that a political theory does not have to 
do anythmg more if the question &dn't rest on the false premise that such institutions can be 
stabhzed once and for all. Once we see that thls assumption is nalve, we wdl also see that 
Habermas's attempt to avoid the problem of motivational possibhty falls into the utopian 
wishful thrnkmg that he wanted to avoid with hls more sociologcally grounded, but s d  
normatively attractive, conception of democracy. 
InstitlAtiona/ Drif/ and Demomatic C*ensb$ 
In an insightful and persuasive essay, Hanna Pitlun argues that the institutions whlch we 
establish to ensure just outcomes in our democratic communities have to be assessed and 
reformed occasionally because over time those institutions and their outcomes tend to 
"dnft" away from the conception of justice accordmg to whlch they were initially designed. 
"Most aspects of social life," she writes, "are left to evolve through dnft and private power" 
(1981: 344). Even if initially just institutions can be established, changes in social, economic 
and political con&tions over time might produce injustices whose correction requires 
institutional reform. P i t h  maintains, then, that "only citizenshp enables us jointly to take 
charge of and take responsibihty for the social forces that otherwise dominate our lives and 
h t  our options, even though we produce them" (1 981: 344). Ultimately, the reform of 
dnfting institutions depends on citizens' capacity to reform those institutions and the 
existence of a set of appropriate norms whlch can p d e  that reform. As Cohen and Rogers 
write, "it is implausible that the appropriate changes in institutional arrangements d be 
made unless the norms themselves function as guides to public deliberation" (1995: 39). 
With his move to an institutional model of public &scourse and a system of sanctions 
for noncompliance that allegedly unburden citizens of the responsibhty to develop the 
moral consciousness or attitudes necessary to reflect on the justice of their institutions, 
Habermas undermines the possibihty that hls conception could remain faithful to hls guidmg 
ideal of a democratic society oKTer time. A realistically utopian political theory must show 
how it encourages the development of citizens' capacity and motivation to engage in that 
kmd of reform otherwise it fads to show how justice is possible. At the very least, it has to 
show how it avoids damagmg that capacity. With the institutional and anonymous model of 
communication, Habermas may dunk that he can sidestep the problem of motivational 
possibhty and thereby make h s  conception of democracy more realistic. But as I hope that 
I have shown here, Habermas has slipped into a na'ive utopianism by assuming that 
institutions can be protected from change and by undermining the development of citizens' 
capacities to reform those changmg institutions when necessary. Indeed, in the latest 
characterization of h s  hscursive conception of democracy, Habermas seems to suggest that 
the participation of most citizens is not really necessary for the arrangements to function 
appropriately. Vl'hat is particularly s t n h g  about that conclusion is how it runs against the 
grain of the democratic core whch inspires Habermas's political theory as a whole. We are 
left with a conception of democracy whch holds that citizens' motivations and capacities are 
ultimately irrelevant to reahzing an ideal in whch "human beings act as free subjects only 
insofar as they obey just those laws they gve themselves" (BFhl: 445-6). 
IV. Conclusion: A More Democratic Realistic Utopia 
K h l e  Habermas ultimately fails to provide us with a solution to the problem of motivational 
possibht)., it is worth emphasizing the strengths of h s  view whch might help us to design a 
more attractive realistically utopian approach to the justice and realism tension more 
generally. One feature of h s  realprocedztralist theory is particularly important - namely, the 
idea that hsdnctions between demands of realism whch should and those whch should not 
be accommodated in principles and norms are to be worked out in a more democratic and 
deliberative way. Admttedly, much of the work of makmg those ~stinctions is done by the 
point of view of an ideal speech situation rather than participants in hscourses themselves, 
but the fact that Haberrnas brings citizens themselves to the centre of debate about such 
issues is crucial. An ideal speech situation and the presuppositions of argumentation may 
gve us guidehes, but whether particular motives, preferences, interests, and beliefs are 
permissible or impermissible in &scourses about valid principles is s o m e h g  that cannot 
always be decided by theory alone. 
But more than defendmg &scourse as merely a practical necessity, Habermas has 
shown how democratic deliberation among citizens helps to reahe the ideal of a "self- 
organizing community of free and equal citizens" (BFN: 445, 7). It may be misguided to 
argue that a proceduralist conception of democracy could ensure the reahzation of that ideal 
alone, but he r e c o p e s  that a political theory whlch takes the interests and values of citizens 
seriously must offer a more democratic approach to the realistically utopian challenge. If 
principles that coordmate the actions of citizens are to be both reliable and just, they must be 
able to gain the acceptance of those very citizens to whom they apply. And that acceptance, 
as we have seen, is strongest not when it is the product of bargaining or the mere 
coordmation of pre-political motives, preferences, interests, and beliefs, but when it is 
granted because principles are seen as legtimate - as senring the generahzable interests of 




Justice and Pluralism 

[Plolitical phdosophy is realistically utopian when it 
extends what are ordmanly thought to be the h t s  of 
practicable political possibihty and, in so doing, 
reconciles us to our political and social condttion. 
- John Rawls (1999b: 11) 
At the end ofthe chapter on Rawls, I wrote that two issues with respect to h s  approach to 
the demands of realism were still outstandmg. One of those issues was the concern that 
Rawls's approach is not democratic enough and we began to explore that issue by 
considering Habermas's political theory in Chapter 4. The other concern had to do with 
how Rawls's theory fares when confronted by the moral and religous plurahsm that 
characterizes contemporary democratic societies. In h s  chapter, I shall take up the 
pluralism issue and, in doing so, also say a little bit more about the democracy issue. By the 
end of thls chapter the path should be well-paved to consider a more robust solution to the 
tension between justice and the demands of realism whlch I d offer in the final chapter. 
To get there, however, we need to work through the intersection of justice and pluralism - 
the other demand of realism on whch the dtssertation focuses. 
The fact of pluralism in democratic societies confronts a conception of justice with 
what appears to be a dtchotomous choice: One can choose to ignore the pluralism of 
ethlcal, religous, and phllosophcal views and insist on independent standards of justice 
untainted by the demands of pluralism. Or one can adjust the conception to accommodate 
the fact of pluralism so that principles of justice can play a role in practical political life and 
thereby avoid the charge of nalve utopianism. Theorists who choose the former option can 
be criticized for ignoring a permanent and perhaps attractive feature of democratic societies. 
Moreover, they fad to solve the problem of doctrinal compatiblltty - namely, that there is 
often a gap between what justice demands and what human beings regard themselves as 
having reason to do in light of their beliefs. Theorists who choose to adjust principles to 
accommodate pluralism, on the other hand, might succeed in solving the problem of 
doctrinal compatibhty but risk makmg concessions to unattractive or objectionable features 
of certain worldviews that we find in contemporary plural democracies. The challenge is to 
find some alternative to the chchotomy. How can we accommodate pluralism without gving 
up on the normative and critical value of a shared conception of justice? What exactly is 
necessary to reconcile a conception of justice to pluralism and, moreover, to what extent (if 
any) must a conception accommodate the determinate beliefs of citizens? 
Rawls (1996) offers an approach to pluralism whch relies on the idea of an 
overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. In a well-ordered society, 
Rawls holds, a "publicly r e c o p e d  conception of justice establishes a shared point of view 
from whch citizens' claims on society can be adjuchcated" (1996: 35). Rawls's hope is that 
an overlapping consensus of mfferent comprehensive doctrines on a shared conception of 
justice can be acheved and thereby accommodate the reasonable pluralism whch 
characterizes democratic societies. And the overlapping consensus is acheved when those 
who hold mfferent, albeit reasonable, comprehensive doctrines come to endorse the 
conception for reasons whch they find within their own comprehensive docttines. If acheved, an 
overlapping consensus would ensure not only that a democratic society has a shared 
conception of justice to whch all can appeal in political hscourse, it would also offer a 
solution to the problem of doctrinal compatibiltty because the reasons citizens would have 
for endorsing the conception would be found w i t h  their own comprehensive worldviews. 
We might ask, however, whch features of citizens' comprehensive doctrines should be 
regarded as fmed points to be accommodated and whch should gve way to the demands of 
the conception of justice to whlch they are asked to consent? Indeed, gven that Rawls 
introduces the idea of an overlapping consensus as a way to "make the idea of a well-ordered 
society more realistic and to a d j d  it to the hstorical and social condrdons of democratic 
societies" we might wonder whether political liberalism goes too far in accommodating the 
sometimes objectionable content of certain existing worldviews (2001: 32. My emphasis). 
As Charles Larrnore observes, we might wonder whether a concern for civil peace trumps 
basic justice in Rawls's political liberalism (2003: 385). On the other hand, because Rawls is 
only interested in accommodating reasonable pluralism, we might wonder whether h s  
overlapping consensus and political conception of justice exclude too much of the pluralism 
found in democratic societies to be practically useful. 
In this chapter, then, I defend Rawls's position that a conception of justice must 
reconcile itself to the fact and range of reasonable pluralism without r e s i p g  itself to the 
objectionablc content of particular comprehensive doctrines. Reconchg justice to the range 
of reasonable pluralism is an appropriate response to an internal challenge of an otherwise 
attractive conception of justice whch secures the justifiabhty, legtimacy, and doctrinal 
compatibhq- of the conception. Resignng justice to the objectionable content of 
comprehensive doctrines, on the other hand, would not only threaten the justifiabhty of the 
political conception of justice, it would threaten its stabhty as well. However, I also argue 
that in order for citizens to reach an overlapping consensus on a conception of justice they 
cannot rely on deliberation whch occurs entirely w i h  their own doctrines, as Rawls 
suggests. Instead, citizens must be able to introduce some of the content of their doctrines 
into public deliberation for two reasons: First, because excludmg all content of 
comprehensive views from public political cbscourse fails to treat fairly those citizens who 
may hare to introduce such content in order to incbcate to other citizens the importance of 
their claims and thereby receive fairer consideration of their political claims. And second, 
because we can not always know in advance of public deliberation what should count as a 
reasonable and what an unreasonable feature of a comprehensive doctrine. 
I begm in Section I with brief explanations of the reasonable pluralism of 
comprehensive doctrines and Rawls's idea of an overlapping consensus whch would 
accommodate the fact or range of reasonable pluralism.85 The subsequent two sections 
articulate and respond to two objections to Rawls's attempt to accommodate reasonable 
pluralism. One objection holds that Rawls is too eager to accommodate plurahsm and 
criticizes hun for adjusting principles of justice for allegedly prudential reasons (Section 11). 
The other objection holds that Rawls is not attentive enough to the pluralism that 
characterizes democratic societies and suggests that greater accommodations are necessary 
both for the practicality and justifiabhty of a conception of justice (Section 111). After 
respondmg to both these objections I enhst a few ideas from Habermas to guide some 
revisions to Rawls's approach to accommodating pluralism (Section IV). Finally, in section 
V, I suggest some ways in whch democratic deliberation could improve Rawls's idea of an 
overlapping consensus. 
I. Reasonable Pluralism and an Overlapping Consensus 
Rawls asserts that in a well-ordered society a "publicly r e c o p e d  conception of justice 
establishes a shared point of view from whch citizens' claims on society can be adjudcated" 
(1996: 35). Hut modem democratic societies are characterized by a pluralism of religous, 
moral, and pldosophcal worldviews whlch makes agreement on a shared conception of 
justice Qfficult to achleve. Moreover, the fact that democratic societies are characterized 
85 I will say mrxe about the &stinction between the fact and the range of reasonable pluralism shortly. 
"not simply by a pluralism of comprehensive religous, pldosophcal, and moral doctrines 
but bv a pluralism of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines," means that a 
shared conception of justice will have to accommodate that reasonable pluralism if it wants 
to meet requnements of both stabhty and legtimacy (1996: xvii). Reasonable citizens, Rawls 
notes, are citizens who r e c o p e  that the "burdens of judgment set luruts on what can be 
reasonably justified to others" (1996: 61). Though they affirm worldviews whlch dlffer from 
those of other citizens, "reasonable persons d h k  it unreasonable to use political power, 
should they possess it, to repress comprehensive views that are not unreasonable, though 
dfferent from their own" (1996: 60). Faced with &us fact of reasonable pluralism, Rawls 
asks "How is it possible that there may exist over time a stable and just society of free and 
equal citizens profoundly dlvided by reasonable though incompatible reQous, pldosophcal, 
and moral doctrines?" (1996: xx). 
But we might push the issue even farther for Rawls by d~s t inpshmg between thefact 
of reasonable pluralism and the range of reasonable pluralism. Thefact of reasonable 
pluralism holds that there are, among the set of comprehensive doctrines currently held by 
citizens, a sul~set of doctrines whch are reasonable. But if Rawls h k  that reasonable 
pluralism must be acknowledged and perhaps accommodated by a conception of justice, 
then he must also dunk that a conception of justice should be designed in a way whch 
would permit the accommodation of other reasonable comprehensive doctrines that may not 
find expression at thls moment in contemporary liberal democracies. In other words, a 
conception of justice must not only confront the fact of reasonable pluralism - that is, the 
existing subset of reasonable comprehensive doctrines - it must also confront the range of 
reasonable pluralism - that is, the range of possibly reasonable comprehensive doctrines that 
may not exist now, but could possibly emerge in a well-ordered s o c i e ~ . ~ "  
In any case, Rawls hopes that an overlapping consensus on a shared political 
conception of justice can be acheved and says that it is acheved when citizens who endorse 
drfferent reasonable comprehensive doctrines accept the political conception of justice for 
reasons that they find w i h  their own comprehensive doctrines. However, Rawls's 
description of the overlapping consensus as a device "to make the idea of a well ordered 
society more real~stic and to a d j d  it to the hstorical condrtions of democratic societies," 
invites concerns about whether that attempt to accommodate pluralism is a matter of ideal 
justice or a matter of mere practicality (2001: 32). Rawls hunself dunks that whde practical 
concerns should not be dsmissed, they are not enough when the main concern should be 
with what justice requires.87 When our concern is with fair terms of social cooperation, we 
should adopt: a critical attitude towards existing beliefs and, as we saw earlier, towards 
existing motives, interests, and preferences. Though we might find that some features of the 
status quo are not objectionable or even attractive, that drscovery should be the outcome of 
critical reflection on, not an automatic acceptance of, the e h c a l  commitments of human 
beings and the facts about the world as we now h d  them. 
On closer inspection, then, what appears to be a concern for mere realism and 
practicality turns out to be a concern with justice itself. In the &st place, Rawls is not c a h g  
here for an accommodation of the content of all existing comprehensive doctrines but instead 
for a reconciliation of justice with the fact ofreasonable pluralism - or, as we might say, the 
range of reasonable pluralism. ,4djusting a theory to account for a permanent general feature 
14gain. I am grateful to David Esdund for making this &stkction and for helping me to see its 
importance to the project as a whole. 
of the social world is different than adjusting a theory to incorporate the determinate content 
of that feat~re.~ '  To be sure, a theory of justice might have to accept the fact that confict is 
a permanent, perhaps natural, feature of social life but it should not automatically 
accommodate the determinate beliefs of the parties to the confict. Rawls wants hls 
conception of justice to be political, but political in the right way - that is, capable of gaining 
the endorsement of a variety of comprehensive doctrines but without m a h g  concessions to 
the power of certain groups and interests in society. 
0 veriippptng C0n.sen.ru.r 
To accommodate the range of reasonable pluralism using the idea of an overlapping 
consensus we proceed in two stages. First, we elaborate a defensible "freestandmg" 
conception of justice "workmg from the fundamental idea of society as a fair system of 
social cooperation and its companion ideas" (Rawls, 1996: 40). The construction of the 
freestandmg concep tion at the first stage is insulated from determinate preferences, interests, 
and beliefs tc) ensure that it is a fair conception of justice whch favours no particular view of 
the good and whlch is not simply a bargain struck by unequal participants. With that 
freestandmg conception in place, citizens are asked at a second stage whether they can 
endorse that conception as a public basis of political deliberation from the point of view of 
the comprehensive doctrine to whch they are atta~hed.~" 
An overlapping consensus is not reached through the gve and take of political 
bargaining, but instead through the unforced decision of free and equal citizens about 
whether the terrns, as gven, are acceptable from their own point of view. ,4s Rawls writes, 
87 ''Justice is the fvst virtue of social institutions.. ..mnstitutions no matter how efficient and well- 
arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust" (1999: 3). 
HWore on thls in section 11. 
"we do not look to the comprehensive doctrines that in fact exist and then draw up a 
political conception that sakes some h d  of balance of forces between them" (2001: 188). 
Instead, we articulate a freestandmg political conception of justice whlch draws on ideas 
implicit in the public political culture of a democracy, but not on ideas taken from moral or 
religous views, and then ask citizens whether they could support that political conception 
after reflecting on the content of their own comprehensive doctrines. A political consensus 
whlch starts from gven beliefs and ethlcal commitments might achleve a moda~ vivendi - that 
is, an agreement between parties who regard the agreement as, at that time, in their self- 
interest. But a modus vivendi d be unstable because the parties to that agreement d be 
ready to abandon it should the dsaibution of power, their interests, or their beliefs change 
(1 996: 146f.). 
The intuition behmd the overlapping consensus is shared by Abdullahl Ahrned An- 
Na'im (1990) who holds that, in the case of human rights, these rights are much more 
credble and thereby stand a better chance of implementation if they are perceived to be 
legtimate w i t h  the various cultural tradtions of the world" (1991: 3). Thus, he proposes 
that the various cultural and religous tradtions engage in a h d  of "internal cultural 
&scourse" whch works from "the bottom up" in order to acheve legtimacy for human 
rights and democracy from w i h n  each tradtion (1990: 3,7). That is, to acheve an 
overlapping c:onsensus, the adherents of various worldviews are to consider whether there 
are resources w i h n  their comprehensive doctrines that would allow them to a f f m  the 
principles of the political conception of justice. But in searchmg for such support, the aim is 
not to try to find shared principles in the sense of locating points where existing worldviews 
overlap; rather, the aim is to have the adherents of various comprehensive doctrines ask 
XWn the two-stage approach to justification, see Rawls (1996): 37, 64-66, 140-44 and (2001): 180-1. 
whether their worldviews could affirm an already existing, freestandmg political conception 
of justice. As An-Na'im puts it, the process of religous or cultural reinterpretation seeks to 
fmd sources of support (legtimacy and stabihty) for the freestandmg conception without 
altering the apriori conception."' So, whereas comprehensive (as opposed to political) 
liberals might be able to affirm the political conception of justice because it ensures 
condttions necessary for the pursuit of indvidual self-development and flourishmg, Musluns 
- the focus of An-Na'im's work - might be able to a f f m  the conception because it 
embodtes one expression of the Islamic obligation to an ideal of social justice - an obligation 
gven to Musluns in the Qur'an and the Sunna of the 
Of course, the procedure for reachmg an overlapping consensus is hrther complicated 
once we endorse the idea that a conception of justice should deal with the range and not 
simply thefadyt of reasonable pluralism. Because the range of reasonable pluralism might not 
find full expression in existing societies, there wdl often be no identifiable citizens or 
communities who can engage in the kmd of internal e h c a l  or religous dtalogue whch is 
necessary at the second stage of Rawls7s theory construction. Indeed, insofar as Rawls seeks 
an overlapping consensus among existing reasonable comprehensive doctrines, the 
possibihq exists that a legtimate conception of justice today might not be a legtimate 
conception of justice tomorrow if a new reasonable comprehensive doctrine emerges whch 
is not already embraced by the overlapping consensus. 
An-Na'irn does say, however, that some slight modfications of the a priori conception may be 
necessan, but he is extremely cautious about allowing that possibihty. He seems to allow for a little 
flexibih<- only to ensure that those who seek to persuade various tradttions that human rights and 
democracy are essential are seen to be acting in good faith. 
" For a more precise account of how- Islam might affirm a political conception of justice see An- 
Na7im (1990). Additionally, I have been working on a paper titled, "Islam and an Overlapping 
Consensus" which speaks to ths concern. 
But it seems that there are two ways to deal with b s  complication: In the first place, 
Rawls's idea of an overlapping consensus can accommodate the range and not merely the fact 
of reasonable pluralism insofar as it simply amounts to a procedure to accommodate 
reasonable pluralism rather than a substantive set of principles. That is, because the idea of 
an overlapping consensus tells us only how we should go about accommodating doctrinal 
pluralism rather than t e h g  us what the content of the consensus should be, Rawls's 
approach leaves the door open for accommodations of the range and not just thefad of 
reasonable pluralism. In the second place, once we make the case for what I call a more 
democratic overlapping consensus, we will see that the range of reasonable pluralism is or can 
be accounted for because the political conception of justice is left open to adjustments that 
are accepted by deliberating democratic citizens who are open to the claims made by others 
as well as to &scussions about the reasonableness or unreasonableness of claims and features 
of existing comprehensive doctrines and any comprehensive doctrine that might be 
endorsed by some group of citizens in the f i ~ t u r e . ~ ~  
Adrmttedly, if an overlapping consensus is reached, citizens wdl have chfferent reasons 
- perhaps even conficting reasons - for endorsing the public conception of justice. As 
Rawls puts it, 
Citizens have conficting religous, phdosophlcal, and moral views and so they 
a f f m  the political conception from w i t h  chfferent and opposing 
More on this in section IV below. I should note that some readers might object that these features 
of the overlapping consensus do not sufficiently address the problem of accommodating the range of 
reasonable pluralism. Critics might hold that we need to examine all possible reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines and determine how these are to be accommodated even if they don't 
currend! have adherents. By contrast, I dunk it is enough to set out and defend apmcedure for 
accommodating the range of reasonable pluralism. We need not work through the details of how to 
accommodate specific comprehensive doctrines until there are actual citizens who endorse those 
specific comprehensive doctrines and who are prepared to engage in the sort of internal examination 
of their own u7orldviews that is an essential part of reaching an overlapping consensus. W e  it 
might seems that thls response takes me back to the view that only the fact of reasonable pluralism 
must be accommodated, I t h k  I've shown that openness to future accommodations is sufficient for 
addressing the r a w  of reasonable pluralism. 
comprehensive doctrines, and so, in part at least, for different reasons. But 
this does not prevent the political conception from being a shared point of 
view from whch they can resolve questions concerning the constitutional 
essentials (2001: 32). 
Indeed, the conception will benefit from stronger motivational support because the reasons 
citizens have for endorsing the conception will be drawn from their own moral and religous 
beliefs and motives. If an overlapping consensus can be acheved then a democratic society 
wdl have a shared public conception of justice to gulde deliberation, on the one hand, and it 
wdl have succeeded in accommodating the fact of reasonable pluralism, on the other. 
Moreover, the two stage approach ensures that in trymg to accommodate pluralism, 
considerations of civll peace and stabihty do not trump basic justice because the 
accommodation is pursued only after a freestandmg conception of justice has been described 
at the first stage of theory. 
Thls way of r e a c h g  a consensus on principles of justice, however, faces a number of 
objections. C>ne objection holds that Rawls's approach to pluralism, whch seeks to 
accommodate reasonable pluralism, risks adjusting the conception of justice to fit with 
unattractive facts of political sociology and unequal &stributions of power. The other 
objection, by contrast, holds that Rawls's approach to pluralism is not sensitive enough to 
the actual pluralism of democratic societies and that, in order for a conception of justice to 
be both practical and normatively compelhg, it must aim at more substantial 
accommodat~ons than those offered by political liberalism. Whde I dunk that neither of the 
objections is fatal to Rawls's theory, we will see that both objections hghhght some h t s  
that an attractive approach to accommodating plurahsm must respect. 
11. An Overlapping Consensus too Accommodating? 
The first objection to Rawls's approach to reasonable pluralism that we should address holds 
that Rawls is too eager to accommodate pluralism and criticizes hun for adjusting principles 
of justice for merely prudential reasons. Proponents of thls view argue that bendmg or 
adjusting principles of justice to accommodate citizens' particular beliefs - as well as their 
determinate interests, preferences, characters, and motivations, more generally - whose own 
defensibhty or justification may be in doubt, is unacceptable. Cohen (2003), for example, 
argues that the Rawlsian method of constructing principles of justice whch acknowledges, 
and sometimes accommodates, certain demands of realism, includmg pluralism, is 
misguided." Citizens' comprehensive doctrines, may be relevant when we are concerned 
with the feasibihty or "stabhty" of a conception of justice, Cohen holds, but they are not 
relevant when the aim is to articulate that initial ideal conception of justice (2003: 199-120). 
We might regard it as politically prudent to reconcile a conception of justice to the fact of 
pluralism, but we should recogmze that any momfications made to the conception of justice 
for prudential reasons undermine the attractiveness of that conception because such 
mo&fications will entail concessions to objectionable beliefs. So the idea of an overlapping 
consensus whose aim is to accommodate the fact or range of reasonable pluralism is 
unacceptable. 
One strength of Cohen's objection is that it allows a theory of justice to avoid 
troublesome, perhaps insurmountable, dfficulties in decidmg whch features of citizens' 
comprehensive doctrines should and whlch should not be accommodated. And that means 
that Cohen protects a conception of justice from the possibhty of accommodating 
9i My description of G.A. Cohen's position is taken from Cohen (2003,2003b) and J. Cohen (1993) 
in which he "extrapolates on some points made by Jerry Cohen in a conversation about Rawls's 
lfference principle" (1 993: 271, 288n.7). 
objectionable or unattractive features of certain comprehensive doctrines. But that strategy 
has a sipficant cost in terms of lost legtimacp and indeed, justifiabhty, of a conception of 
justice. If the defenders of a conception of justice say to citizens with minority 
comprehensive doctrines that their concerns are not deserving even of consideration, let 
alone accommodation, then it is hard to see how those citizens could come to endorse that 
conception of justice even if it seems attractive on other counts. If citizens are to endorse a 
conception of justice and use that to frame their contributions to public deliberation, then 
we must demonstrate that the conception could be endorsed by someone from the 
perspective of their own reasonable comprehensive doctrine. Fdure to do so would mean 
that would regard themselves as not having reason to uphold and to live their political lives 
accordmg to the pdnciples of the conception of justice. 
Of course, one might argue that in cases where there is not an automatic fit between 
the content of citizens' comprehensive doctrines and the demands of a freestandmg 
conception of justice that we should aim instead to change the minds of those citizens. That 
is, rather than developing elaborate and perhaps cumbersome ideas of an overlapping 
consensus, perhaps we should encourage citizens to drop their pre-rational religous 
worldviews and adopt as their exclusive worldview a secular conception of justice. But that 
option is not open for anyone who dunks that the pluralism of comprehensive doctrines 
whch emerges in democratic societies is reasonable - that it is not somedung to be lamented, 
but somethmg whch is the not unwelcome outcome of the exercise of practical and 
theoretical reason under free inst i t~t ions.~~ 
By contrast, one might ask why religous toleration is not enough. In the face of 
religous pluralism why should we aim to achleve on overlapping consensus rather than 
See section 111 below for more on why "changing minds" is not a suitable option. 
simply endorse the idea that comprehensive doctrines are to be tolerated so long as they 
don't violate the principles set out by the conception of justice. Like the "changmg minds" 
argument, the religous toleration argument fails to recogtllze the nature of reasonable 
pluralism, on the one hand, and the need to solve the problem of doctrinal compatibhty, on 
the other. As I w d  argue below, reasonable pluralism is not simply a brute fact of the world 
that must be overcome; rather, it is a feature of the world whch requires accommodation as 
a matter of justice and an overlapping consensus provides the appropriate mechanism for 
that accommodation. Moreover, the religous toleration proposal fads to solve the problem 
of doctrinal compatibhty - that is, it fails to offer an account of how citizens could regard 
themselves as having reason to support the conception of justice rather than grudgmgly 
resigned to abide by its demands. 
In any case, respondmg to Cohen's objection helps us to see why pluralism - 
particularly, reasonable pluralism - must be accommodated not only as a matter of political 
stabhty, but as a matter of justice itself. The problem with Cohen's objection is that it fails 
to dstinguish between an accommodation of normatively salient or what we might call, to 
paraphrase David Estlund, "untainted doctrines" (whch might be a matter of justice) on the 
one hand, and concessions to power and objectionable beliefs (whch are matters of mere 
prudence and feasibhty), on the other. Not all beliefs and not all features of the social and 
political world are the product of unequal power relations or are otherwise objectionable. 
W e  the fact of mere pluralism might be characterized by unequal power between, and 
unattractive beliefs and interests of, various indviduals and groups, the fact and range of 
reasonable pluralism, properlj- understood, is not tainted in those same u-ays. The fact of mere 
pIz~raIisrz describes a social condtion in whch there are a variety of incompatible and 
sometimes conficting comprehensive moral, religous and phdosophcal worldviews 
endorsed by citizens. To accommodate a conception of justice to that brute fact would be 
tantamount to an accommodation to power.95 
However, the idea of reasonable pluralism, to whch a conception of justice should be 
reconciled, is characterized by two important features: First, the adherents of a subset of all 
worldviews r e c o p e  that it is permissible, indeed natural, for other citizens to endorse 
other world\-iews whose content Qffers from their own. "~]easonable persons," Rawls 
writes, "are ready to propose, or to acknowledge when proposed by others, the principles 
needed to specify what can be seen by all as fair terrns of social cooperation" (2001: 6-7). 
Though there may be Qfferent views about the good life whch arise from the "burdens of 
judgment7', citizens who are attached to those Qfferent views might nevertheless r e c o p e  
that they should search for and agree to some fair terms of social cooperation whch can be 
shared with citizens who endorse other, perhaps confhcdng, moral, religous, or 
philosoph~cal worldviews. Second, reasonable pluralism is not simply a brute fact faced by 
democratic societies, but a conQtion whch arises, or could arise, when citizens who live 
under free institutions exercise their capacities for reason and judgment about what 
constitutes a good life. It is, as I shall presently explain, an internal circumstance of justice to 
whch a conception of justice must be reconciled as a matter of justice, rather than an external 
circumstance of justice to whch a conception of justice may or may not resign itself as a 
matter of feasibhty. 
Internal and External Circumstances r$Justice 
An externalcircumstance of justice is some fact about human beings or the social world 
whlch confronts political phdosophy independently of the operation of a principle of justice 
95 On ths point see J. Cohen (1993: 285). 
or a well-ordered society. Such external circumstances include such h g s  as scarcity and 
the h t e d  generosity of human beings about whch Hume (1983) famously wrote." An 
tntental circumstance of justice, by contrast, is some fact about human beings or the social 
world whch arises, or would arise, in an already well-ordered society - in a society in whlch 
citizens conduct their affairs withm institutions that are designed and operate accordmg to 
fair terms of social cooperation. If we thmk that some feature of human beings or the social 
world will develop withm that society, then that feature deserves our attention as s o m e h g  
that may require accommodation as a matter of justice rather than mere practicality. 
As Rawls puts it, reasonable comprehensive doctrines, "are not simply the upshot of 
self- and class interests, or of peoples' understandable tendency to view the political world 
from a h t e d  standpoint" as G.A. Cohen might suspect. "Instead," he continues, "they are 
in part the work of free practical reason withm the framework of free institutions" (Rawls, 
1996: 37). \/'hen we try to reconcile justice to reasonable pluralism, Joshua Cohen adds, "we 
are not accornrnoda~g justice to an unfavorable condrtion of human life, since, as the idea 
of reasonable pluralism shows, we ought not to count moral pluralism itself among the 
unfavorable condrtions" (1993: 272)." Indeed, a circumstance of justice whch arises, or 
could arise, in a well-ordered society where citizens are regarded as free, equal, and 
reasonable, is a feature of the world whch is a serious candrdate for accommodation. 
That some comprehensive doctrines actually deserve accommodation emerges from 
the fact that some of the comprehensive doctrines support politically liberal institutions - 
"See "Of Justice" in Hume (1983): pp. 20-6. For discussion of Hurne's view- and its role in Rawls's 
own theories, see Rawls (1 999): 109- 1 12 and (2001): 84-5. Rawls lstinguishes between "objective" 
and "subjective" circumstances of justice in these works but I thmk that the terms "external" and 
"internal" help to make clearer the point that the fact of reasonable pluralism is a special 
circumstance. 
those same institutions whlch fachtated, along with the exercise of practical and theoretical 
reason, the development of those doctrines themselves. And, moreover, the claims of those 
citizens who affmn those doctrines deserve some kmd of accommodation when those 
citizens are themselves reasonable in the sense of supporting politicallj- liberal institutions 
and the full inclusion of all other reasonable citizens whose own comprehensive doctrines 
might confict with, or even oppose, their own. Citizens are reasonable when they are 
prepared to r e c o p e  other citizens as politically free, equal, and reasonable and when they 
eschew attempts to impose the content of their worldview on other citizens in political 
deliberation and decision-makmg. 
G.A. Cohen's farlure to dtstinguish between objectionable and unobjectionable 
features of the social and political environment leads h.un to reject the idea that reasonable 
pluralism can be accommodated by a conception of justice without makmg concessions to 
power or objectionable features of particular comprehensive doctrines. Nevertheless, h s  
utopian objection reminds us that when we try to accommodate reasonable pluralism, we 
must ensure that principles of justice are insulated from power and other objectionable 
demands of realism. Reasonable pluralism, we should remember, is not the same as the fact of 
mere pluralisnl that we confront in actual democratic societies. Accommodating the former 
in the right way is a matter of justice because of its internal origm and because it is consistent 
with compliance to a politically liberal conception of justice. By contrast, accommodating 
the latter, if we should accommodate it at all, requires careful judgments about the 
reasonableness or unreasonableness of the comprehensive doctrines that make up that 
pluralism. That point must be kept in view when we consider the second objection to 
5 In Rawls's words, "[iln framing the conception so that it can, at the second stage, gain the support 
of reasonable comprehensive doctrines, we are not so much adjusting that conception to brute forces 
of the world but to the inevitable outcome of free human reason" (1996: 37). 
Rawls's use of the overlapping consensus to accommodate reasonable pluralism (in the 
following section) and when we consider some necessary revisions to Rawls's theory (in 
Section TI). 
111. Not Enough Accommodation? 
Monique Deveaux (2000) offers both practical and normative reasons to defend her claim 
that pluralism needs to be accommodated much more substantially than it is by Rawls and 
other liberal theorists. From a practical point of view, Deveaux writes that, "[t]oo often it is 
the TTeq lack of attention to concrete political c h s ,  developments, and practical 
restrictions that lead some political theorists to suggest ineffectual and even implausible ways 
of arrangmg our political affairs" (2000: 30). The implication is that Rawls's theory, though 
sensitive to the need to accommodate pluralism in some fashon, does so at such an abstract 
level that it has no practical use for actual plural democratic societies. Indeed, Rawls's 
restriction of the comprehensive doctrines deserving of accommodation to those whch are 
"reasonable" ignores a number of other comprehensive doctrines whch might not meet the 
reasonable requirement. Along the same h e ,  Galston writes that "for those who are left out 
[of Rawls's political liberalism], it is hard to see how liberalism can be experienced as 
a n y h g  other than an assault. Resistance is therefore to be expected, and it is far from clear 
on what basis it is to be condemned" (1 989: 71 8). 
But arguments of mere practicality are non-starters when our concern is with the 
fundamental principles of justice whch should guide institutional design. Galston may be 
right that "resistance" is to be expected from those who are "left out" of the overlapping 
consensus and that k s  w111 hurt the stabhty of Rawls's conception of justice, but he is 
wrong to say that there is no clear basis on whch we can d~stinguish between justified and 
unjustified resistance. Justified resistance is the resistance of reasonable citizens who endorse 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines that are excluded from the overlapping consensus, 
whereas unjustified resistance is that of unreasonable citizens who are attached to unreasonable 
doctrines. Though we should take seriously resistance of the former sort - because it 
suggests that those who were left out were left out unjustlj7 - the resistance of the latter 
should not have an impact on the content of a conception of justice, though that resistance 
might play a role when we investigate how to q~pb principles of justice to less than ideal 
political circumstances. Slmdarly, Deveaux's complaint that political liberalism might be 
both "ineffectual" and "implausible" might give us reason to make adjustments in the 
application of principles of justice, but no reason to adjust those fundamental principles 
themselves. 
The claims of unreasonable citizens who are not interested in amving at fair terms of 
cooperation with other citizens because they are, instead, only interested in advancing and 
imposing their particular preferences, interests, and beliefs, might require our attention as a 
matter of political prudence, but should not be accommodated in the conception of justice 
itself. A conception of justice whch tries to accommodate the brute fact of mere pluralism 
for reasons of stabhty alone wdl soon find itself lookmg less hke a conception of justice and 
more hke a picture of the status quo because it fails to make judgments about whlch beliefs 
and practices are tolerable and whch are intolerable in a just society. More surprising1~-, it 
will also find that the stabihty whch it took as its guidmg aim fads to emerge because it 
deems the content of all views as worthy of accommodation and therefore offers no 
guidance to resolve lsputes between incompatible ~ iews. '~  
" One of the virtues of Deveaux's approach to pluralism is that it offers a more direct solution to the 
problem of m(:)tivational possibhty. By accommodating a wide variety of minority group claims, 
Deveaux's conception of justice could more easily locate the motivational support necessary to 
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L4ccommodation as a Matter $Jztstice 
In ad&tion to the practical motivation for greater accommodation, however, Deveaux offers 
a normative case for a greater accommodation of pluralism than that offered by Rawls. 
Deveaux argues that Rawlsian political liberalism "purchases political legtimacy and s tabhty 
through a dual strategy of assimiation - of culturally &verse citizens to a neutral liberal 
political cultlue - and exclztsion, by requiring that citizens not invoke their particular moral 
views and identities when debating political fundamentals" (2000: 13). That dual strategy of 
assumlation and exclusion means that not only wdl the justice claims of minorities not be 
accommodated, but that they wdl not even be heard when we constructprinripes of justice 
and decide on constit~ttionalessentials. A conception of justice whch ignores the claims of 
minorities fails to respect the citizens who make those claims and fads to r e c o p e  the 
importance of religous and/or cultural membershp to a sense of identity and a life with 
meaning. O n  thls point I dunk Deveaux is correct. A conception of justice should 
r e c o p e  the importance of religous and cultural membership to the inhviduals who are 
members of those cultures or adherents of those faiths and it should be constructed in ways 
that ensure the participation of all citizens. 
But Deveaux fails to d~stinguish between the consideration of claims, on the one hand, 
and the accommodation of claims on the other. The consideration of a claim requires that 
in&viduals and groups are permitted to present, and even encouraged and assisted in 
presenting, claims in the public political sphere. Moreover, it requires that those claims 
should be gxTen a fair hearing and assessment in public deliberation. But the 
ensure that the conception is stable. But if the strategy for deahg with pluralism is to try to 
accommodate all or most claims, then it is hard to see what work a conception of justice, as a 
conception ofj~~stice as opposed to a conception of stabhty, has to play in a democratic society. 
accommodation of claims should not be as automatic as Deveaux suggests in some places.99 
At times Deveaux appears to be concerned with the question of how minority claims should 
be accommodated before the questions of &ether minority ciauns should be accommodated 
and which clams deserve accommodation have been addressed. W d e  the consideration of 
claims is necessary to ensure that the fact of reasonable pluralism is itself accommodated in a 
conception of justice, an automatic accommodation of claims or the content of 
comprehensive doctrines in principles of justice, absent deliberation about those claims, 
would be both impractical and unjust. Impractical because the claims of dtfferent inchviduals 
and groups often confict and it would be impossible to accommodate all confhcting claims. 
And unjust because the exercise of political power or the dtstribution of collective resources 
should occur only when reasons can be offered with whch other reasonable citizens might 
agree. Automatic accommodation of claims makes a farce of the idea of democratic 
legtimacy - an idea essential to a defensible conception of justice.'"' 
Though Deveaux eventually calls for a form of deliberative liberalism in whlch claims 
would be presented and assessed, rather than automatically accommodated, the fact that she 
wants to gran t "s tandmg" (2000: 9) to particular cultural minorities prior to deliberation might 
be thought to gve greater weight to the claims of those groups prior to the deliberative 
assessment of those claims. An appropriate response to pluralism should ensure that 
citizens have standmg in democratic deliberation aJ n'ti~em. To suggest that certain groups 
The idea of automatic accommodation of minority claims is evident in a feu- places in Deveaux7s 
work: "I suggest that a thicker account of democracy would require the introduction of certain 
collective cultural rights and special arrangements for cultural minorities and so could help secure a 
deeper form of accommodation for national and ethnic minorities" (5). "I aim to offer reasons why 
a more inclusive and deliberative account of democracy.. .might help us to meet cultural minorities' 
demands for social and political accommodation" (6). 
10(' To be fair to Deveaux, there are places in her work where she seems to acknowledge that the issue 
should be one of consideration rather than automatic accommodation, but as a whole, her work 
should also receive standmg as culturalgroups appears to gve welght to the claims of those 
groups prior to the presentation and assessment of those very claims. If aper hearing and 
assessing the claims of minority citizens the democratic society decides that some special 
arrangements or accommodations are necessary, then such arrangements should be made. 
But to make those decisions prior to deliberation would elmunate the very purpose of 
deliberation about claims before accommodating those claims. Moreover, granting standmg 
to culttlraigmups prior to deliberation might threaten the rights and legrdmate interests of 
some members of those groups who msagree with those who claim to speak for the group. 
By now we should be aware that witlun any identifiable group there are often dssenting 
voices and we should be careful not to weaken those voices with political arrangements that 
are b h d  to internal &versity."" 
The ideal o f  Reasonableness 
Nevertheless, we need to consider Deveaux's critique of Rawls's idea of reasonableness 
itself. Deveaux argues that "Rawls's ideal ofreasonableness margmalizes, even effaces, the 
perspectives of those who view their group identity and attendant comprehensive views as 
inextricably linked to their political convictions" (2000: 91). Certain individuals and groups, 
Dereaux tlunks, are not able to make the mstinction between their comprehensive views 
(about the good life) and their political views (about what can be justified to others). Indeed, 
seems insufficiently attentive to the need to clearly dstinguish between consideration and 
accommodation of indwidual or group claims. 
lol I have in mind here the sorts of concerns raised by O h  (1999) and (2005). Specifically, I have in 
mind the concern that when groups are given standmg a s g r o q  the women who are part of those 
groups sometimes find that their interests and rights receive worse protection than under political 
arrangements where citizens receive standing simply as citizens. Of course, we should be careful not 
to let the concerns of internal minorities undermine the legtimate interests and rights of the other 
group members. The best way to navigate those dangerous waters, it seems to me, is to ensure equal 
representation of all citizens as citizens rather than asgmups. 
she claims that Rawls7s "accounts of reasonableness and public reason effectively would 
prevent certain cultural minorities from mscussing political norms and procedures on terms 
that are acceptable to them" (2000: 93). So she argues for fewer constraints on deliberation 
and participation in order to adequately accommodate pluralism widun a conception of 
justice. In her mind, "political liberals uykstb d e h t  the h d  and scope of arguments 
citizens may introduce in public debate and so also restrict the social dfferences we may 
have reason to recogme politically" (2000: 36). 
Though Deveaux may be right that certain inmviduals and groups will be unable to 
separate what they regard as ttxe from what can be regarded aspo(iLica41 acceptabh, two 
considerations speak against allowing citizens to introduce their comprehensive views into 
public deliberation. In the first place, we should remember that in political deliberation we 
are often concerned with the mstribution of public resources, and that deliberation about 
justice itself is deliberation about the principles and rules whlch should guide the 
adjumcation of clams on and hstribution of those resources. Arguments about the rules 
whch should guide the mstribution of public resources, then, must be presented in ways that 
could be justified to others who contribute to the stock of public resources and who might 
have competing claims on those resources. Though some groups might fmd it dfficult to 
frame their claims in ways that can be justified to others, when the concern is with the 
distribution of shared public resources, anydung less than public justification is 
~nacce~table." '~ To be sure, it is difficult to see how a citizen with a gren religous view 
It ' ?  Interestingly, many of Deveaux's examples of groups that she dunks are unable to present their 
claims uithout appeahg to their comprehensive views are groups that want to be left alone in some 
sense - that is, groups who are not, strictly speaking, makmg claims for public resources. See, for 
example, Devcaux's discussion of the Hmdrnarsh Affair (2000: 95-97). In that example we face a 
group that denies that a shared political community exists at all in whch case we are no longer 
confrontmg a ,group making a claim for accommodation, strictly speahg .  See also Deveaux's 
discussion of the Inuit in Canada's Northeast (2000: 92-3). In that example we face a group whch 
could endorse a claim made by another citizen with a dfferent, perhaps competing, religous 
view, on the basis of reasons whch appeal to the content of the latter's religon. Allowing 
citizens to present the content of their comprehensive views might make it easier for them 
to express themselves, but that move would reinforce, rather than reduce, the problems of 
moral and religous pluralism in democratic societies. 
In the second place, Deveaux seems to conflate the dstinction between deliberation 
about fundan~enta/prinn$Les ofjustice and deliberation about pubLicpoLicies where just institutions 
and principles already in place. When the concern is with the fundamental principles of 
justice, appeals to comprehensive doctrines might be allowed but those appeals can't be 
expected to pro~lde the justification for the principles and institutions we ultimately endorse. 
In plural democracies, appeals whch rely on parochal moral and religous views fail to 
accord adequate respect to those who are attached to other moral and religous views and 
who would not be moved by such appeals. Rawls's justice as fairness "aims at uncovering a 
public basis of justification on questions of political justice gven the fact of reasonable 
pluralism" (1996: 100). Because it is a conception of justice whch aims to be "shared" and 
endorsed by all reasonable citizens, the justification for that conception must rely on reasons 
whlch are "addressed to others" and whch could be accepted by others. Faced with 
reasonable pluralism, those reasons, if they are to be acceptable to others, cannot rest on 
appeals to the content of un-shared and controversial comprehensive doctrines. 
Of course, this leads Deveaux to charge that Rawls regards pluralism as simply a 
problem to be overcome rather than a positive feature of democratic societies. "[Hlis notion 
of 'reasonable pluralism'," she writes, "simply confirms the fact of &verse conceptions of the 
accepts some association with the larger political community but which nevertheless seeks 
autonomous political arrangements. In both cases, the claims presented are not claims of 
good but makes no comment as to its desirabhty. [Rawls fails] to concede the value of 
social dversity" (2000: 51). Whlle Deveaux may be correct that Rawls fails to r e c o p e  the 
value of social dversity, it is not clear why a theory of justice whch aims to be political, not 
metaphysical, should r e c o p e  that dversity as valuable. Rawls regards reasonable pluralism 
as welcome evidence of successful practical reasoning of citizens under free institutions as 
well as a challenge to be addressed by a conception of justice.103 Rawls's idea of an 
overlapping consensus is not an attempt to simultaneously "assimilate" and "exclude", but 
instead a sincere effort to accommodate the reasonable pluralism of democratic societies in a 
way that satisfies the need for mutual justification. We owe other reasonable democratic 
citizens reasons for our positions and claims whlch they could understand and endorse 
without violating their own reasonable comprehensive views. We do not owe them, and a 
conception of justice does not owe them, some acknowledgement of the value of their 
comprehenslve doctrine to social and political life more generally.'04 The idea of an 
overlapping consensus on a freestandmg political conception of justice, then, attempts to 
locate consensus on a shared public basis of deliberation that is inclusive of reasonable 
worldviews and critical of unreasonable worldviews - that is, views whch claim exclusive 
access to truth and whlch fail to offer reasons in public deliberation that citizens who don't 
share their view could accept. 
IV. A More Democratic Overlapping Consensus? 
illthough Deveaux's critique misses the mark on some points, the idea that we should adopt 
a more democratic and deliberative approach to accommodating pluralism should be taken 
accommodation but demands to be left alone. Neither Rawls's political liberalism nor Deveaux's 
own deliberative liberalism could be expected to provide solutions to such cases. 
See the response to G.A. Cohen in section I1 above. 
seriously. To be sure, the charge that Rawls's political liberalism is insufficiently democratic 
is a charge that has been advanced quite forcefully not only by Deveaux, but by Habermas. 
Habermas suggests that Rawls's approach to pluralism is insufficiently attentive to the 
content of citizens' determinate worldviews and to the need for a conception of justice 
whch is the outcome of actual deliberation rather than phdosophcal speculation. As we 
saw in the previous chapter, Rawls's overlapping consensus and h s  political phdosophy as a 
whole, Habemas argues, hscount democracy in favour of phllosop hy . Citizens in Rawls's 
theory, 
cannot r e i p t e  the rahcal democratic embers of the origmal position in the 
civic life of their society, for from their perspective all of the essential 
dscourses of legtitnation have already taken place w i h  the theory; and they 
find the results of the theory already s e h e n t e d  in their constitution. Because 
the citizens cannot conceive of the constitution as apmjct, the public use of 
reason does not actually have the sipficance of a present exercise of political 
autonomy but merely promotes the nonviolent presemation ofpolitical stabiiig 
(1998: 69). 
Whereas Rawls h k s  that locating sources for an overlapping consensus between particular 
comprehensive doctrines and the political conception of justice should be a matter of 
hscussion for the adherents of those particular doctrines alone, Habermas wants to open 
those dscourses to the political community as a whole. A more public and democratic 
procedure for accommodating pluralism has two advantages on Habermas's view: First, 
when citizens are able to introduce content from their comprehensive doctrines into public 
dscourse, there is a greater possibhty that they d regard themselves as having reasons to 
uphold the conception of justice because they would be able to regard themselves as the 
authors of those principles. Habermas seems to believe that political autonomy is better 
served, and therefore greater support to be found, in arrangements whch allow citizens to 
develop principles themselves. Rawls's idea of an overlapping consensus, Habermas seems 
lH4 I am indebted to Sarah Song for discussions about the ideas in this paragraph. 
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to dunk, entails that the conception of justice described at the first stage of theory confronts 
citizens as an external or alien constraint on their deliberations rather than a conception 
whch they have gven to themselves. 
Second, a more democratic procedure for accommodating pluralism provides a means 
by whch the comprehensive doctrines - through whch "needs and interests are interpreted" 
- can be subjected to "criticism by others" (Habermas, 1990: 67). "mhe revision of the 
values used to interpret needs and wants," Habermas writes, "cannot be a matter for 
indviduals to handle monologcally" (1990: 68).lo5 The idea here seems to be that unless one 
confronts and engages with points of view dfferent from one's own worldview, one wdl, as 
Wdl Kydcka  puts it "tend to accept existing practices as gvens and thereby perpetuate the 
false needs and false consciousness whch accompany those hstorical practices" (1989: 898). 
Because Rawls appears takes the content of comprehensive doctrines off the agenda of 
public deliberation, he fads to offer citizens opportunities to have their views questioned and 
assessed by others, and opportunities to explain and to defend their views to others. 
As stared, however, both of these reasons fad to justify a more deliberative and more 
democratic approach to accommodating pluralism. In the first case, it is not clear that 
political autonomy, and therefore doctrinal compatibhty and reasoned support, are 
improved simply because indviduals are able to introduce the content of their 
comprehens~ve doctrines into deliberation about a conception of justice. Habermas 
misunderstands Rawls's project on this point. Rawls's political conception of justice is not 
offered as the content of a constitutional democracy decided upon by philosophers and not 
citizens. Rather, Rawls's conception of justice is offered as a shared public basis to guide 
loS As Thomas McCarthy describes Habermas's project, "rather than contractual arrangements 
among 'unencumbered' indviduals with arbitrarily chosen ends, vaberrnas's &scourse ethlcs] 
political dscourse about the design of fair institutions and policies. Whether citizens actually 
adopt that conception and use it to guide their political mscourse is ultimately up to them. 
In that sense, citizens retain the political autonomy that Habermas dunks is both normatively 
essential and practically beneficial. Political autonomy does not require that everyone be the 
authors of their own laws or constitution in the literal sense; rather, autonomy requires 
opportunities to assess the terms of social cooperation and opportunities to decide whether 
one has good reasons to accept or to reject those terms. Rawls7s conception of justice is not 
as undemocratic as Habermas suggests because it is offered, not imposed, as an ideal to 
regulate political dscourse and reasonable citizens always have the final say about whether 
they could or could not agree to the terms of social cooperation as offered.lo6 
The second argument Habermas offers for a more deliberative and more democratic 
approach to pluralism, whch appeals to the benefits of public deliberation for evaluating, 
explaining, and perhaps revising worldviews, also misses the mark. Habermas endorses 
public deliberation about the content of worldviews because he h k s  that such deliberation 
w d  allow citizens to be more reflective about, and critical of, features of their own 
worldviews whch "perpetuate false needs and false consciousness" than they would be on 
their own (Kymhcka, 1989: 898). But, as Kymhcka notes, whde we might agree with 
Habermas that public deliberation might be more likely than internal individual deliberation 
to encourage reflection on and the revision of unattractive views and practices, it is not clear 
that such public deliberation has to take place in the formal political sphere (1989: 898). 
Turning the formal political sphere into a forum of evaluation poses two risks whch we 
should avoid: Fitst, it places citizens at risk of harsh criticism of their worldviews whch 
involves processes of reflective argument among previously socialized subjects whose needs and 
interests are themselves open to lscussion and transformation." (1990: xi.). 
For more on this dispute see J. Cohen (2003). 
might damage their self-respect; and second, it risks re-introducing confict among moral, 
religous, and phllosophcal worldviews whlch are incommensurable but nevertheless 
reasonable. In short, transforming the public political sphere into a forum for the evaluation 
of the worth of various worldviews undermines efforts to accommodate a dversity of views 
and ways of life in the f ~ s t  place. Such a move would effectively shlft us away from an 
attempt to accommodate pluralism and towards a utopian attempt to elmmate that pluralism 
through deliberation and evaluation. 
W e  Haberrnas fails to make the case for a more democratic overlapping consensus, 
the considerations that both he and Deveaux emphasize help us to see two reasons why 
political liberahsm should be more democratic. In the rest of h s  chapter, then, I shall 
explain how those two reasons encourage us to adopt an ideal of deliberative democracy 
w i h  political liberalism. 
1'. Deliberation and Reasonable Pluralism 
1. The Iqodance of Comprehensive Doctmizes 
One reason to allow citizens to introduce content from their comprehensive doctrines into 
political deliberation has to do with issues of mutual understandmg and the importance of 
moral and religous beliefs to the citizens who hold them. Deveaux notes that sometitnes 
appeals to "communities' tradtional beliefs and dstinct ways of life in the course of political 
deliberation.. . [is] necessary to conITey the nature and importance of the cultural 'good' at stake" 
(2000: 85. My emphasis). On that point I dunk Deveaux is correct. Many citizens wdl often 
fail to take the claims of other citizens seriously because they do not have a sense of how 
important features of those citizens' worldviews may be to them. And the failure to take 
those concerns seriously demonstrates a lack of respect for other citizens. If a democratic 
society is to function accordmg to fair terms of social cooperation then mutual respect 
among citizens must be reahed to a sufficient degree. To exclude all content of 
comprehensive views from public political discourse, then, would undermine one way in 
which citizens might be able to demonstrate to others that their concerns are, if not justified, 
then at least important enough that a democratic society should make some effort towards 
understandmg and perhaps accommodating them. 
However, whde r e c o p i n g  the need for public deliberation to be more open to the 
content of cc-lmprehensive views for reasons of mutual understandmg and equal 
consideration of claims, we should remember that such content cannot be introduced to 
ju-(tb the claims made to others. In democratic societies characterized by reasonable 
pluralism, justification to others must rely on considerations and reasons whlch do not 
depend on nor appeal to any particular comprehensive doctrine. To do so would be 
unreasonable - that is, it would fad to treat other citizens with respect and, moreover, it 
would ultimately fail to secure a shared public basis of deliberation. So the introduction of 
content is permissible to indlcate the importance of claims, but should not be regarded as an 
invitation to use comprehensive doctrines to justi@ political arrangements and claims on 
public resources. 
In some ways, Rawls r e c o p e s  h s  concern when he introduces the idea of the "wide 
view of public political culture" whlch holds "that reasonable comprehensive doctrines, 
religous or nonreligious, may be introduced in public political discussion at any time, 
provided that in due course proper political reasons - and not reasons gven solely by 
comprehensive doctrines - are presented that are sufficient to support whatever the 
comprehensive doctrines introduced are said to support" (2001: 152). So citizens can make 
contributions to public political &scourse through their comprehensive doctrines. But the 
final justification of claims and policies must be done in terms of proper political reasons. 
While the wide view of public reason seems to respond to the objection to Rawls's theory 
considered above, we should notice that public dtscourse in tlus case occurs where a political 
conception of justice has already been articulated. Indeed, that conception provides the 
content of the "proper political reasons" that can satisfi. the proviso, as Rawls calls it. But 
our task was to ask whether the demands of realism - in tlus case the dtversity of 
comprehensive doctrines - provide some justification for changes in the content of the 
conception of justice itself, not merely to consider whether the content of comprehensive 
doctrines can be introduced after the content of justice is already settled. In that sense, 
Rawls's wide view- of public reason fails to respond to the objection as stated. 
2. Evalztation~ of Wo& VJ.  judgment^ about Rea~onablene~~ 
More importantly, the content of comprehensive doctrines may have to be admtted into 
public deliberation in order to help citizens dtstinguish between reasonable and unreasonable 
arguments and features of their comprehensive doctrines when they aim at an overlapping 
consensus on a conception of justice. In order for citizens to reach such a consensus on 
justice they cannot rely simply on deliberation and dtscussion whch is internal to their own 
doctrines, as Rawls suggests. 
\XWe Habermas suggests that deliberation should focus on evaluating the won% of 
various features of citizens' dtfferent worldviews, we might instead view deliberation as a 
means for citizens to reflect on the rea~onableness of their worldviews. Rau~ls wants citizens to 
consider whether they could support the freestandmg conception of justice from w i t h  their 
own worldview but we rmght wonder how those citizens are to know whether certain 
features of their worldviews are reasonable or unreasonable and how they q h t  be able to 
revise their views in more reasonable duections. In the absence of some kmd of democratic 
and deliberative engagement with citizens who endorse other worldviews, one might not 
take a reflective and critical attitude towards the reasonableness of one's own worldview. All 
content might be seen, from one's own perspective, as fixed and reasonable. In public 
&scourse with citizens of other faiths and moral views, however, we might begm to see what 
features of our own worldviews might be unreasonable and what, for that matter, might be 
changeable. Indeed, in advance of deliberation with other citizens who do not share one's 
moral or religious worldview, how could one know whether one's view and the sorts of 
reasons one might offer in public deliberation are reasonable? 
Habermas's move to permit erjahtations ofthe wodh and trxth of comprehensive doctrines 
in the public sphere goes too far. To be sure, subjecting citizens' moral and religous views 
to the evaluative gaze of others who neither understand nor are moved by those views would 
fail to treat those citizens with respect. So long as citizens accept the fact and range of 
reasonable pluralism and offer reasons for principles of justice, political arrangements, and 
public policies whlch other reasonable citizens could endorse, then there is no need for 
Habermasian evaluations. At the same time, even Rawls's wide view of public reason 
doesn't go far enough towards meeting the demands of democratic pluralism. Again, the 
wide view permits appeals to comprehensir~e content in democratic deliberation only where 
the content of justice is already settled. Moreover, Rawls's wide view of public reason, 
though it would allow comprehensive content provided the proviso is satisfied in due course, 
does not seem to leave room for &scussions of the reasonableness of the worldviews 
themselves. That is, Rawls allows comprehensive content as part of citizens' arguments for 
particular policies (so long as the proviso can be satisfied), but he does not make room in 
public deliberation for citizens to dlscuss the prior question of whether the content of their 
comprehensive doctrines is reasonable and thus suitable for reachmg on overlapping 
consensus on the political conception of justice. 
Between the Rawlsian restrictions on comprehensive content and the Habermasian 
invitation to evaluation we should locate space forjitdgments about the reasonableness of certain 
features of comprehensive doctrines and arguments in public deliberation. While Rawls 
hopes that cidzens wlll come to endorse a political conception of justice from w i t h  their 
comprehensir~e doctrines, it is not clear that the deliberation leadmg up to that consensus can 
realistically and legtimately be conducted solely w i h  the confines of citizens' own 
worldviews. So whlle I endorse and defend Rawls's argument for an overlapping consensus 
of reasonable comprehensive doctrines, I question whether that consensus can be acheved 
without some pz~blic deliberation about the content of citizens' various comprehensive 
doctrines. 
VI. Conclusion: Towards Deliberative Citizenship 
Whether public deliberation can respect the &stkction between evaluations of worth and 
judgments about reasonableness depends on whether or not btiqens are capable of 
understandmg and respecting the &stkction. One might h k  that a s h g  citizens to respect 
that &stkction is to go beyond the h t s  of practical possibhty for the average citizen. 
Moreover, one might h k  that a political conception of justice whlch, for the most part, 
asks that citizens bracket their comprehensive doctrines when they engage in public 
deliberation asks too much of citizens. Galston (1989), among others, worries that citizens 
are unhkely to regard themselves as simultaneously politically reasonable citizens or public 
persons who are prepared to revise their interests, aims, and beliefs as justice requires, on the 
one hand and as non-public persons with "aims and attachments" that make up their 
identities, on the other."" 
In respondmg to some of the charges against Rawls's political liberalism, I have relied 
on the idea that citizens should be prepared, and that they have the capacity, to reflect on 
and perhaps even revise their determinate motives, interests, preferences, and beliefs when 
the demands of mutual justification and reasonable pluralism require. Rawls hunself relies 
on the idea of citizens as "reasonable persons" who are "ready to propose certain principles 
(as specifjing fair terms of cooperation), as well as to comply with those principles even at 
the expense of their own interests as circumstances require" (2001 : 191). Appeals to the idea 
of a reasonable citizen, however necessary, might raise the question of whether it is realistic 
to rely on such appeals. Can a conception of justice realistically rely on a conception of the 
citizen whch regards citizens as capable of reflecting on and perhaps revising their motives, 
interests, and beliefs when justice requires? I dunk that it can, and I will address that 
question in the next, and final, chapter on deliberative citizenshp. 
" I 7  S d a r  worries are expressed by Sandel (1 982). 
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6 
Justice, Realism, and Deliberative Citizenship 

Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women; when it 
&es there, no constitution, no law, no court can save 
it; no constitution, no law, no court can even do 
much to help it. Whde it lies there it needs no 
constitution, no law, no court to save it. 
- Learned Hand (1752: 170) 
Man's capacity for justice makes democracy possible, 
but man's inchation to injustice makes democracy 
necessary. 
- Reinhold Niebuhr (1944) 
The dissertation began with a few central questions: WhJ, should concerns about the 
demands of realism have a role in theorizing about justice at all? How are we to d ~ s t i n p s h  
between motives, motivational lumtations, and beliefs whch should and those whch should 
not be accommodated in a conception of justice? And, finally, how should a conception of 
justice solve the problems of motivational possibhty and doctrinal compatibhty? We have 
seen how Rousseau, Rawls, and Habermas have attempted to offer answers to those 
questions which avoid concessions to objectionable features of the world and human beings, 
on the one hand, and simultaneously avoid the pitfall of utopian irrelevance, on the other. 
Nevertheless. I have argued that whlle each of these theorists make important contributions 
to a solution to the tension between justice and realism, none of them offers a completely 
satisfactory solution to that problem."'" 
1 ° W i l e  Rousseau shows us how citizens' existing motives and beliefs are not necessarily fmed and 
that political institutions can be arranged in ways that encourage transformation of objectionable 
features, his monoiogzca/ solution to the problem rests on a moral point of view wluch sits in tension 
with the fact and range of reasonable pluralism. Rawls, by contrast, offers a hvpotbetical constnrcti~ist 
theory wluch accounts for reasonable pluralism, but tries to settle too much of the content of justice 
prior to the democratic deliberation of citizens. Finally, while Habermas offers a seemingly more 
democratic rea/pmced.vralist approach to the problem of justice and realism, lus solution to the 
In thls chapter I aim to answer the three central questions by bringmg together and 
more fully elaborating some of the ideas that I introduced and began to develop in the 
previous five chapters. To solve the first problem - the problem of existing motives and 
beliefs - we need an argument about whch motives and beliefs should be accommodated by 
a conception of justice and those whch should not and, addtionally, an argument about why 
such accommodations are necessary at all. In the case of motives, I shall argue that there are 
certain motives whch should be regarded not as mere practical constraints on the feasibhty 
of a conception of justice, but instead as normatively salient motives whch require 
accommodation as a matter of justice.109 To identify whch motives are normatively salient, I 
argue that we should adopt the point of view of a society composed of citizens regarded as 
free, equal, and reasonable - that is, a democratic society of citizens capable of critical 
reflection on their own and others' motives as well as their own and others' interests, 
preferences, and beliefs."" Those existing motives whch should be accommodated by a 
conception of justice, then, are those whlch reasonable deliberative citizens would say are 
necessary for the protection of their freedom as demomatic citizens. 
I11 the case of beliefs, I shall argue that a conception of justice should be prepared to 
accommodate reasonable pluralism. That is, a conception of justice should accommodate 
the fact that there are a variety of ethlcal and religous worldviews whch, whde 
problem of motivational poss ib ih~ fails to protect the mechanism by which citizens can develop the 
capacities and dispositions necessary to ensure the motivational stabihty of a conception of justice. 
" ' T h s  again raises the concern of David Estlund (see note 8 above) who thmks that when we are 
deahg  with normatively salient motives, the language of "accommodation" doesn't seem to capture 
what we're after. Accommodating normatively salient motives is not really a matter of 
accommodation, but what justice requires. I continue to use the term accommodation, then, not 
because I dsagyee with Esdund's point; rather, I use the term because it seems a less cumbersome 
way to refer to the idea that certain motives must count as legtimate considerations in the 
construction or articulation of a defensible conception of justice. 
l1(I Keep in mind that when I speak of reflection on beliefs, I am referring to the idea of judgments 
about reasonaldeness rather than evaluations of worth that I dscussed in Chapter 5. 
incommensurable with each other, are nevertheless held by reasonable citizens who are 
prepared to hnd political principles of justice whch r e c o p e  other citizens - even those 
who endorse mfferent and competing comprehensive doctrines - as politically free, equal, 
and reasonable. 
Moreover, assuming that we do not accommodate all existing motives and beliefs and 
therefore that some competition between the demands of justice and the unaccommodated 
features wdl persist, we need a plausible account of how the motivation necessary to support 
the conception of justice can be generated as well as a plausible account of how doctrinal 
compatibhty could emerge. I d argue, first, that any compehg  conception of justice will 
have to shou7 how it can generate or draw on internal sources of motivation rather than rely 
on externai constraints, sanctions, or incentives. Moreover, I wdl argue that a compehg  
conception of justice must show how it can provide space for the pursuit of reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines and how the citizens who endorse those doctrines can also endorse 
the conception of justice from w i h  their own reasonable worldviews. Demonstrating 
motivational possibhty and doctrinal compatibhty in those internal ways will require two 
companion ideas: a (realistic) idea of the deliberative citizen and an account of the dynamic 
relationship between just democratic institutions and the exercise of deliberative citizenship. 
In the course of developing these two parts of a complete solution to the problem of 
realism I w111 consider and respond to what I hare called the realist and the utopian 
intuitions.'" As thls chapter d show, both the utopian and realist perspectives on the 
The utopian intuition is best expressed by Mill who, in defendmg his uatarian conception of 
justice against those who charge that the standard is "too high for humanity" and therefore unable to 
motivate support, replies that "this is to mistake the very meaning of a standard of morals, and 
confound the rule of action with the motive of it." "The business of ethics," Mill asserts is "to tell us 
what are our duties. or by what test we may know them," not to accommodate the standard of justice 
to meet concerns of practical possibility (Mdl, 1991: 149). By contrast, from a realist perspective, a 
conception of justice which has no hope of being realized in this world by human beings as they are, 
tension between justice and realism are myopic. W e  a conception of justice should avoid 
concessions to objectionable features of the world and human beings, it must accommodate 
motives and beliefs whch are normatively salient. Moreover, wlde a conception of justice 
should have solutions to the problems of motivational possibhty and doctrinal compatibhty, 
those solutions should retain the emancipatory and critical hope that any conception of 
justice worthy of the label must retain. 
To address the problem of existing motives and beliefs I present the idea of 
normatively salient demands of realism (Section I) and I introduce the ideal of deliberative 
democracy as the appropriate point of view from whch decisions should be made about 
whch motives and beliefs should be accommodated and whch should not (Section 11). 
However, while these two ideas help to solve part of the tensions between justice and 
realism, they raise two other issues whlch d have to be addressed - namely, how can we 
solve the problems of motivational possibrlrty and doctrinal compatibihty gven that not all 
existing motives are accommodated at that first stage; and, second, how can we regard the 
ideal of deliberative democracy as anydung but utopian? To address these two issues, I shall 
introduce the idea of deliberative citizenship, inhcate its role in a solution to the problem of 
realism (Section 111), and address the question of whether or not the idea of deliberative 
cidzenshp is objectionably utopian (Section N). Then, in section T7, I address the utopian 
question about why a conception of justice should worry about motivational possibhty or 
doctrinal compatibrlrty at all. I conclude with some thoughts about the hfference between 
pragmatism, optimism, and hope and their connection to justice. 
is no more than an intellectual curiosir! unsuited for political life. Hume captures that idea when he 
writes that "custom is the great guide of human life" (1983: 46) and "men must endeavour to palhate 
what they cannot cure" (1985: 38). 
I. Normatively Salient Demands of Realism 
Two camps have emerged in response to the problem of existing motives and beliefs: Those 
in the realist camp hold that a conception of justice whch fails to accommodate the existing 
motives and/or beliefs of citizens will fail to acheve stabfity. Theorists hke Hobbes (1991) 
and Gauthler (1986), for instance, try to found conceptions of justice on the interests of 
rational inhvid~als."~ They allege that justice, and the political arrangements whch embody 
justice, d be stable only if the citizens who are bound by that conception of justice have 
good self-interested reasons for endorsing that conception. 
By contrast, those in the utopian camp argue that attempts to base the duties of justice 
on the antecedent self-interested motives and narrow beliefs of human beings damage the 
content of justice because those antecedent motives and beliefs are often objectionable. 
G.A. Cohen, for example, holds that existing self-interested motives may be relevant when 
we are concerned with the feasibhty or "stabhty" of a conception of justice, but they are not 
relevant when the aim is to articulate that initial ideal conception of justice (2003: 199-120). 
Attention to existing motives and beliefs, as well as other features of the world and human 
beings such as interests, inequality, and power imbalances, might be prudent in the 
application of principles to existing societies, but prudent mohfications to the conception of 
justice itself would undermine the attractiveness of that conception. 
Yet, wlde each camp hghhghts an important consideration, neither offers an adequate 
response to t-he problem. W e  the realist recogtllzes the importance of the problem, h s  
solution risks shaping justice in objectionable ways. Moreover, it is not at all clear that an 
accommodation of all existing motives, for example, whch the realists dunk would be 
necessary to ensure stabhty, is even conceptually, let alone practically, possible. That is, 
even if we dunk that a complete accommodation is desirable for reasons of stabhty, the 
accommodation of the motives of some citizens may not be compatible with the 
accommodation of the motives of other citizens. There is no way, for example, to 
accommodate my desire to be the most respected citizen in my community with the identical 
desire of another citizen to be the most respected in that same community. We cannot both 
be the most respected and so there cannot be a complete accommodation of all existing 
motives. Sirmlarlp, it is not at all clear how a conception of justice could, practically 
speakmg, accommodate the existing beliefs of all citizens. What are we to do when one 
group of citizens refuses to abide by the demands of justice unless they are taken from and 
explicitly founded upon the Ten Commandments, for example, whde another group 
maintains that all principles of justice must be secular or have secular foundations to gain 
their compliance. These two demands, based on existing beliefs, simply cannot be satisfied 
simultaneously in a conception of justice so there cannot be a complete accommodation of 
all existing beliefs. 
By contrast, whde the utopian recogrues the dangers of attendmg to the demands of 
realism, the utopian strategy of ignoring those concerns risks ignoring those existing motives 
and beliefs w-hch are, what I call, normatively salient. That is, the utopian fails to mstinguish 
between motivational demands whlch are objectionable and motivational demands whch are 
unobjectionable or even attractive. S d a r l y  there are beliefs whch are objectionable and 
beliefs whch are unobjectionable or even attractive. Or, to put it another way, there are 
citizens who are prepared to be politically reasonable even when their comprehensive 
- -- 
112 Their success in this regard is dubious as Rousseau's critique of Hobbes suggests and as 
Gauthier's importation of moral notions hke Locke's proviso into the allegedly rational interest 
explanation of justice shows. 
doctrines c o n k t  with other comprehensive doctrines. There is a dtversity of features of the 
world and human beings to whch a conception of justice should pay attention and some 
features whlch, on reflection, might require accommodation as a matter of justice and not 
merely as a matter of stabhty. 
Pltlralzm: LI/ltle, Motivational, and Reasonable 
It is sometimes held that all of the values whch citizens hold dear (or should hold dear) are 
compatible with each other, that a coherent package of all the concerns that do or should 
matter to citizens will fit together into a coherent conception of justice. Or, at the very least, 
it is held that we shouldn't proceed on the assumption that, even if we haven't found such a 
coherent statement of what justice is yet, it is not possible to do so. Ronald Dworkm writes 
that 
We should hope for a plausible theory of all the central political values - of 
democracy, liberty, and civll society as well as of equality - that shows each of 
these growing out of and reflected in all the others, an account that conceives 
equality, for example, not only as compatible with liberty but as a value that 
someone who prized liberty would therefore also prize (Dworkm, 2000: 4). 
,4s we saw in the previous chapter, however, agreement on values is not only impossible but 
undesirable in a society whch seeks to protect freedom of thought and conscience. To be 
sure, the idea of reasonable pluralism suggests that a shared conception of the best life is not 
only unattainable but undesirable because it could only be achleved through coercion. 
Moreover, that coercion would fad to do more than make people publicly profess a belief in 
a shared conception of the good rather than actually believe in such a shared conception. 
But perhaps even more importantly, it may be the case that the hndamental political 
values whch one q h t  want to incorporate into a conception of justice, rather than the 
ehca l  conceptions that citizens privately embrace, are in tension. Dworkm recopzes that 
h s  view confhcts with that of Isaiah B e r h  who holds that "some values may confict 
intrinsically" and that "the very notion that a pattern must in principle be Qscoverable in 
whch they are all rendered harmonious is founded on a false aprioriview of what the world 
is me." Thus, B e r h  holds that "the need to choose, to sacrifice some ultimate values to 
others, turns out to be a permanent characteristic of the human predcament" (Berh, 1969: 
li). 
What I want to suggest here is not that a conception of justice should aim to 
incorporate value pluralism or value monism. Instead, the appeal to the debate between 
B e r h  and Dworkm is made to remind us that not all the demands of realism that appear to 
confict with the demands of a particular principle of justice, are malign. Citizens' objections 
to the demands of a particular egalitarian principle of Qstributive justice, for example, might 
not be rooted in greedy or jealous motives; rather, the objections might be animated by a 
concern for liberty - and not just liberty for oneself, but a concern for the liberty of all 
citizens. That is, in the same way that B e r h  r e c o v e s  that those dungs we most value 
might confhct rather than fit nicely into a coherent whole, I maintain that those features of 
human beings and the world whch might on the surface confict with other features or 
human beings and the world and with features of a conception of justice, might nevertheless 
be features whch should be respected and, as far as possible, incorporated into a defensible 
conception of justice. 
The Normative Salience of ReasonabLe PLuraLism 
We came across one example of a normatively salient demand of realism in the previous 
chapter - namely, the set of reasonable moral and religous doctrines whlch citizens might 
endorse whlle acknowledgmg the legdmacy of other doctrines whch are incompatible with 
their own. What makes that fact of reasonable pluralism normatively salient are two k g s :  
First, that the pluralism of reasonable doctrines is s o m e k g  whch would emerge under 
already just institutions wluch protect freedom and citizens' opportunities to engage in 
practical reasoning. And, second, that those citizens who endorse reasonable moral or 
religous views are reasonable citizens - i.e., incbviduals who are prepared to acknowledge the 
legtimacy of other reasonable views and prepared to endorse principles of justice whch 
would be acceptable to other reasonable citizens. In short, what makes reasonable pluralism 
normatively salient is its o r i p  in freedom and its compatibhty with reasonable citizenslup. 
A conception of justice wluch seeks to accommodate reasonable pluralism, then, is not 
m a h g  a concession to an unattractive or objectionable feature of the social and political 
status quo, but instead reconciling itself to the exercise of freedom and practical reason. 
rTlus is not to say that any and all consequences of the exercise of freedom would require 
accommodation in a conception of justice; rather, it is to say that some consequences of the 
exercise of liberty by citizens d be compatible with the legtimate interests of all other 
citizens in locating shared principles of justice to guide social and political life. Moreover, 
once we move towards a view of justice as the outcome of an agreement that reasonable, 
reflective citizens could make, we begm to see how the accommodation of certain features of 
the world - features whch arise from reasonable exercises of freedom - would have to be 
made if all citizens are to agree to a gven conception of justice."' 
~\~omzative~ SaIient Motives 
Recent hscussions about the appropriate level of application of Rawls's hfference principle 
- h s  second principle of justice - provides another way to make sense of the claim that 
some demands of realism require accommodation as a matter of justice and not simply as a 
matter of political prudence. Recall G.A. Cohen7s objection to Rawls's application of the 
dfference principle to the basic structure of society rather than to citizens' personal 
behaviour or the social ethos. Because Rawls restricts the application of the dfference 
principle to the basic structure of society, Cohen argues, citizens are permitted to make 
choices that violate the spirit of the hfference principle itself. Indeed, Cohen maintains that 
not only does Rawls pernit incentive-seehg behaviour, but that Rawls must regard that 
behaviour as not unjust. If correct, Cohen's claim means that justice as fairness depends on 
an unattractive concession to an objectionable motive - namely egoism. The talented agents 
who demand incentives, Cohen alleges, do so not because the incentives are necessary, but 
simply because those agents want the incentives and have the power to demand them 
successfully. In that case adjusting the content of justice to fit with citizens' antecedent 
motives would be nothmg more than a violation of justice itself for mere practical 
consideratiotzs. 
But as the dscussion in Chapter 3 demonstrated, applying the dfference principle to 
the basic structure of society and therefore permitting citizens to make choices about their 
personal behaviour, need not be construed as a concession to objectionable motives hke 
greed or egoism. Instead, that decision about level of application can be seen as a way to 
make space for motives whch are, on reflection, the sorts of motives that an attractive 
conception of justice might want to protect. There are not only "untainted motives", such 
as affection for one's farmly, that we might want to incorporate into a conception of justice 
or, at the very least, acknowledge as deserving of some operational space withm or outside of 
the demands of justice (Estlund, 1998: 102, 108). There are also motives that are not merely 
11: Of course, this prompts G.A. Cohen's question about what it is that the idea of agreement adds to 
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"untainted" but should be positively valued bj7 a conception of justice. Citizens might be 
motivated by a concern for their freedom - a desire to lead a life free of unnecessary fetters 
and a desire to have the freedom to conceive of and to pursue a conception of the good that 
one chooses for oneself as opposed to one that is imposed. 
The idea of norrnatively salient motives and normatively salient demands of realism, 
more generally, then, responds to both the realist and utopian strateges for deahg with the 
problem of realism. In contrast to the realist who holds, for example, that existing motives 
must be accommodated in order to ensure motivational stabihty, my view holds that 
accommodations by a conception of justice should be considered only for those 
unobjectionable motives that a conception of justice should incorporate as a maner Ofjustice - 
in particular, citizens' motivation to be free.*14 Unattractive motives such as greed, egoism, 
or an appetite for power might be salient when we are concerned with the application or 
stabhty of principles of justice, but not in the design of the principles themselves. In 
contrast to the utopian who holds that we should pay no attention to motivational concerns 
when articulating principles of justice, then, I hold that there are certain motives that 
demand o w  attention and perhaps accommodation as a matter of justice. Here we are not 
t a h g  about malung accommodations for citizens who through weakness of wdl or malign 
intent seek tc) dodge,the demands of justice. Rather we are t a h g  about the possibhty that 
citizens who are otherwise committed to justice and fulhlltng its duties hnd themselves 
pulled in dfferent chrections by reasonable demands and motives. 
the justness o T p ~ c i p l e s  of justice. I will address that question below. 
1 1 4  Of course :L conception of justice cannot guarantee full freedom for all citizens because each 
citizen's freedom must be h t e d  when necessary to protect an equal degree of freedom for other 
citizens. And, moreover, restrictions on freedom may be necessary to ensure that a conception of 
justice satisfies other interests and concerns such as equality, reciprocity, and publicity. How those 
concerns all fit together in a conception of justice is an important question; however, my aim is only 
to demonstrate that certain motives are among those things whlch must be reconciled. 
But wlde certain motives and reasonable pluralism may be normatively salient and 
therefore in need of accommodation as a matter of justice, we must have some way to 
dstinguish between those normatively salient motives and reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines and other motives and doctrines whch are neither normatively salient nor 
reasonable. To meet that need, I suggest that theories of justice should be p d e d  by two 
ideas: An ideal of deliberative democracy and a conception of deliberative citizenshp. In 
discussing these two ideas, we will also see how addressing the problem of existing motives 
inevitably raises the problems of motivational possiblltty and doctrinal compatiblltty to whch 
the idea of deliberative citizenshp offers the first step towards a solution. 
11. An Ideal of Deliberative Democracy 
iis we have learned from our examination of the theories of Rousseau, Rawls, and 
Habermas, hstinctions between demands of realism whch should and those whch should 
not be accommodated in principles of justice should be made from a moral point of view. 
W e  each of these theorists offer candidates for an appropriate point of view, we have seen 
how, for hfferent reasons, none of them offers a point of view completely suited to 
resolving the justice and realism tensi~n."~ Thus, we need a more suitable perspective from 
whch to make the necessary distinctions. Moreover, as Chapter 5, on reasonable pluralism, 
demonstrated, even when we can identi+ a normatively salient demand of reahsm, exactly 
how that demand should be accommodated remains an open issue. Thus, in order to 
distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate demands, and to provide a means by 
whch accommodations can be considered, I suggest that we should adopt the point of view 
of an ideal of deliberative democracy. 
- --- 
"5 See note 1 3  0 above. 
As Samuel Freeman writes, "the ideal of deliberative democracy says that in voting it is 
the role, perhaps the duty, of democratic citizens to express their impartial judgments of 
what conduces to the common good of all citizens, and not their personal preferences based 
on judpents of how measures affect their indtvidual or group interests" (2000: 375). To 
assist citizens in acheling that aim, or fulf lhg that duty, political arrangements are to 
ensure that there is a free exchange of ideas and reasons, equal opportunities for citizens to 
make and to assess claims, and equal rights, resources, and capacities to effectively use those 
opportunities, among other t h m g ~ . ~ ~ ~ o r e o v e r ,  as Freeman and others note, deliberation is 
to be focusecl on the common good of citizens as a whole and not myopically on their own 
antecedent private preferences and interests: "Deliberation aims for a rationally motivated 
consensus, to find reasons acceptable to all who are committed to acting on the results of free 
and reasoned deliberation by equals" (Freeman, 2000: 390). 
The particular motives and beliefs, as well as preferences, interests, and other dungs 
that citizens hold prior to the adoption of a conception of justice are a mixture of malign, 
benign, and normatively salient motives, beliefs, preferences, and interests. Democratic 
deliberation is a particularly promising way of dtstingwshmg between the mahgn and the 
benign features because of the way it requires citizens to address their claims to other 
citizens, to submit to public scrutiny of their claims, and to justifj- their claims by offering 
reasons whch other citizens could accept. As Joshua Cohen writes, "[wlhen properly 
conducted. . . democratic politics involves pablir dehberationfocused on the common good, requires 
some form of manIfesf equal.9 among citizens, and shapes the identi9 and interests of citizens in 
a7ars that contribute to the formation of a public conception of common good" (1997: 69). 
Indeed, deliberative democracy is expected to make participants more other-regardmg in 
""ee Cohen (1 997), Gutmann B; Thompson (1 996, 2004), Habermas (1 990, 1996), Scanlon (1 998). 
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their behaviour and in the d e h t i o n  of their interests. Participants in deliberation learn to 
frame their contributions in ways whch could reasonably be accepted by other free, equal, 
and reasonable participants.117 As Cohen continues, 
[alssuming fair condrtions of drscussion and an expectation that the results of 
deliberation d regulate subsequent action, the participants would tend to be 
more other-regardulg in their outlook. The structure of drscussion, aimed at 
solving problems rather than pressuring the state for solutions, would 
encourage people to find terms to whch others can agree. And that would 
plausibly dnve argument and proposed action in dwections that respect and 
advance more general interests (1 996: 1 1 3). 
If, as Rousseim believes, indrvidual citizens' weaknesses, vices, and prejudrces seem to 
"shnnk. . .the h t s  of the possible in moral matters" (1978: 3.12.2) then perhaps democratic 
deliberative arrangements can enlarge the h t s  of the possible by subjecting those 
weaknesses, vices, and prejudrces to public scrutiny. 
If we use the ideal of deliberative democracy as the appropriate point of view from 
whch to identi6 malign, benign, and normatively salient demands of realism, that means 
that only those demands whch could be justified to other citizens as reasonable demands 
should be considered as candrdates for accommodation in principles of justice. And we 
might expect that those demands whch should be accommodated by a conception of justice 
- that is, those whch would pass the ideal deliberative test - are those whch reasonable 
deliberative citizens would say are necessary for the protection of their freedom as demomatic 
citi7en.r. Presumably, citizens wdl be motivated not simply by determinate, contingent 
preferences but also by more fundamental interests. A democratic citizen, one might expect, 
wdl want a set of rights and resources necessary to form and to pursue a conception of the 
good as well as the rights and resources necessary to participate as an equal in democratic 
political life. The ideal of deliberative democracy, then, helps to drstinguish between the 
- -- 
H 7  See. for example, Rawls (1996) and (1999~). 
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nonessential contingent preferences and beliefs, on the one hand, and the more fundamental 
interests, motives, and beliefs. Citizens could reasonably justifj to others the need for 
principles of justice whch would accommodate the more fundamental interests of 
democratic citizens, but may not succeed in justifying the need for principles of justice to 
accommodate other antecedent preferences.118 To be sure, the deliberative democratic point 
of view was what helped us to see why citizens' reasonable moral and religous views, as well 
as their interest in freedom, constitute normatively salient demands of realism whlch require 
some h d  of' accommodation. 
It is important to keep in mind that adopting an ideal of deliberative democracy as the 
appropriate point of view does not mean that principles of justice are to be the outcome of 
actual deliberations, at least not chrectly. Actual deliberation, as we learned from our 
&scussion of Habermas, rarely, if ever, approximates the ideal of deliberative democracy and 
risks the possibhty that principles of justice d simply reflect the inequalities and other 
objectionable features of the social and political status quo. The utopian objection to our 
attempt to solve the problem of justice and realism would carry the day here if we relied on 
actual, non-ideal, deliberation to make decisions about the content of justice. Indeed, actual 
deliberation that fails to meet the requirements of the normative ideal of deliberative 
democracy threatens to descend into mere self-interested bargaining, the outcomes of whch 
could not be regarded as principles of justice to whch all citizens could agree. 
WMe the ideal of deliberative democracy offers a first step towards solving the 
tension between justice and the demands of realism, then, thee  other questions and 
concerns now arise: First, how can we solve the problem of motivational possibhty gKTen 
11" have not said that citizens will not succeed in defending more particular preferences to other 
citizens. A moral point of view which ruled out that possibiliq at the outset would fail to treat 
that not all existing motives are accommodated at the &st stage of the solution? Second, 
how can we regard the ideal of deliberative democracy as anythmg but utopian in light of 
citizens' capacities and the comprehensive doctrines whch they endorse? Finally, and 
perhaps most obviously, if we are not t a h g  about actual deliberation then how does the 
ideal of deliberative democracy play a practical role in dscussions about justice? To address 
these issues, we need to consider the role, capacities, and h t a t i o n s  of what I call the 
deliberative citizen."" 
111. Deliberative Citizenship 
While the ideal or actual practice of deliberative democracy is thought by some theorists to 
be doing the work of dstingulshg between reasonable and unreasonable c h s ,  what 1 
want to argue is that it is not simply the institutions or procedures of deliberative democracy 
but an associated exercise ddeliberattive n'ti~eniship whch acheves that aim. In short, the 
capacities, dspositions, and actions of citizens play an essential role in sorting through 
concerns about motives, beliefs, and the demands of realism of realism more generally. And, 
moreover, I want to suggest that a certain h d  of citizen - the deliberative citizen - is the 
kind of citizen that we ought to, and can, rely upon for solutions to the problems of 
motivational possibhty and doctrinal compatibhty. 
citizens and their interests, beliefs, and motives with respect - it would, in effect, risk the totalitarian 
scenario aboul- which Talrnon (1952) and Popper (1 966) complain. See chapter 2. 
N 9  In earlier drafts of the dssertation I used the terms "reflective citizen" and "reasonable citizen" to 
label the conception of the citizen I have in mind here. I now use the terms "deliberative citizen" 
and "deliberative citizenship," which I dunk better capture the spirit of the conception. I first came 
across the ternls "deliberative citizen" and "deliberative citizenship" in Mendelberg (2001). I also 
thank Loren IGng who suggested that term in private conversation. 
The Capacities and Role oj-Deliberative Citixen~ 
A deliberative citizen is a citizen who is prepared and capable of reflecting on her own and 
others' interests, motives, beliefs, and claims in an impartial fashon, prepared to offer 
reasons that others could accept to justi+ their claims, and prepared to revise her 
preferences, interests, and beliefs when required. T h s  conception of deliberative citizenshp 
requires, then., that citizens be more than the self-interested, instrumental reasoners of 
Hobbesian political thought - that is, citizens who are capable of more reflective reasoning 
than what would be necessary for strateping to satisfy one's antecedent aims and 
preferences whatever those might be. 
The conception of deliberative citizenshp draws in part on the idea of "civic 
consciousness" advocated by Cohen and Rogers. They write that "cilc 
consciousness.. .require[s] a general recoption of the norms of democratic process and 
equity [i.e., popular sovereignty, political equality, and hstributive fairness], and a wilhgness 
to uphold them and to accept them as fixing the basic framework of political argument and 
social cooperation" (1995: 38). Cohen and Rogers embrace a deliberative conception of 
democratic legtirnacy in whch the "justification of the exercise of collective political power 
is to proceed on the basis of free public reasoning among equals" (Cohen 1996: 99). It is 
h s  understandmg of democratic legrdmacy whch recogmzes a need for the development of 
"other-regarding" outlooks and behaviour, a " a g n e s s  to treat others with respect as 
equals," and :I greater concern for the "common good." A deliberative citizen, then, wdl not 
only seek to pursue her own aims and interests, but d be prepared to consider not only 
how her interests are compatible or compete with the interests of others but, more 
importantly, she wd.l be prepared to consider the common good of a democratic society 
composed of other free, equal, and reasonable citizens. To put the point another way, 
deliberative citizens wdl be concerned not simply with their own interests, but also with the 
legtimacy of those interests, with ways to pursue those interests consistent with the rights 
and interests of others, and with the common good of all citizens. 
In a moment I'll indcate why I h k  that conception of deliberative citizenshp is not 
unrealistic but, &st, consider why that conception of citizenshp is necessary. I suggested 
earlier that deliberative institutions and procedures alone are insufficient to dstinguish 
between normatively salient and other demands of realism and, I want to add, insufficient 
for stabbing a conception of justice once such a conception has been settled upon.'"' 
Deliberative citizenshp is necessary, then, because it is citizens - not institutions or 
procedures - who ultimately preserve and abide by the ideal of democratic deliberation and 
who, ultimately, provide the real motivational and doctrinal stabihty for a conception of 
justice. 
W e  it is the case that we want institutions and procedures in place that embody the 
norms and principles of justice to whch we could agree, the initial establishment of those 
institutions depends on the actions of citizens who seek to establish them. And if just 
institutions and procedures are to be established, citizens wdl need some way to judge 
whether these institutions wdl promote or damage the principles of justice. Judgment must 
origmate in the aims, &spositions, and normative commitments of citizens themselves. 
When adopting new, and hopefully just, procedures and institutions, then, there is no choice 
but to depend on the reasoning abhties, motivations, and normative and ethlcal 
commitments of citizen. 
Moreover, even if initially just institutions can be established, changes in social, 
economic and political conditions over time might produce inequalities whose correction wdl 
12" See also chapter 5, section 111. 
require institutional reform. "It is implausible," Cohen and Rogers argue, "that the 
appropriate changes in institutional arrangements w d  be made unless the norms themselves 
function as guides to public deliberation" (1995: 39). But those norms certamly don't 
function as "guides to public deliberation" all on their own; rather, those norms emerge as 
standards of institutional assessment and reform when citizens themselves introduce and 
appeal to those norms in public deliberation. Speakmg about liberty, rather than a 
conception of justice as such, Learned Hand makes the point forcefully when he says that 
"Pliberty lies in the hearts of men and women; when it &es there, no constitution, no law, no 
court can save it; no constitution, no law, no court can even do much to help it. While it lies 
there it needs no constitution, no law, no court to save it" (1952: 190). Ultimately, the ideal 
of deliberative democracy will have to be carried by deliberative citizens - that is, embedded 
in the &spositions, motivations, and normative commitments of citizens. 
It might be thought, at thls stage, that what I am arguing for is s d a r  to Rawls's idea 
of the sense of justice. "A sense of justice," Rawls writes, "is the capacity to understand, to 
appl~7, and to act from the public conception of justice whch characterizes the fair terms of 
cooperation. . . [and] a wdh.ngness, if not the desire, to act in relation to others on terms that 
they also can publicly endorse" (1 996: 19). Additionally, Rawls holds that citizens must be 
able to "acquire a normally sufficient sense of justice so that they comply with [a well 
ordered society's] just arrangements" (1 996: 141). I some respects the idea of deliberative 
citizenship shares certain ideas with Rawls's sense of justice, but it goes further than the 
sense of justice. The sense of justice whch requires that citizens "comply with" just 
arrangements and to "act from the public conception of justice" implies that the content of 
the conception of justice is settled prior to deliberation. Thus, the sense of justice is a 
&sposition to obey and to support an already settled conception of justice. Deliberative 
citizenshp, liowever, acknowledges that the content of justice map not be settled before 
deliberation and that citizens wdl need the capacity and motivation to deliberate about the 
content of justice and, thus, to make and assess claims whde regardmg others citizens as free, 
equal, and reasonable. Nevertheless, the two ideas share the intuition that the stabhty of a 
conception of justice does not rest ultimately in the institutions whch embody that 
conception, but instead in the attitudes, actions, and hsposition of citizens. 
Deliberative Cl'iti~ensh@, Motivational PossibiIip, and Rea~onable PluraIism 
So how, exactly, does the idea of deliberative citizenshp help us to solve the problem of 
practical possibhty? The problem of practical possibhty - a more general term for the 
specific problems of motivational possibhty and doctrinal compatiblhty - arises when a gap 
appears to remain between citizens' existing motives or beliefs whch are not accommodated 
and the demands of a canhdate conception of justice. In the face of that gap, an attractive 
conception of justice needs to show that citizens can come to endorse the principles even 
when their antecedent motives and beliefs appear to confhct with those principles. And, 
moreover, it needs to show that motivational possibihty and doctrinal compatibhty could be 
generated internally by a conception of justice rather than enforced through external 
constraints such as sanctions for non~om~l iance .~~ '  
Deliberative citizens, I maintain, are citizens who have the capacity and the motivation 
to deliberate about the requirements of justice, to support a conception of justice, and to 
recognize when social and political institutions need to be reformed. Moreover, they are 
citizens who are receptive to reasonable transformations of their pre-deliberative 
preferences, interests, motives, and beliefs when those transformations are required by 
justice and do not otherwise confhct with their most fundamental interests as democratic 
citizens. Part of the reason why citizens would be open to that kmd of transformative 
possibhty, I want to suggest, arises from the fact that an attractive conception of justice will 
strive to accommodate reasonable pluralism. As we saw with the chapter on reasonable 
pluralism, citizens would be more &ely to support a conception of justice and perhaps more 
amenable to revisions of the determinate motives and preferences if that conception of 
justice was adjusted to permit citizens to hold reasonable moral and religous worldviews. 
That is, if the conception of justice were adjusted to accommodate citizens' fundamental 
interest in pursuing a reasonable conception of the good, then that accommodation would 
gve those citizens an addtional reason to support that conception of justice. 
Of course, it is not the case that citizens d immehately endorse the requirements of 
a conception of justice just because it permits the pursuit of reasonable conceptions of the 
good or provides room for reasonable moral and religous worldviews. Rather, the point is 
that if the conception of justice can be endorsed by citizens for reasons that they find w i b  
their own worldviews, then, over time, citizens would likely be more receptive to the 
transformative demands of that conception of justice. Most, if not all, reasonable moral and 
religous doctrines require that citizens forgo the pursuit of some of their more immedate 
preferences in order to satisfy the requirements of their morality or religon. Because 
citizens regard those moral and religous demands as their own, a conception of justice 
whlch finds support w i b  the worldviews of reasonable citizens can draw on that same 
reflective and transformative possibhq. When the conception of justice is regarded as part 
of the worldriew of a citizen - when an overlapping consensus has been achieved - she d 
feel the demands of justice not as external constraints or demands, but as internal demands, 
lz1 See chapter 1, section I1 and chapter 4, section I11 on why the sanctions-for-noncompliance view 
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demands that must be met by one who wishes to be a faithful adherent of her particular 
moral or religous doctrine. 
Thus, deliberative citizenshp, whch is necessary for the stabhty of a conception of 
justice, could be endorsed as a correct model of citizenshp by citizens from w i h  their own 
comprehensive doctrines. That is, citizens can find reasons to be deliberative citizens, and 
thereby help to support a conception of justice whch relies on a conception of deliberative 
citizenshp, from w i h  their own moral and religous worldviews. That we might 
reasonably e.xpect deliberative citizenshp to be endorsed from w i h  various comprehensive 
doctrines depends on whether citizens can be encouraged by institutional arrangements to 
engage in discourses about their comprehensive doctrines with those who share their 
w orldview . '" 
In any case, the possibhty of deliberative citizenshp being endorsed from w i h  
comprehensive worldviews offers as reliable a solution to the problem of practical possibhty 
that we can hope for. That solution, of course, does not guarantee motivational or doctrinal 
support in part because it still relies on the not infakble political judgment of orchary 
citizens. But it indicates that support is possible and, moreover, it does so without 
committing the realist mistake of damagmg the integrity of principles of justice simply to 
acheve guaranteed stabhty. '" 
fails to deliver stability. 
l2 See An-Na'im (1990, 1992) on the "internal cultural discourse[s]" (1990: 3) necessary to achleve 
thls aim and also for an account of how human rights and democracy might locate legtirnacy from 
within Islamic doctrine. See also Rawls (1999~: 154n.52) on how this might be achieved in 
Catholicism but also for an account of why a political liberalism should generally avoid developing 
such account:: from the outside, rather than inside, of comprehensive doctrines. 
12' The "coulct be endorsed" conQtion is admittedly a weak criterion. But, as I have claimed 
throughout the hssertation and as I will again argue in the final section, a solution to the tension 
between justice and realism should be guided by the idea ofpossibilip - by an idea of what it is 
reasonable to hope for - rather than what is pmbable or like4 because that is necessary for a solution 
to avoid both the realist and utopian pitfalls that I have argue we should avoid. 
IV. Is deliberative citizenship objectionably utopian? 
It might sall be objected that this solution to the tension between justice and realism is 
objectionably utopian. It might be said that the ideal of deliberative democracy and its 
associated conception of deliberative citizenship makes or would make demands on the 
capacities of citizens whch are unrealistic. The idea that deliberating citizens wlll be able to 
make political judgments without considering their personal preferences and the idea that 
they have a capacity to critically reflect on and perhaps revise their existing motives, beliefs, 
and preferences are certainly demandmg ideas. m e  I a h t  that it may be that citizens are 
unlike4 to dexrelop and u d u e  that reflective capacity at all times during their lives, I maintain 
that the capacity is w i h  the h t s  of practical possibihty and I offer three reasons to 
support the claim that the conception of deliberative citizenshp relied upon here is not 
unrealis tic: 
7 .  The Deep Stmcture ofHuman PyboIo&y 
The first reason has to do with human nature and psychology itself. Though citizens often 
act from self-interested motivations or perhaps with a lack of awareness of the consequences 
of their actions, n o h g  in the structure of human nature itself rules out the possibhty that 
human beings can reflect on and perhaps revise many of their interests, preferences, motives, 
and beliefs. 14s Rousseau dscovered, there is a dstinction to be made between human 
nature - whlch is naturally good and unalterable - and the determinate social ethos whch is 
ngd, but nevertheless malleable. When in political theory we take people "as they are", we 
recopze the h u t s  imposed by the deep structure of human nature but adopt a critical 
attitude towards determinate preferences, interests, motives, and beliefs whch are shaped in 
social life (Rousseau, 1978: 1 .I).'" The idea of deliberative citizenslp holds that citizens 
have the capad~~ to dstinguish between their constructed preferences, interests, motives, and 
beliefs, on the one hand, and the fixed features of human nature on the other. Even if that 
capacity is rarely, if ever, exercised, its existence means that we are not being d d l y  utopian 
in holdmg that citizens can reflect on and perhaps revise their views. 
2. The Dynamic Character of Comprehensive Docttines 
Second, a feature of the structure and content of most comprehensive docnines also points 
towards the realism of the conception of the citizen relied upon here. Citizens rarely have 
worldviews whlch are perfectly settled, coherent, and comprehensive so there is a certain 
amount of room to maneuver w i h  their comprehensive doctrines. Writing about cultural 
worldviews, Benhabib notes that much contemporary theorizing adopts "faulty epistemic 
premises" about cultural rigmty (2002: 4). In particular she holds that cultures are assumed 
by many theorists to be much more homogenous, bounded, and dstinct and that their 
content is much more fixed than is, in fact, the case (2002:4). By contrast, Benhabib adopts 
a social constructivist view about culture w l c h  holds that the content of cultural worldviews 
is the product of ongoing evaluations, narratives, and actions (20025). That is, because the 
"social observer" studes cultural worldriews from an external standpoint, the "social 
observer" often fails to r e c o p e  the "contested and contestable" character of cultural 
worldviews as they are experienced by "participants in the culture" (2002: 5). Thus, she 
continues, "we should view human cultures as constant creations, recreations, and 
negotiations" and r e c o v e  that "existing social and cultural cleavages are transformed into 
political mobhzation" (2002: 8, 17). Insofar as ebcal,  religous, and other non-cultural 
j24 On the distinction between human nature and social ethos, see Rousseau (1986). 
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comprehensive worldviews are characterized by h s  same contestabihty, there is room m'thin 
comprehensir~e doctrines for maneuver whch contributes to the realism of the idea of 
deliberative c i t i z e n ~ l u ~ . ' ~ ~  
When asked whether they could endorse a conception of justice and an idea of 
deliberative citizenslup from wih their own worldview, then, most citizens are able to 
consult a worldview wluch has a certain elasticity and therefore may be able to locate 
support for the conception of justice and the idea of deliberative citizenslup by re-ordering 
or revising certain elements of their worldview. m e  some critics might regard h s  as a 
demand that citizens conform to an alien conception of justice, on a Rawlsian understandmg 
h s  is simply to ask citizens to locate support wih their comprehensive views for a 
conception of justice and citizenshp whch they already find attractive for other, non- 
comprehensive, reasons. 
In a sirmlar manner, David Miller notes that empirical research about what ordmary 
people t h k  about justice "suggests not that people are locked into fixed beliefs about 
justice, but that there is a very considerable degree of indeterminacy in many of their specific 
beliefs" (1 999: 60). They may have certain background commitments to general ideas about 
fairness, equality, and the itke, but are rarely "locked into" specific beliefs about justice 
(1999: 6 0 ) . ' ~ ~  SO the dynamic rather than static, and constructed rather than prirnordal, 
nature of most worldviews is another reason why a conception of the citizen as having a 
capacity to reflect on and perhaps to revise their interests and beliefs is not unrealistic.'" 
'25 Benhabib is carehl to note that "sociologcal constructivism does not suggest that cultural 
dfferences are shallow or somehow unreal or 'fictional'. Cultural dfferences run very deep and are 
very real.. ..Yet., the student of human affairs should never take groups' and indviduals' cultural 
narratives at ace value. Rather, to explain human behaviour, the student should seek to understand 
the totality of circumstances of whch culture is an aspect" (2001: 7). 
See also Miller (1999: 61-92). 
"7 See also Rawls (2001: 193) on the "looseness" of comprehensive views. 
?. The Complmentarip of Institutions and Deliberative Citizensh~p 
Finally, though askmg citizens to reflect on their determinate interests and beliefs as 
inhviduals may be a demandmg request, such reflection can be encouraged and assisted 
when deliberative institutions and opportunities are avdable in the formal and the informal 
public spheres. Institutional arrangements whch encourage democratic deliberation, I argue, 
can help citizens to be more reflective about their determinate preferences, opinions, and 
beliefs and help them to acquire the hspositions and developed capacities necessary for 
deliberative citizens to hscover and to support a conception of justice. And evidence from a 
few practical experiments in deliberative democracy inhcates that those expectations are not 
ill-founded.'" Evidence of the effects that deliberative engagements with other citizens have 
on inhviduals' interests, beliefs, and motives, then, offers another reason why a conception 
of the citizen as having a capacity to reflect on and perhaps to revise interests, preferences, 
motives, and beliefs is not unrealistic. 
However, the idea that institutions can facktate the exercise of deliberative citizenshp 
seems to be in tension with the earlier claim that deliberative citizenshp must precede 
institutions. 'The dynamic model of institutions and deliberative citizenshp might sake  
some as itself objectionably utopian or even tautologcal. The institutions whch are to 
encourage deliberative citizenshp seem to depend for their existence on the hspositions and 
activities of deliberative citizens. But that vieu7 is not, I dunk, objectionably utopian nor 
tautologcal once we r e c o p e  that neither completely just institutions nor perfect 
deliberative citizenshp are necessary for our solution to the problem of practical possibihq. 
128 Recent studies on participatory-budgeting in Porto Alegre, Brazil demonstrate that deliberation 
can indeed encourage more reflective and "enlarged" thmlimg among ordmary citizens. See, for 
The ideal of deliberative citizenshp, whde demandmg and often in need of institutional 
encouragement, is a reflective attitude that citizens are capable of adopting whether 
institutions to encourage it exist or not. When I say that deliberative citizenshp can be 
regarded as more realistic gven that certain institutional arrangements can fachtate or 
encourage it, that does not mean that deliberative citizenshp is impossible without those 
mstitutions. Absent those institutions, deliberative citizenshp is adrmttedly improbable, but 
not impossible; whereas with those institutions, deliberative citizenshp is both possible and 
less improbable. 
Of course, that d fail to satisfy those realists who want a closer fit between justice 
and realism. But as I have argued throughout the dssertation, a closer fit between justice 
and realism would risk adjusting the content of justice to accommodate objectionable 
features of human beings and the social and political status quo. Solving the problem of 
pracdcalpos.r,ib~(iCy, rather than aiming at guarantees of motivational stabhty and doctrinal 
compatibhty, is a more appropriate resolution to the tension between justice and realism. 
V. Justice, Legitimacy, and Realism 
Whether or not the conception of deliberative citizenshp is realistic and whether or not it 
helps to solve the tension between justice and realism aside, there is the large, snll 
unanswered, utopian challenge about why we should care about the demands of realism at 
all: Why should we regard motivational possibihty and doctrinal compatibhty as matters of 
justice and not simply matters of practical application? 
The idea of normatively salient demands of realism in the first part of th~s  chapter goes 
some u7ay towards respondmg to that challenge. Some existing features of human beings 
example, Abers (1999) as well as the essays by Abers and Baiocchi in Fung & Wright (2003). For 
and the world, I said, are not mere practical constraints on a conception of justice but rather 
fundamental interests of democratic citizens that must be accommodated if a conception of 
justice is to be considered one to whch reasonable citizens might agree. Reasonable 
pluralism and a concern for liberty, I argued, would have to be accommodated in a 
conception of justice if that conception is to be considered attractive for a democratic 
society. 
Moreover, because the problem of realism is treated here more as a matter of 
demonstrating practicalpossibiIip than one of accommodating all existing motives and beliefs, 
the utopian c:oncern that principles of justice d make concessions to objectionable motives 
and beliefs in order to acheve stabhty is unfounded. The approach to the demands of 
realism defended here shows how the ideals of deliberative democracy and deliberative 
citizenshp, although demandmg, are not unrealistic. Because the solution to the tension 
between justice and realism appeals to ideals or conceptions, rather than citizens' existing 
motives, beliefs, and the imperfect practice of democratic deliberation, the utopian need not 
worry about concessions to objectionable features of human beings and political practice. 
Indeed, it is hard to see why citizens would agree to principles of justice whch are adjusted 
to account for objectionable, but alterable, features of the social and political status quo, 
rather than principles whch maintain a critical attitude and emancipatory hope in the face of 
an objectionable status quo. 
In my view, agreement on principles of justice by reasonable citizens wdl only be 
acheved when it can be demonstrated that those principles are motivationally possible and 
capable of endorsement from w i h  reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Just as it would 
be unreasonable to expect all citizens to agree to principles of justice whlch would regard 
some cautionary remarks, see Mendelberg (200 1). 
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sipficant inequality or oppression as just, it would be unreasonable to expect citizens to 
agree to principles of justice which demand the impossible. And by impossible, I don't 
simply mean impossible in the face of existing motives, beliefs, interests, and behaviour, but 
impossible in the face of deep, unalterable, structural features of human psychology. 
In the Introduction I said that, on my view, a conception of justice must be a 
conception to whch citizens agree or could agree. But I suggested that, even if we can 
locate that a~qeement, once the conception of justice is in place, it is hkely that some citizens 
\dl violate or be tempted to violate the demands of justice from time to time - even when 
those citizens have, or could have, endorsed the principles whch they subsequently violate. 
In that case, the use or threatened use of coercive measures to ensure compliance with the 
demands of justice may be legtimate. But in the face of that possible coercion, I maintain 
that no one could rationally or reasonably agree to principles of justice whch are either 
motivationally impossible or with whch reasonable comprehensive doctrines are 
incompatible because doing so would be to agree to be subjected to inevitable and fude 
coercion. That is, if the demands of justice are beyond the motivational capacities or human 
beings or require commitments and behaviour whch reasonable citizens attached to 
reasonable ccbmprehensive doctrines could not fulfill, then citizens would inevitably face 
coercive action and, moreover, because changes in behaviour or attitude are either 
motivationally or doctrinally impossible, the coercion would serve no practical purpose. 
Thus, I conclude that because no rational or reasonable citizen would agree to unavoidable 
and pointless coercive action, only a conception of justice whch offered a solution to the 
problems of moti~~ational possiblltty and doctrinal compatiblltty could acheve legtimacy. 
That it will be dz@mIt to reahe demandmg principles might prompt citizens to take 
steps to protect themselves against exploitation in actual political life. In that sense the 
assurance problem is a problem of application, but not one of justice - that is, while it would 
be prudent to take steps to ensure that the motivated wdl not be exploited by the 
unmotivated (or the moral by the immoral), for example, the content of those measures 
should not affect the content of a defensible conception of justice. If such concessions are 
impermissible then the principles of justice d remain demandmg. But if those principles 
do not make demands that would break the h t s  of motivational possibihty or doctrinal 
compatibhty, then citizens might still agree that those principles best capture the conception 
of justice which should guide public political deliberation. 
Nevertheless, whlle the idea of normatively salient demands of realism and the ideals 
(rather than practice) of deliberative democracy and deliberative citizenshp go some way 
towards respondmg to the utopian objection, there is a deeper utopian objection to whch 
we must respond. Utopians might ask why we should be concerned with agreement and 
legtimacy in constructing principles of justice at all. Indeed, G.A. Cohen (2003) asks what 
legtimacy or the idea of agreement really add to the justness of principles of justice. 
Agreement or legtimacy are necessary because that is one way in whch a conception 
of justice can r e c o p e  and embody the idea that citizens ought to be regarded as free and 
equal members of a political community. Whlle principles of justice might appear to protect 
citizens' freedom w i h  a political sphere already regulated by the conception of justice, 
unless those citizens could be regarded as having actively agreed to that initial conception of 
justice, it is hard to see how we have really r e c o p e d  and respected the fact that they are to 
be treated as politically free. If one dunks that justice is somedung that exists prior to the 
experiences and activities of citizens in social and political life then one wdl hkely regard 
legtimacy and agreement as superfluous. But if one h k s  that justice is s o m e h g  shaped 
and reshaped in reflective equhbrium with the conmtions of our social and political lives as 
we find them, then legtimacy and agreement will matter to the justness of a conception of 
justice. 
VI. Conclusion: From Resignation to Hope 
Though we might hold that the ideals of deliberative democracy and deliberative citizenshp 
are not unrealistic, it might still be thought unlike4 that citizens will usually, or even 
occasionally, adopt the reflective attitude of deliberative citizens necessary to solve the 
problem of practical possibhty. Given the conact between what one might regard as 
rational in light of one's determinate interests, preferences, and beliefs and what would be 
regarded as reasonable, it might be too much to expect citizens to choose the reasonable 
c)TTer the rational when the two seem to conact. But whlle the conception of deliberative 
citizenshp might for that reason seem utopian, that does not make it pejoratively so. A 
realistically utopian conception of justice should respect the h t s  of what is practically 
possible, but it should maintain a critical attitude towards objectionable motives, beliefs, 
interests, preferences, and behaviour whch is commonplace but not unalterable. 
The issue, to repeat, is to consider just what role the demands of realism should play in 
theorizing about justice. I want to conclude by hlghhghting three &stinctions that, in one 
way or another, have weaved their way though the hssertation and that I maintain d help 
us answer that concern about the appropriate role of the demands of realism. 
The first is a &stkction between practical demands whch are fixed and practical 
demands whch are amenable to transformation. A conception of justice should respect the 
lmuts imposed by fixed constraints but it should not resign itself to those unattractive 
features of the world and determinate motives, interests, preferences, and beliefs whch are 
not part of the deep structure of human nature. In the hssertation I have defended the view 
that certain demands - such as a concern for freedom and a desire to pursue a reasonable 
conception of the good - should be acknowledged and accommodated by a conception of 
justice. But justice should not resign itself to the content of unreasonable worldviews - i.e., 
views held by citizens who insist on the exclusive truth of their views and who reject the 
need to offel. reasons for their claims that other reasonable citizens could endorse - or to 
unattractive and objectionable motives and interests. If such accommodations were even 
conceptually possible under condtions of ethlcal and religous pluralism, we would stdl have 
no reason to capitulate to the demands of unreasonable worldviews because that would force 
us to relmqujsh the emancipatory promise of justice. 
The second dsdnction that has left its mark here is a dstinction between principles of 
justice on the one hand and the applicatioion of those principles in real political life, on the 
other. Though we should strive to reahze the ideals of an amactive conception of justice 
when applying justice to existing societies, we should be sensitive to the practical constraints 
faced by contemporary democracies and adjust our expectations of feasible application as 
required. Indeed, it would be hghly desirable to provide guarantees to those who are 
determined to be just that their behaviour wdl not be exploited by citizens who are out to 
advance their own interests regardless of the effects on others. If such guarantees cannot be 
provided, it may be prudent to release otherwise justly motivated citizens from those 
requirements of justice whch require sigtllficant self-sacrifice and expose them to 
exploitation by the unjust. But releasing citizens from those demands for practical or 
prudential reasons in the application of principles of justice does not mean that the content 
of justice itself should be altered. Surely we can dstinguish between fair and unfair demands 
in practice without gving up on the idea that the demands of justice should retain their 
critical and emancipator). content. To be sure, the fact that we can even speak of releasing 
citizens from the obligations of justice under certain circumstances implies that the content 
of justice itself remains unchanged. 
Thus, political theory should refrain from accommodating the demands of realism in 
the construction of principles of justice except in those cases where the demands require 
accommodation as a matter of justice itself. In the dssertation I have defended the view 
that reasonable pluralism and normatively salient motives are such demands whereas 
unreasonable pluralism or the self-interested motivation whch produces the assurance 
problem and the desire for relative superiority over others, for example, are not. A 
conception of justice must accommodate the range of reasonable pluralism and normatively 
salient motives because they would emerge under otherwise well-ordered and just political 
arrangements, they are held by citizens who themselves as reasonable, and because they 
constitute interests whlch citizens would have as democratic &?em- and not merely as 
unreflective strategc actors. 
The final hstinction that has played a guidmg role in the hssertation is a dstinction 
between political optimism and pessimism, on the one hand, and political hope and despair, 
on the other. I defined political optimism in the introduction as the expectation that the 
society in which one lives d become more just over time. And I defined political 
pessimism, by contrast, as the view whch holds that a society not only wdl not become more 
just over tirnr, but as the expectation that it map even deteriorate from the perspective of 
justice. Yet, I have argued that we should not look to the ideas of political optimism and 
pessimism to gve us the parameters w i h  whch we should theorize about justice. Instead, 
I argued that we should be guided by an idea of political hope. Political hope is the view that 
a better world is possible, even if unhkely. It holds that the h t s  of human capacity have 
not yet been reached and that by furthering developing and exercising those capacities - 
especially the capacity to reflect on one's own motives, preferences, and interests and to 
change those when doing so would create a more just world - the possibhty of a just world 
is withm human reach. As Kant puts it, "man possesses a greater moral capacity, still 
dormant at present, to overcome eventually the evil principle withm hun (for he cannot deny 
that it exists), and to hope that others wdl do hkewise" (1970b: 103). M e  we need not 
endorse Kant's conviction that there is an evll principle in human nature,12' the hope he 
expresses for humanity is one that we should adopt as a gulde in political theory. 
Though some may regard the attempt to accommodate only normatively salient 
demands of realism and the reliance on a conception of deliberative citizenshp to solve the 
problem of practical possibhty as evidence of a najire political optimism, we should instead 
regard these h g s  as an attempt to construct an attractive conception of justice rooted in 
the hope that such a conception is simply possible. It is rooted in the hope that it is possible 
to sever the ':Thrasymachan h k  between power and justice. As Rawls puts it, "political 
philosophy is realistically utopian when it extends what are ordinam'b thought to be the h t s  of 
practicable political possibhty and, in so doing, reconciles us to our political and social 
condtion (1 '399b: 11. My emphasis). In short, a realistically utopian approach to justice 
h t s  its hopes only by what is in fact practically possible, not by what is politically probable 
nor by what is gven by the political status quo. If theorists of justice take their cues from an 
unjust political status quo, and regard that status quo as unalterable, then it is hard to see 
how theorizing about justice could produce anythmg more than a political theory of despair. 
Thus, a realistically utopian approach to principles of justice does not assume that all 
features of the world - that all human motives as they are currently found - are fixed. 
Indeed, in dunking about justice and the demands motivational and doctrinal compliance, as 
" W n  this conviction, however, see Kant (1960). 
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well as the demands of realism more generally, we would do well to remind ourselves of 
Beitz's thoughts about the possible and the impossible. Whde Beitz agrees that justice 
should not demand the impossible in the sense of demandmg that justice ignore or seek to 
oLTercome " impehents  that are unalterable or unavoidable", he maintains that 
" i m p e h e n t : ~  to change that are themselves capable of mohfication over h e "  should not 
be included in our notion of the impossible (1 999: 156). Slrmlarly, I have argued that we 
should not take as the h t s  of the possible the existing motives and beliefs of human 
beings; rather the h t s  of possibhty should be fixed only by what we might hope for. 
And what might we hope for? Given the h t s  of human capacity, we might hope for 
a conception of justice whch includes protections of citizens' freedom and equality as 
democratic citizens as well the rights and resources necessary for citizens to pursue 
reasonable cc.)nceptions of the good. Thus, we need not resign ourselves to the current array 
of objectionable preferences, interests, beliefs, and motives of human beings nor, for that 
matter to power inequalities and other unattractive features of the social and political status 
quo. Of course, the fact that we may hope for a conception of justice whch is not 
corrupted by objectionable features of human beings and the social and political status quo 
does not mean that we can be any less pessimistic or any more optimistic about the 
emergence of a just world than we might already have been. But it does permit us to avoid 
the politics of despair. And if Kant is right that when justice perishes, "there is no longer 
any value in human beings' living on earth" (1 996: 105) then avoidmg the politics of despair 
and pursuing a politics of hope might be our best chance for surr-lr~al and, perhaps, even our 
best chance for happiness. 

Bibliography 
Abers, R. (1 999). Practicing Radcal Democracy: Lessons from Brazil. Plutimondi, 1 (2), 67- 
82. 
An-N a7im, A. A. (1 990). Toward and IsIamic Refomation: Civil Libe&ies, Human Rzghts, and 
International Law. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. 
An-Na7im, A. A. (1 992). Toward a Cross-Cultural Approach to D e h g  International 
Standards of Human fights: The Meaning of Cruel, Inhuman, or Degradmg 
Treatment or Punishment. In A.A. An-Na'irn (Ed.), Human Rzghts in Cm-Cultural 
Perspectives: A Questfor Consensus. Phdadelpha: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Aristotle. (1 !?58). The Politics. London: Oxford University Press. 
Baier, K. (15199). Justice and the Aims of Political Philosophy. Ethics, 99, 771-790. 
Ba ynes, K. ('1 992). The Nomative Gromds o f  S o d  Cm'tinim: Kant ntwls, and Habemas. Albany: 
State University of New York Press. 
Beitz, C. (1 999). Political Theo y and International ReIations. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
Benhabib, S. (1 986). Cm'tique, N o m ,  and Utopia. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Benhabib, S. (1 992). Situating the Se& New York: Routledge. 
Benhabib, S. (2002). The Claims ofCultrre. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Benhabib, S, (Ed.). (1 996). Demoma9 and Dzfference: Contesting the Boundaries ofthe PoliticaL 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Benhabib, S. & Comell, D. (Eds.). (1 987). Feminism as Cm'tigue: Essays on the Por'itcs $Gender 
in Late-Capita& Societies. Mmneapolis: University of Mmnesota Press. 
Benhabib, S. & Dallmayr, F. (Eds.). (1990). The Communicative Ethics Conimversy. Cambridge: 
MIT Press. 
Be rh ,  I. (1 969). Four Essqs  on Lzbeq. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Blaug, R. (2000). Citizenslup and Political Judgment: Between Discourse E h c s  and 
Phmncszi. Res Pzthlica 6, 1 78- 1 98. 
Bohrnan, J. & Rehg, W. (Eds.). (1997). Deliberative Demomay: Essays on Reason and Politics. 
Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Bourcheu, P. (1 998). Practical Reason. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Bufacch, V. (2005). Motivating Justice. Contenporary PoliticalTheory, 4,25-41. 
Calhoun, C. (Ed.). (1 992). Habemas and the Public Sphere. Cambridge: The MIT Press. 
Camus, A. ('1 99 1). The Myth of Sisyphus. In A. Camus, The Myth ofSilf39hu.s and other essys. 
New York: Vintage International. 
Carr, E.H. (1 964). The Tweng Years' Criss, 19 19 - 1939. New York: Harper & Row. 
Cassirer, E. (1 954). The Question oflean-Jacques Rousseau. New York: Columbia University 
Press. 
Chambers, S. (1 996). Reasonable Democrag: Jiirgen Habemas and the Politics o f  Discourse. Ithaca: 
Comell University Press. 
Cohen, G. A. (2000). If Yotl 're an Egalitan'an, How Come You 're So fich? Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. 
Cohen, G. A. (2003). Rescuing Justice From Constructivism. (Unpublished MS). 
Cohen, G.A. (2003b). Facts and Principles. PhilosopLy and Public Affain 3 1 : 3 (Summer). 
Cohen, J. (1993). Moral pluralism and political consensus. In D. Copp, J. Harnpton & J. 
Roemer, (eds.) . The Idea o f  Democrag. Cambridge: Cambridge L-niversity Press. 
Cohen, J. (1 996). Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracv. In S. Benhabib 
(ed). Demomap and D@rence: Contesting the Boundaries ofthe ~o l i t i ck  Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Cohen, J. (1997). Deliberation and Democratic Legtimacy. In J. Bohman & W. Rehg 
(Eds .) . Deliberative Demomay Essqs on Reason and Politcs. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Cohen, J. (1 999). Reflections on Haberrnas and Democracy. Ratio Jmir, 12 (4), 385-41 6. 
Cohen, J. (2001). A Free Community of Equals. (Unpublished MS). 
Cohen, J. (2002) Takmg People as They Are? Philosop& eY Pub(icAffairs 30 (4), 363-386 
Cohen, J. (2003). For a Democratic Society. In S. Freeman (ed.). The Cambridge Companion 
to Rawls. Cambridge: Cambridge LJniversity Press. 
Cohen, 1. 8: Fyung, A. (1996). Introduction: Just Institutions. In Constitution, Demomap, and 
State 1)ower: The Institutions ofJustice. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Cohen, J. & Rogers, J. (1 995). Secondary Associations and Democratic Governance. In 
Wright, E.O. (Ed.). As~oriatons and Demomap. New York: Verso. 
Cronin, C & De Greiff, P. (1998). Introduction. In J. Habermas, The Inclusion ofthe Other. 
C. Cronin & P. De Greiff (Eds.). Cambridge, MIT Press. 
Dereaux, M. (2000). Culturai PluralFrm and Dilemmas OfJustice. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press. 
Dworkm, R. (2000). Sovere&n Iyirtzte: The Theo y and Practice ofEquali9. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. 
Els ter, J . (1 989). The Cement @Sobeg: A Study o f  Social Order. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Els ter, J . (Ed.). (1 998). Deliberative Demora~ .  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Estlund, D. (1998). Liberalism Equality, and Fraternity in Cohen's Critique of Rawls. The 
Joum~zl O f  Political Philosoply, 6 (I), 99-1 12. 
Farrellv, C. (12004). A n  Intmduction to Contempora y Political Theo y. London: Sage Publications. 
Freeman, S. (1 990). Reason and Agreement in Social Contract Views. Philoso& and Public 
Affairs, 19 (2), 122-157. 
Freeman, S. (2000). Deliberative Democracy: A Sympathetic Comment. Philos~phJ, and Public 
Afairs, 29 (4), 371-418. 
Freeman, S. (Ed.). (2003). The Cambridge Companion to Rawls. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Fung, A. & Wright, E.O. (Eds.). (2003). Deepening Demonay: Imtitutional Innovations in 
Empowered PadiczPato y Governance. London: Verso Press. 
Galston, W. (1 989). Pluralism and Social Unity. Ethics, 99, 71 1-726. 
Gauthler, D . (1 9 86). Morals By Agreement. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Gutrnann, ,4. & Thompson, D. (1 996). Democraq and Disagreement. Cambridge: Belknap. 
Gutmann, A & Thompson, D. (2004). K'hq' Deliberative Demonay? Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Habermas, J. (1 984). The Theo y ofCommt/nicative Action. Vol. 1. Thomas McCarthy, trans.. 
Boston: Beacon Press. 
Habermas, J. (1 987). The Tbeoy of CommtAnicative Action. \Jol. 2. Thomas McCarthp, trans.. 
Boston: Beacon Press. 
H abermas, J . (1 989). The Stmcturaal TranJfoomation Ofthe PuMic Sphere. T .  Burger (trans.). 
Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Habermas, J . (1 990). Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. C. Lenhardt & S. Weber 
Nicholsen, (trans.). Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Habermas, J. (1 993). Justtfication and Applcation: Remarks on Discourse Ethics. Cambridge: MIT 
Press. 
Habermas, J. (1 996). Between Facb and Noms.  W. Rehg (trans.). Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Habermas, J. (1 998). The Inclusion ofthe Other. C. Cronin & P. De Greiff (Eds.). Cambridge, 
MIT Press. 
Harmlton, A., Madson, J. &Jay, J. (1982). The Federalist Papers. G. Wdhs (Ed.). New York: 
Bantam Books. 
Hand, L. (1 952). The S ' t  c f L b e 9 .  New York: Knopf. 
Heath, J . (200 1). Communicative Action and Rational Choice. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Heath, J. (2002). The Eficient Sociep: W b  Canada is as Close to Utopia aJ it Gets. Toronto: 
Penguin Canada. 
Heath, 1. (2005). Rawls on Global Distributive Justice: A Defense. Forthcoming in D. 
Weins tock (Ed.). Canadian Journal o f  Philosophl, Supplementary Volume 29, Lethbridge: 
University of Calgary Press. 
Heath, J. (2005b). On the Scope of Egalitarian Justice. (Unpublished MS). 
Hegel, G. W. F.. (1967). phi lo sop^ ofRzght. T. M .  Knox (trans.). Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Hobbes, T. (1 968). Leviathan. C.B. Macpherson (Ed.). London: Penguin Books. 
Hobbes, T. (1 99 1). Leviathan. R. Tuck (Ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Holrnes, S. (1988). Precornmitment and the paradox of democracy. In J. Elster & R. 
Slagstad (Eds.) . Constitutionalism and Demomay. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Hume, D. (1078). A Treatise $Human Nature. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Ed.). Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 
Hume, D. (1983). A n  Enquiy Concerning the Prinriples ofn/orals. J. B. Schneewind (Ed.). 
Inhanapolis: Hackett. 
Hume, D. ( 1 8 5 )  Of the O r i p  of Government. In D. Hume, Essay: illoral, Political, and 
Lteraty. E.F. Mdler (Ed.). Inmanapolis: Liberty Classics. 
Kant, I. (1960). Religion Within the kmits ofReason Alone. T.  M. Greene & H. H. Hudson 
(trans.). New York: Harper & Row. 
JGint, I. (1970a). On the Common Saying: ' m s  May be True in Theory, but it does not 
Apply in Practice7. In I. Kant, Political Writings. H. Reiss (Ed.). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
IGnt, I. (1 970b). Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch. In I. Kant, Polilical Wm'tings. H. 
Reiss (Ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kant, I. (1 990a). Foundations oftbe Metdpbysics of Morals. L. W .  Beck (trans.). New York: 
MacMan .  
Kant, I. (1990b). Critigue $Pure Reason. J .  M. D. Melklejohn (trans.). New York 
Pronletheus Books. 
Kant, I. (1 9 3 )  Cn'tique $Practical Reason. L. W. Beck (trans.). New Jersey: Prentice Hall. 
Kant, I. (1 996). The Metapbysics $MoralJ. M. Gregor (Ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Kymhcka, W. (1989). Lberal Indvidualism and Lberal Neutrality. Ethics, 99, 883-905. 
Idarmore, C. (2003). Public Reason. In S. Freeman (Ed.). The Cambridge Companion to RawIs. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Lear, J. (1 998). Open-Minded: W70rktng Out the Logic $the SOHI. Cambridge: Han~ard 
University Press. 
I ~ m o s ,  R. M . (1 977). Romeau S- Political Philosopby: A n  E~position and Interpretation. Athens: 
University of Georga Press. 
I.ocke, J. (1980). Second Treatise ofGovemment. C.B. Macpherson (Ed.). Indanapolis: 
Hack.ett. 
Machavelk, N. (1979). The Portable MachiaveIli. P. Bondanella & M. Musa (Eds. and trans.). 
New York: Penguin. 
Manin, B. (1987). On Legtimacy and Political Deliberation. Politial Theoy, 15,3. 
Masters, R. D. (1 968). The Political Philosopby ~ R o m e a r / .  Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
McCarthj-, T. (1 990). Introduction. In J. Habermas. Moral Consciousness and Commz~nicative 
Action. C. Lenhardt & S. Weber Nicholsen, (trans.). Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Mendelberg, T. (2001). The Deliberative Citizen: Theory and Evidence. Forthcoming in M. 
D. Carpini, L. Huddy & R. Y. Shapiro (Eds.). Research in Micropolitcs, Volume 6. 
Elsevier Press. 
Mdl, J.S. (1 99 1). Utihtarianism. In J.S. Mdl, On L b e q  and Other Ess9.r. J. Gray (Ed.). 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
W e r ,  D. (1 999). Prinriples ofSocialJustlce. Cambridge: Han~ard University Press. 
Murphy, L. B. (1 999). Institutions and the Demands of Justice. phi lo sop^ e9 Public Affairs, 
27 (4:), 251-291. 
Niebuhr, R. (1 944). Children o f  Light and the Children of Darkness. Charles Scribner 's Sons. 
Retrieved June 30,2005, from the Religon-Onhe website: 
http: ,'/uW.religion-o~e.or~/showbook.asa?title=446. 
O h ,  S. (1 9 89). IIAstce, Gender, and the Family. Basic Books. 
O h ,  S. (1939). Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? In J. Cohen, M. Howard & M. C. 
Nussbaum (Eds.). Is Multicultura(irm Badfor Women? Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
O h ,  S. (2005). Multiculturalism and Feminism: No Simple Question, No Simple Answers. 
Forthcoming in A. Eisenberg & J. Spinner-Have1 (Eds.). Minom'ties wz'thin Minom'ties. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
P i h ,  H. (1 98 1). Justice: On Relating Private and Public. Political Theory, 9 (31, 327-352. 
Plato. (1 974'). Republic. G. M. A. Grube (Trans.). Indlanapolis: Hackett. 
Plato. (1 988). Laws. T. Pangle (Trans.). Chcago: University of Chcago Press. 
Pogge, T. (2000). On  the Site of Distributive Justice: Reflections on Cohen and Murphy. 
Phihopby dw PztblicAffaairs, 29 (2), 137-169. 
Popper, I<. ( 1 966). The Open Son'ety and Its Enemies, Volume I :  The Spell of Plato. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Rawls, J. (1 996). Political Lberahm. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Rawls, J. (1 999). Theo y ofJustice. Revised edltion. Cambridge: Han~ard University Press. 
Rawls, J. (1 999b). The L w  of Peoples. Cambridge: Han~ard University Press. 
Rawls, J. (1999~). The Idea of Public Reason Revisited. In J. Rawls, The Law $Peoples. 
Cambridge: Han~ard University Press. 
Rawls, J. (1999d). Collected Papers. S. Freeman (Ed.). Cambridge: Hanard University Press. 
Rawls, J. (2000). Lectures on the Historyof Moral PhilosophJi. B. Herman (Ed.). Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press. 
Rawls, 1. (200 1). Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. E. Kelly (Ed.). Cambridge: Belknap Press 
of Han~ard University Press. 
Rehg, W. (1 996). Translator's Introduction. In J. Habermas. Between Facts and Noms.  W .  
Rehg (Trans.). Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Rosenblatt, I-I. (1 99 7). Rousseau and Geneva. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Rostboll, C. F. (2005). Preferences and Paternalism: On Freedom and Deliberative 
Democracy-. Political Theo y, 33 (3), 370-396. 
Rousseau, J.J. (1 964). The FirJt and Second Disconrses. R. D. Masters (Ed. and trans.) & J. R. 
Masters (trans.). New York: St. Martin's Press. 
Rousseau, J.J. (1 968). Letter to  diAlembed on the Theatre. A. Bloom (Trans.). Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press. 
Rousseau, J .J. (1 978). On the S o d  Contract with Geneva Manusmipt and Political Economy. R. D. 
Masters (Ed.) & J.R. Masters (Trans.). New York: St. Martin's Press. 
Rousseau, J.J. (1 985). The Government ofPoland. W .  Kendall (Trans.). Inhanapolis: Hackett. 
Rousseau, J .J. (1 986). . First and Second DiJconrses and Essay on the Origin of  Languagees. V .  
Gourevitch (Ed. & trans.). New York: Harper & Row. 
Rousseau, J.J. (1987). Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men. 
In J .J. Rousseau, The Basic Political Wm'tings. D.A. Cress (Trans.). Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishmg Company. 
Rousseau, J.J. (1 993). Emile. B. Foxley (Trans.). London: Everyman. 
Sandel, M. (1.982). Lzberalism and the hemimits .fJusstice. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.. 
Saramago, J. (1 997). Blindness. San Diego: Harcourt. 
Scanlon, T.M .. (1 998). What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge: Belknap. 
Scheuerman, W. E. (1999). Between Ra&calism and Resignation: Democratic Theory in 
Habe.mas7s Between Facts and Nom. In P. Dews (Ed.). ha be ma^: A Critical Reader. 
Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 
Shapiro, I. (2003). The State ofDemomatic Theory. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Shklar, J . (1 069). Men and Citi2en.r: A S t u 4  o f  Romeau 'J Sorial Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Talmon, J.L. (1952). The h e  of Totalitam'an Demomay. Boston: The Beacon Press. 
17emon, R. (2001). Political Moralip: A Theo ry ofLberal Demomay. London: Continuum. 
Whlte, S. (2003). The Civic Minimum: On the Rghts and Obl&ations ofEconomic Citi~ensb$. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
WiUlams, A. (1998). Incentives, Inequality, and Publicity. Pillo~opky dw PublicAffairs, 27 (3), 
225-247. 
Wdhams, B. (1 98 1). Moral Luck Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Wfiams, B. (1 985). Ethics and the Lzmits of PhiIosophJ,. Cambridge, M A :  Harvard University 
Press. 
Wokler, R. (1 995). Rousseau. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Wolff, J .  (1998). Fairness, Respect, and the Egalitarian Ethos. Philosopby & Public Affairs, 27 
(2), 99-122. 
